Step 2: Normative Requirements Pass (Discussion Section)
Extract principles, obligations, constraints, and capabilities from the discussion section
Acknowledging Errors in Design
Step 2 of 5
Discussion Section
Section Content:
Discussion: This case addresses two ethical issues in engineering practice: to what extent are design engineers obligated to account for construction safety risks in their designs if they are not trained or have experience in construction safety methods, and are engineers obligated by the NSPE Code of Ethics to “acknowledge errors” when it is not clear an error has been made. The first issue, having to do with considering construction safety risks in the design, can be approached from both a legal/contractual (i.e., risk management) perspective and from an ethical perspective. On the legal/contractual side, many professional engineers familiar with construction contracts believe contract language sufficiently settles the matter. They point to standard construction contract provisions such as, “Contractor shall be solely responsible for the means, methods, techniques, sequences, and procedures of construction” (Engineers Joint Contract Documents Committee [EJCDC], C-700, Standard General Conditions of the Construction Contract, Article 7, Paragraph 7.01A). The construction contracts also include provisions identifying the Contractor’s sole responsibility for initiating, maintaining, and supervising all safety programs and precautions (Article 7, Paragraph 7.13A), for obtaining additional services as needed to carry out Contractor’s safety responsibilities (Article 7, Paragraph 7.01B), and for taking necessary precautions for safety and providing necessary protection to prevent damage, injury, or loss to all persons on the site who may be affected by the work (Article 7, Paragraph 7.13C). Through these legal/contractual mechanisms, risk and responsibility for worker safety during construction are formally transferred to the contractor, the contractor being the party best positioned to provide for project safety. By this view, and with reference to the present case, the contractor is solely responsible for project safety, so Engineer T did not make any design error so long as the design met the professional standard of care (which the facts suggest it did). But engineers must also consider the ethical perspective, and that is the primary area of concern for the Board of Ethical Review. Ethically, the facts of this case reveal a tension between the engineer doing what is professionally required, versus ”going above and beyond” in the interest of the public health, safety, and welfare. The Board has considered this ethical tension in various ways over the years. BER Case 97-13 introduces Engineer A, a civil engineer, who serves as a subconsultant to perform bridge inspection services on a major bridge overhaul project. Engineer A’s scope of work is solely to identify any pavement damage on the bridge and report the damage to its client, VWX Architects. While conducting the bridge inspection, and although not part of the scope of services for which he was retained, Engineer A notices an apparent pre-existing defective condition in a retaining wall which failed to restrain a vehicle, leading to a fatal accident involving Police Officer B. Engineer A surmises that the defective condition may have been a contributing factor in the wall failure and notes this in the engineering notes. Engineer A verbally reports this information to the client, which then verbally reports the information to the public agency. In finding it was ethical for Engineer A to retain the information in the engineering notes, but not include it in the final written report, the Board noted that Engineer A did the appropriate thing in coming forward to the client with the information and also by documenting the information for possible future reference as appropriate. But under the circumstances “it would have been improper for Engineer A to include reference to the information in his final report, particularly since it would have been based upon mere speculation and not careful testing or evaluation by a competent individual or firm.” In fact, the Board opined that had Engineer A formally “reported” the matter publicly, it would have been “an overreaction and could easily have risked jeopardizing the professional reputations of [Engineer A’s] client and the public agency.” The key finding from Case 97-13 is that the public welfare was best served by Engineer A exercising restraint in reporting. This parallels the current case, where Engineer A identified a safety risk in the design details, but per customary professional practice relied on the contractor (who had specific construction safety expertise) to address the issue. A second example is BER Case 21-2 , where a second Engineer A serves as a consulting engineer representing Client B, a developer who is proposing to develop a healthcare facility that requires a significant upgrade to the property’s access road that crosses a tidal saltmarsh. Engineer A’s scope includes design and local permitting of the roadway, including an upgrade of the tidal crossing from a small culvert to a small bridge, increasing its hydraulic capacity. The local development regulations and national design codes and standards have not yet been updated to reflect changing conditions and weather patterns, including effects of sea level rise and changes in precipitation intensities and recurrence intervals effected by on-going climate change. It is Engineer A’s judgment, based on hydraulic evaluation procedures presented at a recent transportation agency conference, that the proposed project may result in some upstream homes becoming uninhabitable a decade or more earlier than would otherwise be the case. Engineer A proposes a complex and costly hydrologic and hydraulic analysis by a specialized subconsultant to predict the extent to which sea level rise and the increased hydraulic capacity of the tidal crossing will result in flood damage to a neighborhood of twenty upstream homes during future high tides and storm surges, anticipating this to be a difficult question to answer in the project’s public hearings. Client B directs Engineer A to proceed without the costly analysis unless and until such an analysis is requested by the applicable regulatory authorities. In this case, the BER found that “if Engineer A is reasonably certain that the project will result in adverse impacts to public health, safety, and welfare, and if the Client B denies the requisite evaluation, Engineer A should include the concern regarding potential adverse public health, safety, and welfare impacts in an engineering report for consideration by regulatory agencies and the public.” Thus, the key finding from Case 21-2 is that the public welfare was best served by Engineer A reporting the public health, safety, and welfare concerns, even if the client did not wish for this to be done. This differs from the current case, not because public health, safety, and welfare is somehow less important now than in Case 21-2 , but because a project delivery process exists in this case by which it was accepted professional practice for Engineer A to complete the structural design, and rely on the contractor to handle safety aspects of construction. The Engineer A from Case 21-2 did not have this option. Finally, there is BER Case 02-5 where a third Engineer A, a structural engineer with experience in the design of structures in the region in which the current project is located, designed a structural system that Engineer A believed was sound and met applicable codes. However, new and improved design methods had recently been suggested in an article published in a technical journal, addressing new information regarding severe weather design in that region. Engineer A had not read that technical journal article. Within a year following construction, the building was damaged by severe weather conditions. It was determined that had the methods suggested in the technical articles been utilized in design, the damage would not have occurred. The BER concluded that it was not unethical for Engineer A to fail to follow methods suggested in a recent technical journal article that Engineer A had not reviewed. The BER indicated that they believed that the definition of what is “current practice” must be discerning and reasonable. The key finding from Case 02-5 was that engineers cannot be expected (obligated) to incorporate each and every new, innovative technique until such techniques are incorporated into generally accepted practice and become standards that should be followed. Engineer T (in the current case) and Engineer A ( Case 02-5 ) both followed accepted standard design practice. But these same engineers also had the opportunity (not obligation) to take the public welfare more firmly into account, to go above and beyond what was legally and ethically required. While they cannot be ethically faulted for not “going the extra mile” for the sake of the public health, safety, and welfare, the project outcomes likely would have been better if these engineers had done so. In hindsight, knowing the outcomes, the BER believes all parties would have wanted to at least consider the opportunity. Collectively, the prior BER Cases reveal several principles to guide the engineer relative to the ethics of the situation. First, the engineer must hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public. Second, engineers must be competent in their areas of service. Third, engineers must be honest, and issue public statements only in an objective and truthful manner. Fourth, the engineer must acknowledge their errors and not distort or alter the facts. These ethical obligations are required, and non-negotiable. So it is within this context that the engineer must determine how best to satisfy their obligations. The facts of the present case do not raise concerns about Engineer T’s competence in performing structural engineering design work. Further, Engineer T’s structural modification approach appears to have been straightforward, professionally designed, and properly presented in the construction documents. Not only this, but the design specifically mentions that the new structural connections were located in such a way that access was limited. These points demonstrate proper awareness and consideration of public safety, health, and welfare. When the design was completed, the facts imply Engineer T relied on the contractor to provide for worker safety during construction, and formally transferred this risk and responsibility via standard contractual language. Further, the facts indicate the contractor accepted the construction risk and responsibility without any question. On this basis, the facts do not suggest Engineer T made a design error. As with Engineer A in Case 97-13 , the fact that Engineer T (this present case) noticed after the accident that an alternative design approach could have prevented the worker injury does not mean that Engineer T was required to report this as an error. But the question remains – similar to Case 21-2 and Case 02-5 – whether Engineer T did all that could have been done for worker safety? After all, the solution approach Engineer T followed for this project did include an unusual and challenging construction aspect. Was it enough simply to call attention to this and shift safety responsibility to the contractor? Case 21-2 suggests it would have been ethically appropriate (an opportunity, not an obligation) for Engineer T to identify not just the straightforward design alternative, but also the more involved structural modification concept, to identify and discuss the benefits and drawbacks of both options, and to place these matters before the client and other members of the design team, possibly including the contractor, early in the process. Another option would have been for Engineer T to request a constructability review, or an independent construction safety review, or to inquire whether the contractor’s construction safety plan had flagged the heightened safety risk. If so, perhaps the issue would have been raised and alternatives might have been addressed. But Engineer T did not actively seek this input, and perhaps that is why Engineer T “felt some personal responsibility for the accident.” But was this an “error?” Did Engineer T and/or Engineer B deviate from ethical engineering practice under the facts? The BER affirms the “ethical high road” of considering more than one design approach, and certainly the BER would agree with seeking critical input from construction safety professionals. But as in Case 02-5 , the BER does not view Engineer T’s design as unethical. While the construction accident and worker injury are tragic outcomes, because Engineer T’s design approach represented professional practice consistent with the standard of care, the BER sees this more as a missed opportunity than an ethical lapse and concludes that no “error” was made in design. Was it ethical for Engineer T not to acknowledge an error after the accident occurred? The facts of this case and especially the discussion between Engineer T and Engineer B, as well as the legal/contractual perspective and ethical considerations outlined above, provide a rationale as to why Engineer T’s design was not an “error.” Because there was no error, Engineer T was not ethically obligated to acknowledge an error after the accident occurred. However, the BER believes this project was a missed opportunity for Engineer T to more fully and carefully hold paramount the public safety, health, and welfare. The BER believes Engineer T should state that while no error was made, based on hindsight, other ways to approach the project existed which may have prevented the accident and worker injury. The view is consistent with ethics provisions that require engineers to be objective and truthful in professional reports, statements, or testimony; that engineers include all relevant and pertinent information, that they not distort or alter the facts, and avoid the use of statements containing a material misrepresentation of fact or omitting a material fact; and that they accept personal responsibility for their professional activities. Such conversation will not only allow Engineer T’s firm and others to benefit from lessons learned through this very difficult experience but will also promote continued professional development relative to projects of this type. Was it ethical for Engineer T not to acknowledge an error during the deposition? Again, using the same analysis presented above, the BER concludes that Engineer T’s design was not an “error.” Because there was no error, Engineer T was not ethically obligated to acknowledge an error during the deposition. Engineer T should respond clearly and honestly when questioned about the project, including T’s views on alternative design approaches vis-à-vis the public safety, health, and welfare, but should not characterize the work as a design error.
Principles Extraction
LLM Prompt
DUAL PRINCIPLE EXTRACTION - Ethical Principles Analysis
THEORETICAL CONTEXT (Chapter 2.2.2):
- Principles are ABSTRACT ethical foundations requiring extensional definition through cases
- They function like constitutional principles - open-textured and requiring interpretation
- Principles mediate moral ideals into concrete reality through context-specific application
- They cannot be applied deductively but require balancing and interpretation
EXISTING PRINCIPLE CLASSES IN ONTOLOGY:
- Competence Principle: Balances professional autonomy with recognition of limitations and need for collaboration.
- Confidentiality Principle: Must be balanced against public safety obligations and legal disclosure requirements.
- Domain-Specific Principle: Examples: Environmental Stewardship (engineering), Patient Autonomy (medicine), Academic Freedom (education). These address domain-specific ethical ch
- Environmental Stewardship Principle: Bridges engineering practice with broader environmental and societal responsibilities.
- Ethical Principle: Legacy synonym for Principle. Use :Principle for new concepts.
- Fundamental Ethical Principle: Examples: Public Welfare Paramount, Respect for Persons, Justice, Beneficence. These require extensive interpretation and balancing in specific contex
- Integrity Principle: Central to professional identity formation and trust maintenance in professional relationships.
- Principle: An information content entity representing ethical values and guidelines for conduct. This is the P component of the formal specification D=(R,P,O,S,R
- Principle Argument: An argument based on fundamental ethical principles or values.
- Principle Refinement: Capability to evolve principles as inconsistencies are resolved and new cases are added (GenEth system, Anderson & Anderson 2018)
- Professional Virtue Principle: Examples: Integrity, Competence, Honesty, Professional Courage, Accountability. These shape professional character and decision-making.
- Public Welfare Principle: Requires contextual interpretation to balance against client confidentiality and employer loyalty when public safety is at risk.
- Relational Principle: Examples: Confidentiality, Loyalty, Fairness, Transparency, Respect for Autonomy. These govern interpersonal professional dynamics.
- Transparency Principle: Essential for maintaining trust and enabling stakeholder participation in professional decisions.
=== TASK ===
From the following case text (discussion section), extract information at TWO levels:
LEVEL 1 - NEW PRINCIPLE CLASSES: Identify ethical principles that appear to be NEW types not covered by existing classes above. Look for:
- Fundamental ethical values being invoked
- Abstract moral ideals guiding decisions
- Constitutional-like principles requiring interpretation
- Values that transcend specific rules or obligations
For each NEW principle class, provide:
- label: Clear principle name (e.g., "Environmental Stewardship", "Professional Autonomy")
- definition: What moral ideal this principle represents
- abstract_nature: The abstract ethical foundation (justice, welfare, autonomy, etc.)
- extensional_examples: Concrete cases/situations where this principle applies
- value_basis: Core moral value underlying the principle
- application_context: Professional domains or situations where relevant
- operationalization: How this abstract principle becomes concrete in practice
- balancing_requirements: What other principles it typically must be balanced against
- examples_from_case: How this principle appears in the case text
LEVEL 2 - PRINCIPLE INDIVIDUALS: Identify specific instances where principles are invoked or applied. For each instance:
- identifier: Unique identifier for this principle instance (e.g., "PublicSafety_Case8_Discussion")
- principle_class: Which principle class it instantiates (use existing classes when possible)
- concrete_expression: EXACT text showing how the principle is expressed
- invoked_by: Who invokes or appeals to this principle
- applied_to: What decision/situation/dilemma it applies to
- interpretation: How the principle is interpreted in this specific context
- balancing_with: Other principles that must be balanced against it
- tension_resolution: How conflicts between principles are resolved
- case_relevance: Why this principle matters in this specific case
IMPORTANT:
- Focus on ABSTRACT ethical foundations, not specific rules or procedures
- Principles are broader than obligations - they generate obligations in context
- Use EXACT quotes from case text where principles are expressed
- Distinguish between the abstract principle CLASS and its concrete APPLICATION
CASE TEXT:
This case addresses two ethical issues in engineering practice: to what extent are design engineers obligated to account for construction safety risks in their designs if they are not trained or have experience in construction safety methods, and are engineers obligated by the NSPE Code of Ethics to “acknowledge errors” when it is not clear an error has been made.
The first issue, having to do with considering construction safety risks in the design, can be approached from both a legal/contractual (i.e., risk management) perspective and from an ethical perspective. On the legal/contractual side, many professional engineers familiar with construction contracts believe contract language sufficiently settles the matter. They point to standard construction contract provisions such as, “Contractor shall be solely responsible for the means, methods, techniques, sequences, and procedures of construction” (Engineers Joint Contract Documents Committee [EJCDC], C-700, Standard General Conditions of the Construction Contract, Article 7, Paragraph 7.01A). The construction contracts also include provisions identifying the Contractor’s sole responsibility for initiating, maintaining, and supervising all safety programs and precautions (Article 7, Paragraph 7.13A), for obtaining additional services as needed to carry out Contractor’s safety responsibilities (Article 7, Paragraph 7.01B), and for taking necessary precautions for safety and providing necessary protection to prevent damage, injury, or loss to all persons on the site who may be affected by the work (Article 7, Paragraph 7.13C). Through these legal/contractual mechanisms, risk and responsibility for worker safety during construction are formally transferred to the contractor, the contractor being the party best positioned to provide for project safety. By this view, and with reference to the present case, the contractor is solely responsible for project safety, so Engineer T did not make any design error so long as the design met the professional standard of care (which the facts suggest it did).
But engineers must also consider the ethical perspective, and that is the primary area of concern for the Board of Ethical Review. Ethically, the facts of this case reveal a tension between the engineer doing what is professionally required, versus ”going above and beyond” in the interest of the public health, safety, and welfare. The Board has considered this ethical tension in various ways over the years.
BER Case 97-13 introduces Engineer A, a civil engineer, who serves as a subconsultant to perform bridge inspection services on a major bridge overhaul project. Engineer A’s scope of work is solely to identify any pavement damage on the bridge and report the damage to its client, VWX Architects. While conducting the bridge inspection, and although not part of the scope of services for which he was retained, Engineer A notices an apparent pre-existing defective condition in a retaining wall which failed to restrain a vehicle, leading to a fatal accident involving Police Officer B. Engineer A surmises that the defective condition may have been a contributing factor in the wall failure and notes this in the engineering notes. Engineer A verbally reports this information to the client, which then verbally reports the information to the public agency. In finding it was ethical for Engineer A to retain the information in the engineering notes, but not include it in the final written report, the Board noted that Engineer A did the appropriate thing in coming forward to the client with the information and also by documenting the information for possible future reference as appropriate. But under the circumstances “it would have been improper for Engineer A to include reference to the information in his final report, particularly since it would have been based upon mere speculation and not careful testing or evaluation by a competent individual or firm.” In fact, the Board opined that had Engineer A formally “reported” the matter publicly, it would have been “an overreaction and could easily have risked jeopardizing the professional reputations of [Engineer A’s] client and the public agency.” The key finding from Case 97-13 is that the public welfare was best served by Engineer A exercising restraint in reporting. This parallels the current case, where Engineer A identified a safety risk in the design details, but per customary professional practice relied on the contractor (who had specific construction safety expertise) to address the issue.
A second example is BER Case 21-2 , where a second Engineer A serves as a consulting engineer representing Client B, a developer who is proposing to develop a healthcare facility that requires a significant upgrade to the property’s access road that crosses a tidal saltmarsh. Engineer A’s scope includes design and local permitting of the roadway, including an upgrade of the tidal crossing from a small culvert to a small bridge, increasing its hydraulic capacity. The local development regulations and national design codes and standards have not yet been updated to reflect changing conditions and weather patterns, including effects of sea level rise and changes in precipitation intensities and recurrence intervals effected by on-going climate change. It is Engineer A’s judgment, based on hydraulic evaluation procedures presented at a recent transportation agency conference, that the proposed project may result in some upstream homes becoming uninhabitable a decade or more earlier than would otherwise be the case. Engineer A proposes a complex and costly hydrologic and hydraulic analysis by a specialized subconsultant to predict the extent to which sea level rise and the increased hydraulic capacity of the tidal crossing will result in flood damage to a neighborhood of twenty upstream homes during future high tides and storm surges, anticipating this to be a difficult question to answer in the project’s public hearings. Client B directs Engineer A to proceed without the costly analysis unless and until such an analysis is requested by the applicable regulatory authorities. In this case, the BER found that “if Engineer A is reasonably certain that the project will result in adverse impacts to public health, safety, and welfare, and if the Client B denies the requisite evaluation, Engineer A should include the concern regarding potential adverse public health, safety, and welfare impacts in an engineering report for consideration by regulatory agencies and the public.” Thus, the key finding from Case 21-2 is that the public welfare was best served by Engineer A reporting the public health, safety, and welfare concerns, even if the client did not wish for this to be done. This differs from the current case, not because public health, safety, and welfare is somehow less important now than in Case 21-2 , but because a project delivery process exists in this case by which it was accepted professional practice for Engineer A to complete the structural design, and rely on the contractor to handle safety aspects of construction. The Engineer A from Case 21-2 did not have this option.
Finally, there is BER Case 02-5 where a third Engineer A, a structural engineer with experience in the design of structures in the region in which the current project is located, designed a structural system that Engineer A believed was sound and met applicable codes. However, new and improved design methods had recently been suggested in an article published in a technical journal, addressing new information regarding severe weather design in that region. Engineer A had not read that technical journal article. Within a year following construction, the building was damaged by severe weather conditions. It was determined that had the methods suggested in the technical articles been utilized in design, the damage would not have occurred. The BER concluded that it was not unethical for Engineer A to fail to follow methods suggested in a recent technical journal article that Engineer A had not reviewed. The BER indicated that they believed that the definition of what is “current practice” must be discerning and reasonable. The key finding from Case 02-5 was that engineers cannot be expected (obligated) to incorporate each and every new, innovative technique until such techniques are incorporated into generally accepted practice and become standards that should be followed. Engineer T (in the current case) and Engineer A ( Case 02-5 ) both followed accepted standard design practice. But these same engineers also had the opportunity (not obligation) to take the public welfare more firmly into account, to go above and beyond what was legally and ethically required. While they cannot be ethically faulted for not “going the extra mile” for the sake of the public health, safety, and welfare, the project outcomes likely would have been better if these engineers had done so. In hindsight, knowing the outcomes, the BER believes all parties would have wanted to at least consider the opportunity.
Collectively, the prior BER Cases reveal several principles to guide the engineer relative to the ethics of the situation. First, the engineer must hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public. Second, engineers must be competent in their areas of service. Third, engineers must be honest, and issue public statements only in an objective and truthful manner. Fourth, the engineer must acknowledge their errors and not distort or alter the facts. These ethical obligations are required, and non-negotiable. So it is within this context that the engineer must determine how best to satisfy their obligations. The facts of the present case do not raise concerns about Engineer T’s competence in performing structural engineering design work. Further, Engineer T’s structural modification approach appears to have been straightforward, professionally designed, and properly presented in the construction documents. Not only this, but the design specifically mentions that the new structural connections were located in such a way that access was limited. These points demonstrate proper awareness and consideration of public safety, health, and welfare. When the design was completed, the facts imply Engineer T relied on the contractor to provide for worker safety during construction, and formally transferred this risk and responsibility via standard contractual language. Further, the facts indicate the contractor accepted the construction risk and responsibility without any question. On this basis, the facts do not suggest Engineer T made a design error. As with Engineer A in Case 97-13 , the fact that Engineer T (this present case) noticed after the accident that an alternative design approach could have prevented the worker injury does not mean that Engineer T was required to report this as an error.
But the question remains – similar to Case 21-2 and Case 02-5 – whether Engineer T did all that could have been done for worker safety? After all, the solution approach Engineer T followed for this project did include an unusual and challenging construction aspect. Was it enough simply to call attention to this and shift safety responsibility to the contractor? Case 21-2 suggests it would have been ethically appropriate (an opportunity, not an obligation) for Engineer T to identify not just the straightforward design alternative, but also the more involved structural modification concept, to identify and discuss the benefits and drawbacks of both options, and to place these matters before the client and other members of the design team, possibly including the contractor, early in the process. Another option would have been for Engineer T to request a constructability review, or an independent construction safety review, or to inquire whether the contractor’s construction safety plan had flagged the heightened safety risk. If so, perhaps the issue would have been raised and alternatives might have been addressed. But Engineer T did not actively seek this input, and perhaps that is why Engineer T “felt some personal responsibility for the accident.”
But was this an “error?” Did Engineer T and/or Engineer B deviate from ethical engineering practice under the facts? The BER affirms the “ethical high road” of considering more than one design approach, and certainly the BER would agree with seeking critical input from construction safety professionals. But as in Case 02-5 , the BER does not view Engineer T’s design as unethical. While the construction accident and worker injury are tragic outcomes, because Engineer T’s design approach represented professional practice consistent with the standard of care, the BER sees this more as a missed opportunity than an ethical lapse and concludes that no “error” was made in design.
Was it ethical for Engineer T not to acknowledge an error after the accident occurred? The facts of this case and especially the discussion between Engineer T and Engineer B, as well as the legal/contractual perspective and ethical considerations outlined above, provide a rationale as to why Engineer T’s design was not an “error.” Because there was no error, Engineer T was not ethically obligated to acknowledge an error after the accident occurred. However, the BER believes this project was a missed opportunity for Engineer T to more fully and carefully hold paramount the public safety, health, and welfare.
The BER believes Engineer T should state that while no error was made, based on hindsight, other ways to approach the project existed which may have prevented the accident and worker injury. The view is consistent with ethics provisions that require engineers to be objective and truthful in professional reports, statements, or testimony; that engineers include all relevant and pertinent information, that they not distort or alter the facts, and avoid the use of statements containing a material misrepresentation of fact or omitting a material fact; and that they accept personal responsibility for their professional activities. Such conversation will not only allow Engineer T’s firm and others to benefit from lessons learned through this very difficult experience but will also promote continued professional development relative to projects of this type.
Was it ethical for Engineer T not to acknowledge an error during the deposition? Again, using the same analysis presented above, the BER concludes that Engineer T’s design was not an “error.” Because there was no error, Engineer T was not ethically obligated to acknowledge an error during the deposition. Engineer T should respond clearly and honestly when questioned about the project, including T’s views on alternative design approaches vis-à-vis the public safety, health, and welfare, but should not characterize the work as a design error.
Respond with valid JSON in this format:
{
"new_principle_classes": [
{
"label": "Sustainable Development",
"definition": "Principle that engineering solutions must balance current needs with long-term environmental and societal impacts",
"abstract_nature": "Intergenerational justice and environmental stewardship",
"extensional_examples": ["Green building design", "Renewable energy projects", "Resource conservation"],
"value_basis": "Responsibility to future generations",
"application_context": ["Infrastructure projects", "Environmental engineering", "Urban planning"],
"operationalization": "Through environmental impact assessments, lifecycle analysis, sustainable design criteria",
"balancing_requirements": ["Economic feasibility", "Immediate safety needs", "Client requirements"],
"examples_from_case": ["Engineer considered long-term environmental impacts", "balanced immediate needs with sustainability"],
"source_text": "Engineer considered long-term environmental impacts and balanced immediate needs with sustainability"
}
],
"principle_individuals": [
{
"identifier": "PublicSafety_Case8_Facts",
"principle_class": "Public Safety",
"concrete_expression": "the safety of the public must be held paramount",
"invoked_by": ["Engineer L"],
"applied_to": ["stormwater management system design"],
"interpretation": "Safety considerations override cost savings in drainage design",
"source_text": "the safety of the public must be held paramount",
"balancing_with": ["Cost Efficiency", "Client Interests"],
"tension_resolution": "Safety takes precedence even if it increases project costs",
"case_relevance": "Critical for evaluating adequacy of proposed drainage solution"
}
]
}
Saved: 2025-12-20 13:42
LLM Response
```json
{
"new_principle_classes": [
{
"label": "Professional Prudence",
"definition": "Principle that engineers should proactively consider and address foreseeable risks beyond minimum legal and professional requirements",
"abstract_nature": "Precautionary responsibility and risk anticipation",
"extensional_examples": ["Seeking constructability reviews", "Requesting safety assessments", "Considering alternative designs for safety"],
"value_basis": "Proactive protection of public welfare",
"application_context": ["Complex construction projects", "Novel design situations", "High-risk engineering activities"],
"operationalization": "Through voluntary safety reviews, seeking additional expert input, presenting multiple design alternatives",
"balancing_requirements": ["Professional standard of care", "Contractual obligations", "Economic efficiency"],
"examples_from_case": ["it would have been ethically appropriate (an opportunity, not an obligation) for Engineer T to identify not just the straightforward design alternative, but also the more involved structural modification concept"],
"source_text": "it would have been ethically appropriate (an opportunity, not an obligation) for Engineer T to identify not just the straightforward design alternative, but also the more involved structural modification concept"
},
{
"label": "Contextual Restraint",
"definition": "Principle that engineers should exercise appropriate restraint in reporting when speculation could harm professional reputations without serving public welfare",
"abstract_nature": "Balanced transparency and professional judgment",
"extensional_examples": ["Not including speculative findings in formal reports", "Verbal reporting of concerns outside scope", "Documenting observations for future reference"],
"value_basis": "Responsible professional communication",
"application_context": ["Incident investigations", "Scope-limited assessments", "Professional reporting"],
"operationalization": "Through careful distinction between speculation and verified findings, appropriate documentation practices",
"balancing_requirements": ["Transparency obligations", "Public welfare", "Professional reputation protection"],
"examples_from_case": ["The key finding from Case 97-13 is that the public welfare was best served by Engineer A exercising restraint in reporting"],
"source_text": "The key finding from Case 97-13 is that the public welfare was best served by Engineer A exercising restraint in reporting"
}
],
"principle_individuals": [
{
"identifier": "PublicWelfare_Primary_Discussion",
"principle_class": "Public Welfare Principle",
"concrete_expression": "the engineer must hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public",
"invoked_by": ["Board of Ethical Review"],
"applied_to": ["Engineer T's design decisions and post-accident response"],
"interpretation": "Public welfare is the overriding consideration but must be balanced with professional standards and contractual frameworks",
"source_text": "the engineer must hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public",
"balancing_with": ["Competence Principle", "Professional standard of care"],
"tension_resolution": "Public welfare remains paramount but is satisfied through accepted professional practice",
"case_relevance": "Central to evaluating whether Engineer T acted ethically in design and post-accident response"
},
{
"identifier": "Competence_EngineerT_Discussion",
"principle_class": "Competence Principle",
"concrete_expression": "engineers must be competent in their areas of service",
"invoked_by": ["Board of Ethical Review"],
"applied_to": ["Engineer T's structural engineering work"],
"interpretation": "Competence in structural design does not require expertise in construction safety methods",
"source_text": "engineers must be competent in their areas of service",
"balancing_with": ["Public Welfare Principle", "Professional scope limitations"],
"tension_resolution": "Competence is domain-specific; engineers can rely on other professionals for expertise outside their domain",
"case_relevance": "Establishes that Engineer T was competent in structural design despite lack of construction safety expertise"
},
{
"identifier": "Integrity_ErrorAcknowledgment_Discussion",
"principle_class": "Integrity Principle",
"concrete_expression": "the engineer must acknowledge their errors and not distort or alter the facts",
"invoked_by": ["Board of Ethical Review"],
"applied_to": ["Engineer T's response to the accident and deposition"],
"interpretation": "Obligation to acknowledge errors only applies when an actual error has been made",
"source_text": "the engineer must acknowledge their errors and not distort or alter the facts",
"balancing_with": ["Truthfulness obligation", "Professional judgment"],
"tension_resolution": "No error to acknowledge if design met professional standards",
"case_relevance": "Critical for determining Engineer T's ethical obligations post-accident"
},
{
"identifier": "Transparency_Truthfulness_Discussion",
"principle_class": "Transparency Principle",
"concrete_expression": "engineers must be honest, and issue public statements only in an objective and truthful manner",
"invoked_by": ["Board of Ethical Review"],
"applied_to": ["Engineer T's statements about the accident"],
"interpretation": "Requires honest discussion of alternatives without mischaracterizing work as error",
"source_text": "engineers must be honest, and issue public statements only in an objective and truthful manner",
"balancing_with": ["Error acknowledgment obligation", "Professional reputation"],
"tension_resolution": "Be truthful about missed opportunities without falsely admitting error",
"case_relevance": "Guides how Engineer T should discuss the project in deposition and reports"
},
{
"identifier": "PublicWelfare_AboveBeyond_Discussion",
"principle_class": "Public Welfare Principle",
"concrete_expression": "going above and beyond in the interest of the public health, safety, and welfare",
"invoked_by": ["Board of Ethical Review"],
"applied_to": ["Engineer T's design approach choices"],
"interpretation": "Public welfare creates opportunities for enhanced safety measures beyond minimum requirements",
"source_text": "going above and beyond in the interest of the public health, safety, and welfare",
"balancing_with": ["Professional standard of care", "Contractual obligations"],
"tension_resolution": "Opportunity but not obligation to exceed standard practice for safety",
"case_relevance": "Frames the missed opportunity to prevent worker injury"
},
{
"identifier": "ProfessionalResponsibility_Personal_Discussion",
"principle_class": "Professional Virtue Principle",
"concrete_expression": "accept personal responsibility for their professional activities",
"invoked_by": ["Board of Ethical Review"],
"applied_to": ["Engineer T's reflection on the accident"],
"interpretation": "Personal responsibility includes learning from experiences even when no error occurred",
"source_text": "accept personal responsibility for their professional activities",
"balancing_with": ["Error acknowledgment", "Professional development"],
"tension_resolution": "Take responsibility for learning without admitting non-existent error",
"case_relevance": "Supports Engineer T sharing lessons learned while maintaining no error was made"
}
]
}
```
Obligations Extraction
LLM Prompt
You are an expert in professional ethics analyzing a case for obligations (professional duties and requirements).
Based on the literature:
- Obligations are CONCRETE PROFESSIONAL DUTIES derived from abstract principles (Hallamaa & Kalliokoski 2022)
- They specify what professionals MUST, SHOULD, or MUST NOT do (Dennis et al. 2016)
- Obligations have deontic force and are enforceable (Wooldridge & Jennings 1995)
- They operationalize principles in specific contexts (Kong et al. 2020)
Your task is to:
1. Identify NEW OBLIGATION CLASSES not in the existing ontology
2. Extract SPECIFIC OBLIGATION INDIVIDUALS from the case
EXISTING OBLIGATIONS IN ONTOLOGY (check if your identified obligations match these before creating new classes):
- Attribution Obligation: Duty to properly cite and acknowledge all sources, tools, and methods used in creating professional deliverables
- Collegial Obligation: Duties toward professional peers including respect, fairness, and credit for work
- Competence Obligation: Requirement to perform services only in areas of competence (NSPE II.2)
- Conditional Obligation: Obligations that apply only when specific conditions are met
- Confidentiality Obligation: Duty to protect confidential information of clients or employers (NSPE III.4)
- Defeasible Obligation: Obligations that admit justified exceptions under specified conditions (Ganascia 2007)
- Disclosure Obligation: Requirement to inform stakeholders about conflicts, limitations, or risks (NSPE II.3.a)
- Ethical Obligation: Obligations arising from ethical principles beyond legal requirements
- Legal Obligation: Obligations arising from legal requirements and regulations
- Mandatory Obligation: Obligations that MUST be fulfilled (deontic force: mandatory)
- Obligation: An information content entity expressing required actions or behaviors in professional contexts. This is the O component of the formal specification D=(R,P,O,S,Rs,A,E,Ca,Cs).
- Prima Facie Obligation: Obligations that hold at first appearance but may be overridden by stronger duties (Anderson & Anderson)
- Professional Obligation: A duty or responsibility arising from professional role or standards
- Quality Assurance Obligation: Requirement to implement appropriate review and verification processes for all professional deliverables before submission
- Reporting Obligation: Duty to report violations or unsafe conditions to appropriate authorities
- Responsible Charge Obligation: Duty to maintain active engagement and personal decision-making authority throughout engineering process from conception to completion
- Safety Obligation: Duty to hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public (NSPE I.1)
- Technology Competence Obligation: Requirement to understand and verify the capabilities, limitations, and risks of technological tools used in professional practice
- Technology Verification Obligation: Requirement to thoroughly verify and validate outputs from technological tools including AI before incorporating them into professional work
Analyze this discussion section:
This case addresses two ethical issues in engineering practice: to what extent are design engineers obligated to account for construction safety risks in their designs if they are not trained or have experience in construction safety methods, and are engineers obligated by the NSPE Code of Ethics to “acknowledge errors” when it is not clear an error has been made.
The first issue, having to do with considering construction safety risks in the design, can be approached from both a legal/contractual (i.e., risk management) perspective and from an ethical perspective. On the legal/contractual side, many professional engineers familiar with construction contracts believe contract language sufficiently settles the matter. They point to standard construction contract provisions such as, “Contractor shall be solely responsible for the means, methods, techniques, sequences, and procedures of construction” (Engineers Joint Contract Documents Committee [EJCDC], C-700, Standard General Conditions of the Construction Contract, Article 7, Paragraph 7.01A). The construction contracts also include provisions identifying the Contractor’s sole responsibility for initiating, maintaining, and supervising all safety programs and precautions (Article 7, Paragraph 7.13A), for obtaining additional services as needed to carry out Contractor’s safety responsibilities (Article 7, Paragraph 7.01B), and for taking necessary precautions for safety and providing necessary protection to prevent damage, injury, or loss to all persons on the site who may be affected by the work (Article 7, Paragraph 7.13C). Through these legal/contractual mechanisms, risk and responsibility for worker safety during construction are formally transferred to the contractor, the contractor being the party best positioned to provide for project safety. By this view, and with reference to the present case, the contractor is solely responsible for project safety, so Engineer T did not make any design error so long as the design met the professional standard of care (which the facts suggest it did).
But engineers must also consider the ethical perspective, and that is the primary area of concern for the Board of Ethical Review. Ethically, the facts of this case reveal a tension between the engineer doing what is professionally required, versus ”going above and beyond” in the interest of the public health, safety, and welfare. The Board has considered this ethical tension in various ways over the years.
BER Case 97-13 introduces Engineer A, a civil engineer, who serves as a subconsultant to perform bridge inspection services on a major bridge overhaul project. Engineer A’s scope of work is solely to identify any pavement damage on the bridge and report the damage to its client, VWX Architects. While conducting the bridge inspection, and although not part of the scope of services for which he was retained, Engineer A notices an apparent pre-existing defective condition in a retaining wall which failed to restrain a vehicle, leading to a fatal accident involving Police Officer B. Engineer A surmises that the defective condition may have been a contributing factor in the wall failure and notes this in the engineering notes. Engineer A verbally reports this information to the client, which then verbally reports the information to the public agency. In finding it was ethical for Engineer A to retain the information in the engineering notes, but not include it in the final written report, the Board noted that Engineer A did the appropriate thing in coming forward to the client with the information and also by documenting the information for possible future reference as appropriate. But under the circumstances “it would have been improper for Engineer A to include reference to the information in his final report, particularly since it would have been based upon mere speculation and not careful testing or evaluation by a competent individual or firm.” In fact, the Board opined that had Engineer A formally “reported” the matter publicly, it would have been “an overreaction and could easily have risked jeopardizing the professional reputations of [Engineer A’s] client and the public agency.” The key finding from Case 97-13 is that the public welfare was best served by Engineer A exercising restraint in reporting. This parallels the current case, where Engineer A identified a safety risk in the design details, but per customary professional practice relied on the contractor (who had specific construction safety expertise) to address the issue.
A second example is BER Case 21-2 , where a second Engineer A serves as a consulting engineer representing Client B, a developer who is proposing to develop a healthcare facility that requires a significant upgrade to the property’s access road that crosses a tidal saltmarsh. Engineer A’s scope includes design and local permitting of the roadway, including an upgrade of the tidal crossing from a small culvert to a small bridge, increasing its hydraulic capacity. The local development regulations and national design codes and standards have not yet been updated to reflect changing conditions and weather patterns, including effects of sea level rise and changes in precipitation intensities and recurrence intervals effected by on-going climate change. It is Engineer A’s judgment, based on hydraulic evaluation procedures presented at a recent transportation agency conference, that the proposed project may result in some upstream homes becoming uninhabitable a decade or more earlier than would otherwise be the case. Engineer A proposes a complex and costly hydrologic and hydraulic analysis by a specialized subconsultant to predict the extent to which sea level rise and the increased hydraulic capacity of the tidal crossing will result in flood damage to a neighborhood of twenty upstream homes during future high tides and storm surges, anticipating this to be a difficult question to answer in the project’s public hearings. Client B directs Engineer A to proceed without the costly analysis unless and until such an analysis is requested by the applicable regulatory authorities. In this case, the BER found that “if Engineer A is reasonably certain that the project will result in adverse impacts to public health, safety, and welfare, and if the Client B denies the requisite evaluation, Engineer A should include the concern regarding potential adverse public health, safety, and welfare impacts in an engineering report for consideration by regulatory agencies and the public.” Thus, the key finding from Case 21-2 is that the public welfare was best served by Engineer A reporting the public health, safety, and welfare concerns, even if the client did not wish for this to be done. This differs from the current case, not because public health, safety, and welfare is somehow less important now than in Case 21-2 , but because a project delivery process exists in this case by which it was accepted professional practice for Engineer A to complete the structural design, and rely on the contractor to handle safety aspects of construction. The Engineer A from Case 21-2 did not have this option.
Finally, there is BER Case 02-5 where a third Engineer A, a structural engineer with experience in the design of structures in the region in which the current project is located, designed a structural system that Engineer A believed was sound and met applicable codes. However, new and improved design methods had recently been suggested in an article published in a technical journal, addressing new information regarding severe weather design in that region. Engineer A had not read that technical journal article. Within a year following construction, the building was damaged by severe weather conditions. It was determined that had the methods suggested in the technical articles been utilized in design, the damage would not have occurred. The BER concluded that it was not unethical for Engineer A to fail to follow methods suggested in a recent technical journal article that Engineer A had not reviewed. The BER indicated that they believed that the definition of what is “current practice” must be discerning and reasonable. The key finding from Case 02-5 was that engineers cannot be expected (obligated) to incorporate each and every new, innovative technique until such techniques are incorporated into generally accepted practice and become standards that should be followed. Engineer T (in the current case) and Engineer A ( Case 02-5 ) both followed accepted standard design practice. But these same engineers also had the opportunity (not obligation) to take the public welfare more firmly into account, to go above and beyond what was legally and ethically required. While they cannot be ethically faulted for not “going the extra mile” for the sake of the public health, safety, and welfare, the project outcomes likely would have been better if these engineers had done so. In hindsight, knowing the outcomes, the BER believes all parties would have wanted to at least consider the opportunity.
Collectively, the prior BER Cases reveal several principles to guide the engineer relative to the ethics of the situation. First, the engineer must hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public. Second, engineers must be competent in their areas of service. Third, engineers must be honest, and issue public statements only in an objective and truthful manner. Fourth, the engineer must acknowledge their errors and not distort or alter the facts. These ethical obligations are required, and non-negotiable. So it is within this context that the engineer must determine how best to satisfy their obligations. The facts of the present case do not raise concerns about Engineer T’s competence in performing structural engineering design work. Further, Engineer T’s structural modification approach appears to have been straightforward, professionally designed, and properly presented in the construction documents. Not only this, but the design specifically mentions that the new structural connections were located in such a way that access was limited. These points demonstrate proper awareness and consideration of public safety, health, and welfare. When the design was completed, the facts imply Engineer T relied on the contractor to provide for worker safety during construction, and formally transferred this risk and responsibility via standard contractual language. Further, the facts indicate the contractor accepted the construction risk and responsibility without any question. On this basis, the facts do not suggest Engineer T made a design error. As with Engineer A in Case 97-13 , the fact that Engineer T (this present case) noticed after the accident that an alternative design approach could have prevented the worker injury does not mean that Engineer T was required to report this as an error.
But the question remains – similar to Case 21-2 and Case 02-5 – whether Engineer T did all that could have been done for worker safety? After all, the solution approach Engineer T followed for this project did include an unusual and challenging construction aspect. Was it enough simply to call attention to this and shift safety responsibility to the contractor? Case 21-2 suggests it would have been ethically appropriate (an opportunity, not an obligation) for Engineer T to identify not just the straightforward design alternative, but also the more involved structural modification concept, to identify and discuss the benefits and drawbacks of both options, and to place these matters before the client and other members of the design team, possibly including the contractor, early in the process. Another option would have been for Engineer T to request a constructability review, or an independent construction safety review, or to inquire whether the contractor’s construction safety plan had flagged the heightened safety risk. If so, perhaps the issue would have been raised and alternatives might have been addressed. But Engineer T did not actively seek this input, and perhaps that is why Engineer T “felt some personal responsibility for the accident.”
But was this an “error?” Did Engineer T and/or Engineer B deviate from ethical engineering practice under the facts? The BER affirms the “ethical high road” of considering more than one design approach, and certainly the BER would agree with seeking critical input from construction safety professionals. But as in Case 02-5 , the BER does not view Engineer T’s design as unethical. While the construction accident and worker injury are tragic outcomes, because Engineer T’s design approach represented professional practice consistent with the standard of care, the BER sees this more as a missed opportunity than an ethical lapse and concludes that no “error” was made in design.
Was it ethical for Engineer T not to acknowledge an error after the accident occurred? The facts of this case and especially the discussion between Engineer T and Engineer B, as well as the legal/contractual perspective and ethical considerations outlined above, provide a rationale as to why Engineer T’s design was not an “error.” Because there was no error, Engineer T was not ethically obligated to acknowledge an error after the accident occurred. However, the BER believes this project was a missed opportunity for Engineer T to more fully and carefully hold paramount the public safety, health, and welfare.
The BER believes Engineer T should state that while no error was made, based on hindsight, other ways to approach the project existed which may have prevented the accident and worker injury. The view is consistent with ethics provisions that require engineers to be objective and truthful in professional reports, statements, or testimony; that engineers include all relevant and pertinent information, that they not distort or alter the facts, and avoid the use of statements containing a material misrepresentation of fact or omitting a material fact; and that they accept personal responsibility for their professional activities. Such conversation will not only allow Engineer T’s firm and others to benefit from lessons learned through this very difficult experience but will also promote continued professional development relative to projects of this type.
Was it ethical for Engineer T not to acknowledge an error during the deposition? Again, using the same analysis presented above, the BER concludes that Engineer T’s design was not an “error.” Because there was no error, Engineer T was not ethically obligated to acknowledge an error during the deposition. Engineer T should respond clearly and honestly when questioned about the project, including T’s views on alternative design approaches vis-à-vis the public safety, health, and welfare, but should not characterize the work as a design error.
Extract obligations following this JSON structure:
{
"new_obligation_classes": [
{
"label": "Clear, specific obligation class name",
"definition": "What this type of obligation requires professionals to do",
"derived_from_principle": "Which principle this operationalizes (e.g., 'Public Safety', 'Honesty')",
"duty_type": "professional|legal|ethical|societal",
"enforcement_mechanism": "How this obligation is typically enforced",
"violation_consequences": "What happens when this obligation is violated",
"examples_from_case": ["Example 1 from the case", "Example 2"],
"source_text": "EXACT text snippet from case where this obligation is identified (max 200 characters)",
"confidence": 0.0-1.0,
"reasoning": "Why this is a new class not in existing ontology"
}
],
"obligation_individuals": [
{
"identifier": "Unique name for this specific obligation instance",
"obligation_class": "Name of the obligation class (new or existing)",
"obligated_party": "Who has this obligation (e.g., 'Engineer L', 'All Licensed PEs')",
"obligation_statement": "The specific duty statement (e.g., 'Report safety risks to authorities')",
"derived_from": "Source principle or law (e.g., 'NSPE Code', 'State Law')",
"enforcement_context": "How enforced in this case",
"temporal_scope": "When this obligation applies",
"compliance_status": "met|unmet|unclear|pending",
"case_context": "How this obligation manifests in the specific case",
"source_text": "EXACT text snippet from case where this obligation is mentioned (max 200 characters)",
"is_existing_class": true/false,
"confidence": 0.0-1.0
}
]
}
Focus on:
1. NEW obligation types that represent novel professional duties
2. Specific obligation instances showing how duties apply in this case
3. The relationship between obligations and the principles they operationalize
4. Enforcement mechanisms and compliance status
Return ONLY the JSON structure, no additional text.
Saved: 2025-12-20 13:43
LLM Response
```json
{
"new_obligation_classes": [
{
"label": "Constructability Review Obligation",
"definition": "Duty to seek or conduct reviews of design constructability and construction safety implications when designs present unusual or challenging construction aspects",
"derived_from_principle": "Public Safety and Welfare",
"duty_type": "professional",
"enforcement_mechanism": "Professional standards review, peer evaluation, post-incident investigation",
"violation_consequences": "Increased liability exposure, professional criticism, preventable accidents",
"examples_from_case": ["Engineer T could have requested a constructability review", "independent construction safety review"],
"source_text": "Another option would have been for Engineer T to request a constructability review, or an independent construction safety review",
"confidence": 0.85,
"reasoning": "Distinct from existing safety obligations - specifically addresses proactive review of construction implications during design phase, not covered by general safety or competence obligations"
},
{
"label": "Design Alternative Consideration Obligation",
"definition": "Duty to identify, evaluate, and present multiple design alternatives with their respective safety implications to clients and stakeholders",
"derived_from_principle": "Public Safety and Professional Judgment",
"duty_type": "ethical",
"enforcement_mechanism": "Professional ethics review, best practice standards",
"violation_consequences": "Missed opportunities for safer designs, ethical criticism",
"examples_from_case": ["identify not just the straightforward design alternative, but also the more involved structural modification concept"],
"source_text": "it would have been ethically appropriate...to identify not just the straightforward design alternative, but also the more involved structural modification",
"confidence": 0.75,
"reasoning": "Goes beyond competence or disclosure obligations - specifically requires presenting multiple approaches with safety trade-offs"
},
{
"label": "Hindsight Acknowledgment Obligation",
"definition": "Duty to acknowledge when alternative approaches could have prevented adverse outcomes, even when no error was made",
"derived_from_principle": "Honesty and Professional Development",
"duty_type": "ethical",
"enforcement_mechanism": "Professional ethics standards, continuous improvement practices",
"violation_consequences": "Lost learning opportunities, reduced professional credibility",
"examples_from_case": ["Engineer T should state that while no error was made, based on hindsight, other ways to approach the project existed"],
"source_text": "Engineer T should state that while no error was made, based on hindsight, other ways to approach the project existed which may have prevented",
"confidence": 0.80,
"reasoning": "Distinct from error acknowledgment - addresses learning from outcomes without admitting fault"
}
],
"obligation_individuals": [
{
"identifier": "EngineerT_SafetyParamount_Obligation",
"obligation_class": "Safety Obligation",
"obligated_party": "Engineer T",
"obligation_statement": "Hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public",
"derived_from": "NSPE Code I.1",
"enforcement_context": "Professional ethics review following construction accident",
"temporal_scope": "Throughout design and construction phases",
"compliance_status": "met",
"case_context": "Engineer T's design met professional standards but worker was injured during construction",
"source_text": "First, the engineer must hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public",
"is_existing_class": true,
"confidence": 0.95
},
{
"identifier": "EngineerT_Competence_Obligation",
"obligation_class": "Competence Obligation",
"obligated_party": "Engineer T",
"obligation_statement": "Perform structural engineering services only within area of competence",
"derived_from": "NSPE Code II.2",
"enforcement_context": "Design review and professional standards evaluation",
"temporal_scope": "During structural design phase",
"compliance_status": "met",
"case_context": "No concerns raised about Engineer T's competence in structural engineering design work",
"source_text": "The facts of the present case do not raise concerns about Engineer T's competence in performing structural engineering design work",
"is_existing_class": true,
"confidence": 0.95
},
{
"identifier": "EngineerT_ErrorAcknowledgment_Obligation",
"obligation_class": "Disclosure Obligation",
"obligated_party": "Engineer T",
"obligation_statement": "Acknowledge errors and not distort or alter facts",
"derived_from": "NSPE Code",
"enforcement_context": "Post-accident investigation and deposition",
"temporal_scope": "After construction accident",
"compliance_status": "met",
"case_context": "No error was made, so no obligation to acknowledge error",
"source_text": "Fourth, the engineer must acknowledge their errors and not distort or alter the facts",
"is_existing_class": true,
"confidence": 0.90
},
{
"identifier": "EngineerT_TruthfulTestimony_Obligation",
"obligation_class": "Legal Obligation",
"obligated_party": "Engineer T",
"obligation_statement": "Provide objective and truthful testimony during deposition",
"derived_from": "Legal requirements and NSPE Code",
"enforcement_context": "Legal deposition proceedings",
"temporal_scope": "During deposition",
"compliance_status": "pending",
"case_context": "Engineer T must respond clearly and honestly when questioned about the project",
"source_text": "Engineer T should respond clearly and honestly when questioned about the project",
"is_existing_class": true,
"confidence": 0.95
},
{
"identifier": "EngineerT_ConstructabilityReview_Opportunity",
"obligation_class": "Constructability Review Obligation",
"obligated_party": "Engineer T",
"obligation_statement": "Request constructability or safety review for designs with unusual construction aspects",
"derived_from": "Public Safety principle",
"enforcement_context": "Professional best practices",
"temporal_scope": "During design phase",
"compliance_status": "unmet",
"case_context": "Engineer T did not request constructability review despite challenging construction aspect",
"source_text": "Another option would have been for Engineer T to request a constructability review",
"is_existing_class": false,
"confidence": 0.75
},
{
"identifier": "EngineerT_AlternativePresentation_Opportunity",
"obligation_class": "Design Alternative Consideration Obligation",
"obligated_party": "Engineer T",
"obligation_statement": "Present multiple design alternatives with safety implications to client and team",
"derived_from": "Public Safety and Professional Judgment",
"enforcement_context": "Ethical best practices",
"temporal_scope": "Early in design process",
"compliance_status": "unmet",
"case_context": "Engineer T did not present alternative design approaches that could have prevented injury",
"source_text": "identify and discuss the benefits and drawbacks of both options, and to place these matters before the client",
"is_existing_class": false,
"confidence": 0.70
},
{
"identifier": "EngineerT_HindsightAcknowledgment_Obligation",
"obligation_class": "Hindsight Acknowledgment Obligation",
"obligated_party": "Engineer T",
"obligation_statement": "State that other approaches existed which may have prevented the accident",
"derived_from": "Honesty and Professional Development",
"enforcement_context": "Professional ethics and continuous improvement",
"temporal_scope": "Post-accident communications",
"compliance_status": "pending",
"case_context": "BER recommends Engineer T acknowledge alternative approaches without admitting error",
"source_text": "Engineer T should state that while no error was made, based on hindsight, other ways to approach the project existed",
"is_existing_class": false,
"confidence": 0.85
},
{
"identifier": "Contractor_SafetyResponsibility_Obligation",
"obligation_class": "Legal Obligation",
"obligated_party": "Contractor",
"obligation_statement": "Solely responsible for means, methods, techniques, sequences, and procedures of construction",
"derived_from": "EJCDC C-700 Contract",
"enforcement_context": "Construction contract enforcement",
"temporal_scope": "During construction phase",
"compliance_status": "unmet",
"case_context": "Contractor had contractual responsibility for worker safety but accident occurred",
"source_text": "Contractor shall be solely responsible for the means, methods, techniques, sequences, and procedures of construction",
"is_existing_class": true,
"confidence": 0.95
}
]
}
```
Constraints Extraction
LLM Prompt
You are an expert in professional ethics analyzing a case for constraints (boundaries, limitations, and restrictions).
Based on the literature:
- Constraints are INVIOLABLE BOUNDARIES that limit acceptable actions (Dennis et al. 2016)
- They differ from obligations by being restrictions rather than requirements
- Constraints can be legal, physical, resource-based, or procedural
- They define the space within which ethical decisions must be made
Your task is to:
1. Identify NEW CONSTRAINT CLASSES not in the existing ontology
2. Extract SPECIFIC CONSTRAINT INDIVIDUALS from the case
EXISTING CONSTRAINTS IN ONTOLOGY (check if your identified constraints match these before creating new classes):
- Attribution Constraint: Requirements and limitations regarding the disclosure and citation of tools, methods, or sources used in professional work products
- Competence Constraint: Boundaries defined by agent capabilities and technical limitations (Hallamaa & Kalliokoski 2022)
- Confidentiality Constraint: Boundaries on information disclosure and privacy (Dennis et al. 2016)
- Constraint: An information content entity expressing limitations or restrictions on professional actions or decisions. This is the Cs component of the formal specification D=(R,P,O,S,Rs,A,E,Ca,Cs).
- Defeasible Constraint: Constraints that admit justified exceptions under specified conditions (Ganascia 2007)
- Ethical Constraint: Professional ethical boundaries beyond legal requirements (Benzmüller et al. 2020)
- Inviolable Constraint: Absolute constraints that cannot be overridden under any circumstances (Dennis et al. 2016)
- Jurisdictional Constraint: Boundaries of authority and geographical or organizational scope (Dennis et al. 2016)
- Legal Constraint: Constraints arising from legal requirements and statutes that establish inviolable boundaries (Kroll 2020, Stenseke 2024)
- Priority Constraint: Constraints establishing precedence when multiple requirements conflict (Scheutz & Malle 2014)
- Procedural Constraint: Requirements for following specific processes or protocols (Furbach et al. 2014)
- Regulatory Constraint: Constraints from regulatory bodies and professional standards organizations (Taddeo et al. 2024)
- Resource Constraint: Limitations on available time, budget, materials, or human resources (Ganascia 2007)
- Safety Constraint: Constraints ensuring safety requirements are met (Arkin 2008)
- Technology Substitution Constraint: Boundaries preventing technology from replacing professional judgment and human oversight in critical decision-making
Analyze this discussion section:
This case addresses two ethical issues in engineering practice: to what extent are design engineers obligated to account for construction safety risks in their designs if they are not trained or have experience in construction safety methods, and are engineers obligated by the NSPE Code of Ethics to “acknowledge errors” when it is not clear an error has been made.
The first issue, having to do with considering construction safety risks in the design, can be approached from both a legal/contractual (i.e., risk management) perspective and from an ethical perspective. On the legal/contractual side, many professional engineers familiar with construction contracts believe contract language sufficiently settles the matter. They point to standard construction contract provisions such as, “Contractor shall be solely responsible for the means, methods, techniques, sequences, and procedures of construction” (Engineers Joint Contract Documents Committee [EJCDC], C-700, Standard General Conditions of the Construction Contract, Article 7, Paragraph 7.01A). The construction contracts also include provisions identifying the Contractor’s sole responsibility for initiating, maintaining, and supervising all safety programs and precautions (Article 7, Paragraph 7.13A), for obtaining additional services as needed to carry out Contractor’s safety responsibilities (Article 7, Paragraph 7.01B), and for taking necessary precautions for safety and providing necessary protection to prevent damage, injury, or loss to all persons on the site who may be affected by the work (Article 7, Paragraph 7.13C). Through these legal/contractual mechanisms, risk and responsibility for worker safety during construction are formally transferred to the contractor, the contractor being the party best positioned to provide for project safety. By this view, and with reference to the present case, the contractor is solely responsible for project safety, so Engineer T did not make any design error so long as the design met the professional standard of care (which the facts suggest it did).
But engineers must also consider the ethical perspective, and that is the primary area of concern for the Board of Ethical Review. Ethically, the facts of this case reveal a tension between the engineer doing what is professionally required, versus ”going above and beyond” in the interest of the public health, safety, and welfare. The Board has considered this ethical tension in various ways over the years.
BER Case 97-13 introduces Engineer A, a civil engineer, who serves as a subconsultant to perform bridge inspection services on a major bridge overhaul project. Engineer A’s scope of work is solely to identify any pavement damage on the bridge and report the damage to its client, VWX Architects. While conducting the bridge inspection, and although not part of the scope of services for which he was retained, Engineer A notices an apparent pre-existing defective condition in a retaining wall which failed to restrain a vehicle, leading to a fatal accident involving Police Officer B. Engineer A surmises that the defective condition may have been a contributing factor in the wall failure and notes this in the engineering notes. Engineer A verbally reports this information to the client, which then verbally reports the information to the public agency. In finding it was ethical for Engineer A to retain the information in the engineering notes, but not include it in the final written report, the Board noted that Engineer A did the appropriate thing in coming forward to the client with the information and also by documenting the information for possible future reference as appropriate. But under the circumstances “it would have been improper for Engineer A to include reference to the information in his final report, particularly since it would have been based upon mere speculation and not careful testing or evaluation by a competent individual or firm.” In fact, the Board opined that had Engineer A formally “reported” the matter publicly, it would have been “an overreaction and could easily have risked jeopardizing the professional reputations of [Engineer A’s] client and the public agency.” The key finding from Case 97-13 is that the public welfare was best served by Engineer A exercising restraint in reporting. This parallels the current case, where Engineer A identified a safety risk in the design details, but per customary professional practice relied on the contractor (who had specific construction safety expertise) to address the issue.
A second example is BER Case 21-2 , where a second Engineer A serves as a consulting engineer representing Client B, a developer who is proposing to develop a healthcare facility that requires a significant upgrade to the property’s access road that crosses a tidal saltmarsh. Engineer A’s scope includes design and local permitting of the roadway, including an upgrade of the tidal crossing from a small culvert to a small bridge, increasing its hydraulic capacity. The local development regulations and national design codes and standards have not yet been updated to reflect changing conditions and weather patterns, including effects of sea level rise and changes in precipitation intensities and recurrence intervals effected by on-going climate change. It is Engineer A’s judgment, based on hydraulic evaluation procedures presented at a recent transportation agency conference, that the proposed project may result in some upstream homes becoming uninhabitable a decade or more earlier than would otherwise be the case. Engineer A proposes a complex and costly hydrologic and hydraulic analysis by a specialized subconsultant to predict the extent to which sea level rise and the increased hydraulic capacity of the tidal crossing will result in flood damage to a neighborhood of twenty upstream homes during future high tides and storm surges, anticipating this to be a difficult question to answer in the project’s public hearings. Client B directs Engineer A to proceed without the costly analysis unless and until such an analysis is requested by the applicable regulatory authorities. In this case, the BER found that “if Engineer A is reasonably certain that the project will result in adverse impacts to public health, safety, and welfare, and if the Client B denies the requisite evaluation, Engineer A should include the concern regarding potential adverse public health, safety, and welfare impacts in an engineering report for consideration by regulatory agencies and the public.” Thus, the key finding from Case 21-2 is that the public welfare was best served by Engineer A reporting the public health, safety, and welfare concerns, even if the client did not wish for this to be done. This differs from the current case, not because public health, safety, and welfare is somehow less important now than in Case 21-2 , but because a project delivery process exists in this case by which it was accepted professional practice for Engineer A to complete the structural design, and rely on the contractor to handle safety aspects of construction. The Engineer A from Case 21-2 did not have this option.
Finally, there is BER Case 02-5 where a third Engineer A, a structural engineer with experience in the design of structures in the region in which the current project is located, designed a structural system that Engineer A believed was sound and met applicable codes. However, new and improved design methods had recently been suggested in an article published in a technical journal, addressing new information regarding severe weather design in that region. Engineer A had not read that technical journal article. Within a year following construction, the building was damaged by severe weather conditions. It was determined that had the methods suggested in the technical articles been utilized in design, the damage would not have occurred. The BER concluded that it was not unethical for Engineer A to fail to follow methods suggested in a recent technical journal article that Engineer A had not reviewed. The BER indicated that they believed that the definition of what is “current practice” must be discerning and reasonable. The key finding from Case 02-5 was that engineers cannot be expected (obligated) to incorporate each and every new, innovative technique until such techniques are incorporated into generally accepted practice and become standards that should be followed. Engineer T (in the current case) and Engineer A ( Case 02-5 ) both followed accepted standard design practice. But these same engineers also had the opportunity (not obligation) to take the public welfare more firmly into account, to go above and beyond what was legally and ethically required. While they cannot be ethically faulted for not “going the extra mile” for the sake of the public health, safety, and welfare, the project outcomes likely would have been better if these engineers had done so. In hindsight, knowing the outcomes, the BER believes all parties would have wanted to at least consider the opportunity.
Collectively, the prior BER Cases reveal several principles to guide the engineer relative to the ethics of the situation. First, the engineer must hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public. Second, engineers must be competent in their areas of service. Third, engineers must be honest, and issue public statements only in an objective and truthful manner. Fourth, the engineer must acknowledge their errors and not distort or alter the facts. These ethical obligations are required, and non-negotiable. So it is within this context that the engineer must determine how best to satisfy their obligations. The facts of the present case do not raise concerns about Engineer T’s competence in performing structural engineering design work. Further, Engineer T’s structural modification approach appears to have been straightforward, professionally designed, and properly presented in the construction documents. Not only this, but the design specifically mentions that the new structural connections were located in such a way that access was limited. These points demonstrate proper awareness and consideration of public safety, health, and welfare. When the design was completed, the facts imply Engineer T relied on the contractor to provide for worker safety during construction, and formally transferred this risk and responsibility via standard contractual language. Further, the facts indicate the contractor accepted the construction risk and responsibility without any question. On this basis, the facts do not suggest Engineer T made a design error. As with Engineer A in Case 97-13 , the fact that Engineer T (this present case) noticed after the accident that an alternative design approach could have prevented the worker injury does not mean that Engineer T was required to report this as an error.
But the question remains – similar to Case 21-2 and Case 02-5 – whether Engineer T did all that could have been done for worker safety? After all, the solution approach Engineer T followed for this project did include an unusual and challenging construction aspect. Was it enough simply to call attention to this and shift safety responsibility to the contractor? Case 21-2 suggests it would have been ethically appropriate (an opportunity, not an obligation) for Engineer T to identify not just the straightforward design alternative, but also the more involved structural modification concept, to identify and discuss the benefits and drawbacks of both options, and to place these matters before the client and other members of the design team, possibly including the contractor, early in the process. Another option would have been for Engineer T to request a constructability review, or an independent construction safety review, or to inquire whether the contractor’s construction safety plan had flagged the heightened safety risk. If so, perhaps the issue would have been raised and alternatives might have been addressed. But Engineer T did not actively seek this input, and perhaps that is why Engineer T “felt some personal responsibility for the accident.”
But was this an “error?” Did Engineer T and/or Engineer B deviate from ethical engineering practice under the facts? The BER affirms the “ethical high road” of considering more than one design approach, and certainly the BER would agree with seeking critical input from construction safety professionals. But as in Case 02-5 , the BER does not view Engineer T’s design as unethical. While the construction accident and worker injury are tragic outcomes, because Engineer T’s design approach represented professional practice consistent with the standard of care, the BER sees this more as a missed opportunity than an ethical lapse and concludes that no “error” was made in design.
Was it ethical for Engineer T not to acknowledge an error after the accident occurred? The facts of this case and especially the discussion between Engineer T and Engineer B, as well as the legal/contractual perspective and ethical considerations outlined above, provide a rationale as to why Engineer T’s design was not an “error.” Because there was no error, Engineer T was not ethically obligated to acknowledge an error after the accident occurred. However, the BER believes this project was a missed opportunity for Engineer T to more fully and carefully hold paramount the public safety, health, and welfare.
The BER believes Engineer T should state that while no error was made, based on hindsight, other ways to approach the project existed which may have prevented the accident and worker injury. The view is consistent with ethics provisions that require engineers to be objective and truthful in professional reports, statements, or testimony; that engineers include all relevant and pertinent information, that they not distort or alter the facts, and avoid the use of statements containing a material misrepresentation of fact or omitting a material fact; and that they accept personal responsibility for their professional activities. Such conversation will not only allow Engineer T’s firm and others to benefit from lessons learned through this very difficult experience but will also promote continued professional development relative to projects of this type.
Was it ethical for Engineer T not to acknowledge an error during the deposition? Again, using the same analysis presented above, the BER concludes that Engineer T’s design was not an “error.” Because there was no error, Engineer T was not ethically obligated to acknowledge an error during the deposition. Engineer T should respond clearly and honestly when questioned about the project, including T’s views on alternative design approaches vis-à-vis the public safety, health, and welfare, but should not characterize the work as a design error.
Extract constraints following this JSON structure:
{
"new_constraint_classes": [
{
"label": "Clear, specific constraint class name",
"definition": "What this type of constraint limits or restricts",
"constraint_type": "legal|physical|resource|temporal|procedural",
"flexibility": "hard|soft|negotiable",
"violation_impact": "What happens if this constraint is violated",
"mitigation_possible": "Whether and how this constraint can be mitigated",
"examples_from_case": ["Example 1 from the case", "Example 2"],
"source_text": "EXACT text snippet from case where this constraint is identified (max 200 characters)",
"confidence": 0.0-1.0,
"reasoning": "Why this is a new class not in existing ontology"
}
],
"constraint_individuals": [
{
"identifier": "Unique name for this specific constraint instance",
"constraint_class": "Name of the constraint class (new or existing)",
"constrained_entity": "What or who is constrained (e.g., 'Engineer L', 'Project')",
"constraint_statement": "The specific limitation (e.g., 'Cannot exceed budget of $X')",
"source": "Origin of constraint (e.g., 'Client budget', 'Environmental law')",
"enforcement_mechanism": "How this constraint is enforced",
"temporal_scope": "When this constraint applies",
"severity": "critical|major|minor",
"case_context": "How this constraint manifests in the specific case",
"source_text": "EXACT text snippet from case where this constraint is mentioned (max 200 characters)",
"is_existing_class": true/false,
"confidence": 0.0-1.0
}
]
}
Focus on:
1. NEW constraint types that represent novel limitations or boundaries
2. Specific constraint instances showing how limitations apply in this case
3. The difference between constraints (boundaries) and obligations (duties)
4. Impact and severity of constraints on decision-making
Return ONLY the JSON structure, no additional text.
Saved: 2025-12-20 13:44
LLM Response
```json
{
"new_constraint_classes": [
{
"label": "Contractual Risk Transfer Constraint",
"definition": "Limitations on liability and responsibility that are formally transferred between parties through contractual mechanisms",
"constraint_type": "legal",
"flexibility": "hard",
"violation_impact": "Legal liability shifts back to the party attempting to transfer risk",
"mitigation_possible": "Can be mitigated through additional contractual provisions or insurance",
"examples_from_case": ["Contractor solely responsible for construction safety", "Standard contract provisions transferring safety responsibility"],
"source_text": "Contractor shall be solely responsible for the means, methods, techniques, sequences, and procedures of construction",
"confidence": 0.85,
"reasoning": "Differs from general Legal Constraint by specifically addressing formal transfer of boundaries between parties rather than just legal requirements"
},
{
"label": "Standard of Care Constraint",
"definition": "Boundaries defined by accepted professional practice standards that limit what can be considered an error or deviation",
"constraint_type": "procedural",
"flexibility": "soft",
"violation_impact": "Professional liability for negligence if standard is not met",
"mitigation_possible": "Can exceed standard but cannot fall below it",
"examples_from_case": ["Design meeting professional standard of care", "Following accepted standard design practice"],
"source_text": "Engineer T did not make any design error so long as the design met the professional standard of care",
"confidence": 0.9,
"reasoning": "Distinct from Competence Constraint as it defines minimum acceptable practice boundaries rather than capability limits"
},
{
"label": "Scope of Service Constraint",
"definition": "Boundaries limiting professional responsibilities to explicitly defined service areas in contracts or agreements",
"constraint_type": "procedural",
"flexibility": "negotiable",
"violation_impact": "Potential liability for work outside defined scope without authorization",
"mitigation_possible": "Can be expanded through contract amendments or additional service agreements",
"examples_from_case": ["Engineer A's scope solely for bridge inspection", "Not part of scope of services retained for"],
"source_text": "Engineer A's scope of work is solely to identify any pavement damage on the bridge and report the damage to its client",
"confidence": 0.95,
"reasoning": "Different from Jurisdictional Constraint as it limits service boundaries within a project rather than authority boundaries"
}
],
"constraint_individuals": [
{
"identifier": "Construction_Safety_Responsibility_Transfer",
"constraint_class": "Contractual Risk Transfer Constraint",
"constrained_entity": "Engineer T",
"constraint_statement": "Cannot be held responsible for construction safety methods once contractually transferred to contractor",
"source": "EJCDC C-700 Standard General Conditions",
"enforcement_mechanism": "Legal contract provisions",
"temporal_scope": "During construction phase",
"severity": "major",
"case_context": "Engineer T relied on contractor for worker safety during construction",
"source_text": "risk and responsibility for worker safety during construction are formally transferred to the contractor",
"is_existing_class": false,
"confidence": 0.9
},
{
"identifier": "Design_Standard_of_Care_Boundary",
"constraint_class": "Standard of Care Constraint",
"constrained_entity": "Engineer T",
"constraint_statement": "Must meet but not required to exceed professional standard of care in structural design",
"source": "Professional engineering standards",
"enforcement_mechanism": "Professional liability standards",
"temporal_scope": "During design phase",
"severity": "critical",
"case_context": "Engineer T's design met standard of care despite accident",
"source_text": "Engineer T did not make any design error so long as the design met the professional standard of care",
"is_existing_class": false,
"confidence": 0.85
},
{
"identifier": "Construction_Safety_Competence_Limit",
"constraint_class": "Competence Constraint",
"constrained_entity": "Design engineers",
"constraint_statement": "Cannot be obligated to account for construction safety risks beyond training and experience",
"source": "Professional competence requirements",
"enforcement_mechanism": "Professional ethics standards",
"temporal_scope": "During design phase",
"severity": "major",
"case_context": "Design engineers not trained in construction safety methods",
"source_text": "design engineers obligated to account for construction safety risks in their designs if they are not trained",
"is_existing_class": true,
"confidence": 0.95
},
{
"identifier": "Bridge_Inspection_Scope_Limit",
"constraint_class": "Scope of Service Constraint",
"constrained_entity": "Engineer A (Case 97-13)",
"constraint_statement": "Limited to identifying and reporting pavement damage only",
"source": "Subconsultant contract",
"enforcement_mechanism": "Contractual agreement",
"temporal_scope": "During bridge inspection project",
"severity": "major",
"case_context": "Engineer A noticed defects outside scope",
"source_text": "Engineer A's scope of work is solely to identify any pavement damage on the bridge",
"is_existing_class": false,
"confidence": 0.9
},
{
"identifier": "Current_Practice_Adoption_Boundary",
"constraint_class": "Procedural Constraint",
"constrained_entity": "Engineer A (Case 02-5)",
"constraint_statement": "Not required to incorporate techniques not yet in generally accepted practice",
"source": "Professional standards evolution",
"enforcement_mechanism": "Professional practice standards",
"temporal_scope": "At time of design",
"severity": "minor",
"case_context": "New methods in journal not yet standard practice",
"source_text": "engineers cannot be expected (obligated) to incorporate each and every new, innovative technique",
"is_existing_class": true,
"confidence": 0.8
},
{
"identifier": "Deposition_Truth_Requirement",
"constraint_class": "Legal Constraint",
"constrained_entity": "Engineer T",
"constraint_statement": "Must respond clearly and honestly when questioned, cannot misrepresent facts",
"source": "Legal deposition requirements",
"enforcement_mechanism": "Legal penalties for perjury",
"temporal_scope": "During deposition",
"severity": "critical",
"case_context": "Engineer T questioned about design during deposition",
"source_text": "Engineer T should respond clearly and honestly when questioned about the project",
"is_existing_class": true,
"confidence": 0.95
},
{
"identifier": "Client_Analysis_Directive_Limit",
"constraint_class": "Resource Constraint",
"constrained_entity": "Engineer A (Case 21-2)",
"constraint_statement": "Cannot proceed with costly hydrologic analysis without client approval",
"source": "Client B directive",
"enforcement_mechanism": "Client contract control",
"temporal_scope": "During project planning",
"severity": "major",
"case_context": "Client denied funding for specialized analysis",
"source_text": "Client B directs Engineer A to proceed without the costly analysis",
"is_existing_class": true,
"confidence": 0.85
}
]
}
```
Capabilities Extraction
LLM Prompt
You are an expert in professional ethics analyzing a case for capabilities (competencies and skills required for professional practice).
Based on the literature:
- Capabilities are COMPETENCIES that enable norm compliance (Hallamaa & Kalliokoski 2022)
- They represent the skills needed to fulfill professional obligations (Dennis et al. 2016)
- Capabilities include technical, ethical, communicative, and analytical competencies
- They constitute "norm competence" - the ability to act ethically (Kong et al. 2020)
Your task is to:
1. Identify NEW CAPABILITY CLASSES not in the existing ontology
2. Extract SPECIFIC CAPABILITY INDIVIDUALS from the case
EXISTING CAPABILITIES IN ONTOLOGY (check if your identified capabilities match these before creating new classes):
- AI Tool Evaluation Capability: The competency to assess, validate, and appropriately use AI-generated content in professional work
- Capability: A realizable entity that can be realized by specific types of actions or processes in professional contexts. This is the Ca component of the formal specification D=(R,P,O,S,Rs,A,E,Ca,Cs).
- Capability Type: Meta-class for specific capability types recognized by the ProEthica system
- Data Privacy Protection Capability: The competency to safeguard confidential client information when using digital tools and platforms
- Justification Capability: Capability to trace reasoning paths connecting decisions to authoritative sources (McLaren 2003, Anderson & Anderson 2018)
- Regulatory Compliance Capability: The competency to ensure designs and documents meet local regulations and safety standards
- Responsible Charge Capability: The competency to maintain active engagement and supervisory control from conception to completion of engineering work
- Technical Capability: A specialized technical skill or competency in a professional domain
- Technical Writing Capability: The competency to produce clear, accurate, and professional technical documentation and reports
- Technology Integration Capability: The competency to appropriately integrate new technologies while maintaining professional judgment
Analyze this discussion section:
This case addresses two ethical issues in engineering practice: to what extent are design engineers obligated to account for construction safety risks in their designs if they are not trained or have experience in construction safety methods, and are engineers obligated by the NSPE Code of Ethics to “acknowledge errors” when it is not clear an error has been made.
The first issue, having to do with considering construction safety risks in the design, can be approached from both a legal/contractual (i.e., risk management) perspective and from an ethical perspective. On the legal/contractual side, many professional engineers familiar with construction contracts believe contract language sufficiently settles the matter. They point to standard construction contract provisions such as, “Contractor shall be solely responsible for the means, methods, techniques, sequences, and procedures of construction” (Engineers Joint Contract Documents Committee [EJCDC], C-700, Standard General Conditions of the Construction Contract, Article 7, Paragraph 7.01A). The construction contracts also include provisions identifying the Contractor’s sole responsibility for initiating, maintaining, and supervising all safety programs and precautions (Article 7, Paragraph 7.13A), for obtaining additional services as needed to carry out Contractor’s safety responsibilities (Article 7, Paragraph 7.01B), and for taking necessary precautions for safety and providing necessary protection to prevent damage, injury, or loss to all persons on the site who may be affected by the work (Article 7, Paragraph 7.13C). Through these legal/contractual mechanisms, risk and responsibility for worker safety during construction are formally transferred to the contractor, the contractor being the party best positioned to provide for project safety. By this view, and with reference to the present case, the contractor is solely responsible for project safety, so Engineer T did not make any design error so long as the design met the professional standard of care (which the facts suggest it did).
But engineers must also consider the ethical perspective, and that is the primary area of concern for the Board of Ethical Review. Ethically, the facts of this case reveal a tension between the engineer doing what is professionally required, versus ”going above and beyond” in the interest of the public health, safety, and welfare. The Board has considered this ethical tension in various ways over the years.
BER Case 97-13 introduces Engineer A, a civil engineer, who serves as a subconsultant to perform bridge inspection services on a major bridge overhaul project. Engineer A’s scope of work is solely to identify any pavement damage on the bridge and report the damage to its client, VWX Architects. While conducting the bridge inspection, and although not part of the scope of services for which he was retained, Engineer A notices an apparent pre-existing defective condition in a retaining wall which failed to restrain a vehicle, leading to a fatal accident involving Police Officer B. Engineer A surmises that the defective condition may have been a contributing factor in the wall failure and notes this in the engineering notes. Engineer A verbally reports this information to the client, which then verbally reports the information to the public agency. In finding it was ethical for Engineer A to retain the information in the engineering notes, but not include it in the final written report, the Board noted that Engineer A did the appropriate thing in coming forward to the client with the information and also by documenting the information for possible future reference as appropriate. But under the circumstances “it would have been improper for Engineer A to include reference to the information in his final report, particularly since it would have been based upon mere speculation and not careful testing or evaluation by a competent individual or firm.” In fact, the Board opined that had Engineer A formally “reported” the matter publicly, it would have been “an overreaction and could easily have risked jeopardizing the professional reputations of [Engineer A’s] client and the public agency.” The key finding from Case 97-13 is that the public welfare was best served by Engineer A exercising restraint in reporting. This parallels the current case, where Engineer A identified a safety risk in the design details, but per customary professional practice relied on the contractor (who had specific construction safety expertise) to address the issue.
A second example is BER Case 21-2 , where a second Engineer A serves as a consulting engineer representing Client B, a developer who is proposing to develop a healthcare facility that requires a significant upgrade to the property’s access road that crosses a tidal saltmarsh. Engineer A’s scope includes design and local permitting of the roadway, including an upgrade of the tidal crossing from a small culvert to a small bridge, increasing its hydraulic capacity. The local development regulations and national design codes and standards have not yet been updated to reflect changing conditions and weather patterns, including effects of sea level rise and changes in precipitation intensities and recurrence intervals effected by on-going climate change. It is Engineer A’s judgment, based on hydraulic evaluation procedures presented at a recent transportation agency conference, that the proposed project may result in some upstream homes becoming uninhabitable a decade or more earlier than would otherwise be the case. Engineer A proposes a complex and costly hydrologic and hydraulic analysis by a specialized subconsultant to predict the extent to which sea level rise and the increased hydraulic capacity of the tidal crossing will result in flood damage to a neighborhood of twenty upstream homes during future high tides and storm surges, anticipating this to be a difficult question to answer in the project’s public hearings. Client B directs Engineer A to proceed without the costly analysis unless and until such an analysis is requested by the applicable regulatory authorities. In this case, the BER found that “if Engineer A is reasonably certain that the project will result in adverse impacts to public health, safety, and welfare, and if the Client B denies the requisite evaluation, Engineer A should include the concern regarding potential adverse public health, safety, and welfare impacts in an engineering report for consideration by regulatory agencies and the public.” Thus, the key finding from Case 21-2 is that the public welfare was best served by Engineer A reporting the public health, safety, and welfare concerns, even if the client did not wish for this to be done. This differs from the current case, not because public health, safety, and welfare is somehow less important now than in Case 21-2 , but because a project delivery process exists in this case by which it was accepted professional practice for Engineer A to complete the structural design, and rely on the contractor to handle safety aspects of construction. The Engineer A from Case 21-2 did not have this option.
Finally, there is BER Case 02-5 where a third Engineer A, a structural engineer with experience in the design of structures in the region in which the current project is located, designed a structural system that Engineer A believed was sound and met applicable codes. However, new and improved design methods had recently been suggested in an article published in a technical journal, addressing new information regarding severe weather design in that region. Engineer A had not read that technical journal article. Within a year following construction, the building was damaged by severe weather conditions. It was determined that had the methods suggested in the technical articles been utilized in design, the damage would not have occurred. The BER concluded that it was not unethical for Engineer A to fail to follow methods suggested in a recent technical journal article that Engineer A had not reviewed. The BER indicated that they believed that the definition of what is “current practice” must be discerning and reasonable. The key finding from Case 02-5 was that engineers cannot be expected (obligated) to incorporate each and every new, innovative technique until such techniques are incorporated into generally accepted practice and become standards that should be followed. Engineer T (in the current case) and Engineer A ( Case 02-5 ) both followed accepted standard design practice. But these same engineers also had the opportunity (not obligation) to take the public welfare more firmly into account, to go above and beyond what was legally and ethically required. While they cannot be ethically faulted for not “going the extra mile” for the sake of the public health, safety, and welfare, the project outcomes likely would have been better if these engineers had done so. In hindsight, knowing the outcomes, the BER believes all parties would have wanted to at least consider the opportunity.
Collectively, the prior BER Cases reveal several principles to guide the engineer relative to the ethics of the situation. First, the engineer must hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public. Second, engineers must be competent in their areas of service. Third, engineers must be honest, and issue public statements only in an objective and truthful manner. Fourth, the engineer must acknowledge their errors and not distort or alter the facts. These ethical obligations are required, and non-negotiable. So it is within this context that the engineer must determine how best to satisfy their obligations. The facts of the present case do not raise concerns about Engineer T’s competence in performing structural engineering design work. Further, Engineer T’s structural modification approach appears to have been straightforward, professionally designed, and properly presented in the construction documents. Not only this, but the design specifically mentions that the new structural connections were located in such a way that access was limited. These points demonstrate proper awareness and consideration of public safety, health, and welfare. When the design was completed, the facts imply Engineer T relied on the contractor to provide for worker safety during construction, and formally transferred this risk and responsibility via standard contractual language. Further, the facts indicate the contractor accepted the construction risk and responsibility without any question. On this basis, the facts do not suggest Engineer T made a design error. As with Engineer A in Case 97-13 , the fact that Engineer T (this present case) noticed after the accident that an alternative design approach could have prevented the worker injury does not mean that Engineer T was required to report this as an error.
But the question remains – similar to Case 21-2 and Case 02-5 – whether Engineer T did all that could have been done for worker safety? After all, the solution approach Engineer T followed for this project did include an unusual and challenging construction aspect. Was it enough simply to call attention to this and shift safety responsibility to the contractor? Case 21-2 suggests it would have been ethically appropriate (an opportunity, not an obligation) for Engineer T to identify not just the straightforward design alternative, but also the more involved structural modification concept, to identify and discuss the benefits and drawbacks of both options, and to place these matters before the client and other members of the design team, possibly including the contractor, early in the process. Another option would have been for Engineer T to request a constructability review, or an independent construction safety review, or to inquire whether the contractor’s construction safety plan had flagged the heightened safety risk. If so, perhaps the issue would have been raised and alternatives might have been addressed. But Engineer T did not actively seek this input, and perhaps that is why Engineer T “felt some personal responsibility for the accident.”
But was this an “error?” Did Engineer T and/or Engineer B deviate from ethical engineering practice under the facts? The BER affirms the “ethical high road” of considering more than one design approach, and certainly the BER would agree with seeking critical input from construction safety professionals. But as in Case 02-5 , the BER does not view Engineer T’s design as unethical. While the construction accident and worker injury are tragic outcomes, because Engineer T’s design approach represented professional practice consistent with the standard of care, the BER sees this more as a missed opportunity than an ethical lapse and concludes that no “error” was made in design.
Was it ethical for Engineer T not to acknowledge an error after the accident occurred? The facts of this case and especially the discussion between Engineer T and Engineer B, as well as the legal/contractual perspective and ethical considerations outlined above, provide a rationale as to why Engineer T’s design was not an “error.” Because there was no error, Engineer T was not ethically obligated to acknowledge an error after the accident occurred. However, the BER believes this project was a missed opportunity for Engineer T to more fully and carefully hold paramount the public safety, health, and welfare.
The BER believes Engineer T should state that while no error was made, based on hindsight, other ways to approach the project existed which may have prevented the accident and worker injury. The view is consistent with ethics provisions that require engineers to be objective and truthful in professional reports, statements, or testimony; that engineers include all relevant and pertinent information, that they not distort or alter the facts, and avoid the use of statements containing a material misrepresentation of fact or omitting a material fact; and that they accept personal responsibility for their professional activities. Such conversation will not only allow Engineer T’s firm and others to benefit from lessons learned through this very difficult experience but will also promote continued professional development relative to projects of this type.
Was it ethical for Engineer T not to acknowledge an error during the deposition? Again, using the same analysis presented above, the BER concludes that Engineer T’s design was not an “error.” Because there was no error, Engineer T was not ethically obligated to acknowledge an error during the deposition. Engineer T should respond clearly and honestly when questioned about the project, including T’s views on alternative design approaches vis-à-vis the public safety, health, and welfare, but should not characterize the work as a design error.
Extract capabilities following this JSON structure:
{
"new_capability_classes": [
{
"label": "Clear, specific capability class name",
"definition": "What competency or skill this capability represents",
"capability_type": "technical|ethical|communicative|analytical",
"norm_competence_related": "Which professional obligations this capability enables",
"skill_level": "basic|intermediate|advanced|expert",
"acquisition_method": "How this capability is typically acquired (education, training, experience)",
"examples_from_case": ["Example 1 from the case", "Example 2"],
"source_text": "EXACT text snippet from case where this capability is identified (max 200 characters)",
"confidence": 0.0-1.0,
"reasoning": "Why this is a new class not in existing ontology"
}
],
"capability_individuals": [
{
"identifier": "Unique name for this specific capability instance",
"capability_class": "Name of the capability class (new or existing)",
"possessed_by": "Who has this capability (e.g., 'Engineer L', 'All Licensed PEs')",
"capability_statement": "The specific competency (e.g., 'Design stormwater systems')",
"demonstrated_through": "How shown in the case (e.g., 'Years of experience', 'Professional license')",
"proficiency_level": "basic|intermediate|advanced|expert",
"enables_obligations": "Which obligations this capability enables",
"temporal_aspect": "When this capability is relevant",
"case_context": "How this capability manifests in the specific case",
"source_text": "EXACT text snippet from case where this capability is mentioned (max 200 characters)",
"is_existing_class": true/false,
"confidence": 0.0-1.0
}
]
}
Focus on:
1. NEW capability types that represent novel competencies
2. Specific capability instances showing professional competencies in this case
3. The relationship between capabilities and norm competence
4. How capabilities enable fulfillment of professional obligations
Return ONLY the JSON structure, no additional text.
Saved: 2025-12-20 13:45
LLM Response
```json
{
"new_capability_classes": [
{
"label": "Construction Safety Risk Assessment Capability",
"definition": "The competency to identify, evaluate, and communicate potential safety hazards during the construction phase while in the design stage",
"capability_type": "technical",
"norm_competence_related": "Enables fulfillment of obligation to hold paramount public health, safety, and welfare",
"skill_level": "advanced",
"acquisition_method": "Cross-disciplinary training, construction experience, safety certification programs",
"examples_from_case": ["Identifying limited access issues in structural connections", "Recognizing heightened safety risks in design choices"],
"source_text": "to what extent are design engineers obligated to account for construction safety risks in their designs if they are not trained or have experience in construction safety methods",
"confidence": 0.9,
"reasoning": "Distinct from general safety capabilities - specifically addresses the intersection of design decisions and construction safety, not covered by existing classes"
},
{
"label": "Constructability Review Capability",
"definition": "The competency to evaluate designs for practical construction feasibility and identify potential implementation challenges",
"capability_type": "analytical",
"norm_competence_related": "Supports obligation to consider public welfare and prevent foreseeable harm",
"skill_level": "intermediate",
"acquisition_method": "Field experience, collaboration with contractors, specialized training",
"examples_from_case": ["Requesting constructability review", "Evaluating alternative structural modification concepts"],
"source_text": "Another option would have been for Engineer T to request a constructability review, or an independent construction safety review",
"confidence": 0.85,
"reasoning": "Goes beyond technical design capability to include practical construction considerations, not explicitly covered in existing ontology"
},
{
"label": "Professional Restraint Capability",
"definition": "The competency to recognize when not to report or act based on speculation, maintaining professional boundaries while protecting reputations",
"capability_type": "ethical",
"norm_competence_related": "Enables appropriate professional judgment in reporting and disclosure obligations",
"skill_level": "expert",
"acquisition_method": "Professional experience, ethics training, mentorship",
"examples_from_case": ["Not reporting speculation as fact", "Avoiding overreaction that could damage reputations"],
"source_text": "it would have been improper for Engineer A to include reference to the information in his final report, particularly since it would have been based upon mere speculation",
"confidence": 0.8,
"reasoning": "Unique ethical capability about knowing when NOT to act, distinct from general ethical capabilities in existing ontology"
}
],
"capability_individuals": [
{
"identifier": "EngineerT_StructuralDesign",
"capability_class": "Technical Capability",
"possessed_by": "Engineer T",
"capability_statement": "Competent in performing structural engineering design work meeting professional standards",
"demonstrated_through": "Properly designed structural modifications that met standard of care",
"proficiency_level": "advanced",
"enables_obligations": "Fulfills obligation to perform services only in areas of competence",
"temporal_aspect": "During design phase of project",
"case_context": "Successfully designed structural modifications with proper documentation",
"source_text": "The facts of the present case do not raise concerns about Engineer T's competence in performing structural engineering design work",
"is_existing_class": true,
"confidence": 0.95
},
{
"identifier": "EngineerT_SafetyAwareness",
"capability_class": "Construction Safety Risk Assessment Capability",
"possessed_by": "Engineer T",
"capability_statement": "Ability to identify limited access issues in structural connections",
"demonstrated_through": "Noted access limitations in construction documents",
"proficiency_level": "intermediate",
"enables_obligations": "Partial fulfillment of obligation to hold paramount public safety",
"temporal_aspect": "During design documentation phase",
"case_context": "Identified but did not fully address construction safety risks",
"source_text": "the design specifically mentions that the new structural connections were located in such a way that access was limited",
"is_existing_class": false,
"confidence": 0.85
},
{
"identifier": "EngineerA_ProfessionalRestraint",
"capability_class": "Professional Restraint Capability",
"possessed_by": "Engineer A (Case 97-13)",
"capability_statement": "Exercising appropriate restraint in formal reporting while documenting concerns",
"demonstrated_through": "Verbally reported to client, documented in notes, but excluded from final report",
"proficiency_level": "expert",
"enables_obligations": "Balances truth-telling obligation with avoiding speculation-based harm",
"temporal_aspect": "During reporting phase after observation",
"case_context": "Noticed defective condition outside scope but handled appropriately",
"source_text": "The key finding from Case 97-13 is that the public welfare was best served by Engineer A exercising restraint in reporting",
"is_existing_class": false,
"confidence": 0.9
},
{
"identifier": "EngineerA_ClimateAdaptation",
"capability_class": "Regulatory Compliance Capability",
"possessed_by": "Engineer A (Case 21-2)",
"capability_statement": "Understanding limitations of current codes regarding climate change impacts",
"demonstrated_through": "Recognition that codes haven't been updated for changing conditions",
"proficiency_level": "advanced",
"enables_obligations": "Enables going beyond minimum compliance for public welfare",
"temporal_aspect": "During design and permitting phase",
"case_context": "Proposed additional analysis beyond regulatory requirements",
"source_text": "The local development regulations and national design codes and standards have not yet been updated to reflect changing conditions",
"is_existing_class": true,
"confidence": 0.8
},
{
"identifier": "Contractor_SafetyManagement",
"capability_class": "Construction Safety Risk Assessment Capability",
"possessed_by": "Contractor (implied)",
"capability_statement": "Sole responsibility for construction means, methods, and safety programs",
"demonstrated_through": "Contractual acceptance of safety responsibilities",
"proficiency_level": "expert",
"enables_obligations": "Fulfills legal and ethical obligations for worker safety during construction",
"temporal_aspect": "During construction phase",
"case_context": "Expected to identify and mitigate safety risks in Engineer T's design",
"source_text": "Contractor shall be solely responsible for the means, methods, techniques, sequences, and procedures of construction",
"is_existing_class": false,
"confidence": 0.9
},
{
"identifier": "EngineerT_ConstructabilityGap",
"capability_class": "Constructability Review Capability",
"possessed_by": "Engineer T (lacking)",
"capability_statement": "Did not request constructability or safety review for challenging design aspects",
"demonstrated_through": "Absence of action despite unusual construction challenges",
"proficiency_level": "basic",
"enables_obligations": "Missed opportunity to more fully hold paramount public safety",
"temporal_aspect": "During design development phase",
"case_context": "Could have prevented accident through additional review",
"source_text": "Another option would have been for Engineer T to request a constructability review",
"is_existing_class": false,
"confidence": 0.85
}
]
}
```