Step 1b: Contextual Framework Pass (Discussion)

Extract roles, states, and resources from the discussion section

Acknowledging Errors in Design
Step 1 of 5

Discussion Section

Section Content:
Discussion:
This case addresses two ethical issues in engineering practice: to what extent are design engineers obligated to account for construction safety risks in their designs if they are not trained or have experience in construction safety methods, and are engineers obligated by the NSPE Code of Ethics to “acknowledge errors” when it is not clear an error has been made.
The first issue, having to do with considering construction safety risks in the design, can be approached from both a legal/contractual (i.e., risk management) perspective and from an ethical perspective.
On the legal/contractual side, many professional engineers familiar with construction contracts believe contract language sufficiently settles the matter.
They point to standard construction contract provisions such as, “Contractor shall be solely responsible for the means, methods, techniques, sequences, and procedures of construction” (Engineers Joint Contract Documents Committee [EJCDC], C-700, Standard General Conditions of the Construction Contract, Article 7, Paragraph 7.01A).
The construction contracts also include provisions identifying the Contractor’s sole responsibility for initiating, maintaining, and supervising all safety programs and precautions (Article 7, Paragraph 7.13A), for obtaining additional services as needed to carry out Contractor’s safety responsibilities (Article 7, Paragraph 7.01B), and for taking necessary precautions for safety and providing necessary protection to prevent damage, injury, or loss to all persons on the site who may be affected by the work (Article 7, Paragraph 7.13C).
Through these legal/contractual mechanisms, risk and responsibility for worker safety during construction are formally transferred to the contractor, the contractor being the party best positioned to provide for project safety.
By this view, and with reference to the present case, the contractor is solely responsible for project safety, so Engineer T did not make any design error so long as the design met the professional standard of care (which the facts suggest it did).
But engineers must also consider the ethical perspective, and that is the primary area of concern for the Board of Ethical Review.
Ethically, the facts of this case reveal a tension between the engineer doing what is professionally required, versus ”going above and beyond” in the interest of the public health, safety, and welfare.
The Board has considered this ethical tension in various ways over the years.
BER Case 97-13 introduces Engineer A, a civil engineer, who serves as a subconsultant to perform bridge inspection services on a major bridge overhaul project.
Engineer A’s scope of work is solely to identify any pavement damage on the bridge and report the damage to its client, VWX Architects.
While conducting the bridge inspection, and although not part of the scope of services for which he was retained, Engineer A notices an apparent pre-existing defective condition in a retaining wall which failed to restrain a vehicle, leading to a fatal accident involving Police Officer B.
Engineer A surmises that the defective condition may have been a contributing factor in the wall failure and notes this in the engineering notes.
Engineer A verbally reports this information to the client, which then verbally reports the information to the public agency.
In finding it was ethical for Engineer A to retain the information in the engineering notes, but not include it in the final written report, the Board noted that Engineer A did the appropriate thing in coming forward to the client with the information and also by documenting the information for possible future reference as appropriate.
But under the circumstances “it would have been improper for Engineer A to include reference to the information in his final report, particularly since it would have been based upon mere speculation and not careful testing or evaluation by a competent individual or firm.” In fact, the Board opined that had Engineer A formally “reported” the matter publicly, it would have been “an overreaction and could easily have risked jeopardizing the professional reputations of [Engineer A’s] client and the public agency.” The key finding from Case 97-13 is that the public welfare was best served by Engineer A exercising restraint in reporting.
This parallels the current case, where Engineer A identified a safety risk in the design details, but per customary professional practice relied on the contractor (who had specific construction safety expertise) to address the issue.
A second example is BER Case 21-2 , where a second Engineer A serves as a consulting engineer representing Client B, a developer who is proposing to develop a healthcare facility that requires a significant upgrade to the property’s access road that crosses a tidal saltmarsh.
Engineer A’s scope includes design and local permitting of the roadway, including an upgrade of the tidal crossing from a small culvert to a small bridge, increasing its hydraulic capacity.
The local development regulations and national design codes and standards have not yet been updated to reflect changing conditions and weather patterns, including effects of sea level rise and changes in precipitation intensities and recurrence intervals effected by on-going climate change.
It is Engineer A’s judgment, based on hydraulic evaluation procedures presented at a recent transportation agency conference, that the proposed project may result in some upstream homes becoming uninhabitable a decade or more earlier than would otherwise be the case.
Engineer A proposes a complex and costly hydrologic and hydraulic analysis by a specialized subconsultant to predict the extent to which sea level rise and the increased hydraulic capacity of the tidal crossing will result in flood damage to a neighborhood of twenty upstream homes during future high tides and storm surges, anticipating this to be a difficult question to answer in the project’s public hearings.
Client B directs Engineer A to proceed without the costly analysis unless and until such an analysis is requested by the applicable regulatory authorities.
In this case, the BER found that “if Engineer A is reasonably certain that the project will result in adverse impacts to public health, safety, and welfare, and if the Client B denies the requisite evaluation, Engineer A should include the concern regarding potential adverse public health, safety, and welfare impacts in an engineering report for consideration by regulatory agencies and the public.” Thus, the key finding from Case 21-2 is that the public welfare was best served by Engineer A reporting the public health, safety, and welfare concerns, even if the client did not wish for this to be done.
This differs from the current case, not because public health, safety, and welfare is somehow less important now than in Case 21-2 , but because a project delivery process exists in this case by which it was accepted professional practice for Engineer A to complete the structural design, and rely on the contractor to handle safety aspects of construction.
The Engineer A from Case 21-2 did not have this option.
Finally, there is BER Case 02-5 where a third Engineer A, a structural engineer with experience in the design of structures in the region in which the current project is located, designed a structural system that Engineer A believed was sound and met applicable codes.
However, new and improved design methods had recently been suggested in an article published in a technical journal, addressing new information regarding severe weather design in that region.
Engineer A had not read that technical journal article.
Within a year following construction, the building was damaged by severe weather conditions.
It was determined that had the methods suggested in the technical articles been utilized in design, the damage would not have occurred.
The BER concluded that it was not unethical for Engineer A to fail to follow methods suggested in a recent technical journal article that Engineer A had not reviewed.
The BER indicated that they believed that the definition of what is “current practice” must be discerning and reasonable.
The key finding from Case 02-5 was that engineers cannot be expected (obligated) to incorporate each and every new, innovative technique until such techniques are incorporated into generally accepted practice and become standards that should be followed.
Engineer T (in the current case) and Engineer A ( Case 02-5 ) both followed accepted standard design practice.
But these same engineers also had the opportunity (not obligation) to take the public welfare more firmly into account, to go above and beyond what was legally and ethically required.
While they cannot be ethically faulted for not “going the extra mile” for the sake of the public health, safety, and welfare, the project outcomes likely would have been better if these engineers had done so.
In hindsight, knowing the outcomes, the BER believes all parties would have wanted to at least consider the opportunity.
Collectively, the prior BER Cases reveal several principles to guide the engineer relative to the ethics of the situation.
First, the engineer must hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public.
Second, engineers must be competent in their areas of service.
Third, engineers must be honest, and issue public statements only in an objective and truthful manner.
Fourth, the engineer must acknowledge their errors and not distort or alter the facts.
These ethical obligations are required, and non-negotiable.
So it is within this context that the engineer must determine how best to satisfy their obligations.
The facts of the present case do not raise concerns about Engineer T’s competence in performing structural engineering design work.
Further, Engineer T’s structural modification approach appears to have been straightforward, professionally designed, and properly presented in the construction documents.
Not only this, but the design specifically mentions that the new structural connections were located in such a way that access was limited.
These points demonstrate proper awareness and consideration of public safety, health, and welfare.
When the design was completed, the facts imply Engineer T relied on the contractor to provide for worker safety during construction, and formally transferred this risk and responsibility via standard contractual language.
Further, the facts indicate the contractor accepted the construction risk and responsibility without any question.
On this basis, the facts do not suggest Engineer T made a design error.
As with Engineer A in Case 97-13 , the fact that Engineer T (this present case) noticed after the accident that an alternative design approach could have prevented the worker injury does not mean that Engineer T was required to report this as an error.
But the question remains – similar to Case 21-2 and Case 02-5 – whether Engineer T did all that could have been done for worker safety?
After all, the solution approach Engineer T followed for this project did include an unusual and challenging construction aspect.
Was it enough simply to call attention to this and shift safety responsibility to the contractor?
Case 21-2 suggests it would have been ethically appropriate (an opportunity, not an obligation) for Engineer T to identify not just the straightforward design alternative, but also the more involved structural modification concept, to identify and discuss the benefits and drawbacks of both options, and to place these matters before the client and other members of the design team, possibly including the contractor, early in the process.
Another option would have been for Engineer T to request a constructability review, or an independent construction safety review, or to inquire whether the contractor’s construction safety plan had flagged the heightened safety risk.
If so, perhaps the issue would have been raised and alternatives might have been addressed.
But Engineer T did not actively seek this input, and perhaps that is why Engineer T “felt some personal responsibility for the accident.” But was this an “error?” Did Engineer T and/or Engineer B deviate from ethical engineering practice under the facts?
The BER affirms the “ethical high road” of considering more than one design approach, and certainly the BER would agree with seeking critical input from construction safety professionals.
But as in Case 02-5 , the BER does not view Engineer T’s design as unethical.
While the construction accident and worker injury are tragic outcomes, because Engineer T’s design approach represented professional practice consistent with the standard of care, the BER sees this more as a missed opportunity than an ethical lapse and concludes that no “error” was made in design.
Was it ethical for Engineer T not to acknowledge an error after the accident occurred?
The facts of this case and especially the discussion between Engineer T and Engineer B, as well as the legal/contractual perspective and ethical considerations outlined above, provide a rationale as to why Engineer T’s design was not an “error.” Because there was no error, Engineer T was not ethically obligated to acknowledge an error after the accident occurred.
However, the BER believes this project was a missed opportunity for Engineer T to more fully and carefully hold paramount the public safety, health, and welfare.
The BER believes Engineer T should state that while no error was made, based on hindsight, other ways to approach the project existed which may have prevented the accident and worker injury.
The view is consistent with ethics provisions that require engineers to be objective and truthful in professional reports, statements, or testimony; that engineers include all relevant and pertinent information, that they not distort or alter the facts, and avoid the use of statements containing a material misrepresentation of fact or omitting a material fact; and that they accept personal responsibility for their professional activities.
Such conversation will not only allow Engineer T’s firm and others to benefit from lessons learned through this very difficult experience but will also promote continued professional development relative to projects of this type.
Was it ethical for Engineer T not to acknowledge an error during the deposition?
Again, using the same analysis presented above, the BER concludes that Engineer T’s design was not an “error.” Because there was no error, Engineer T was not ethically obligated to acknowledge an error during the deposition.
Engineer T should respond clearly and honestly when questioned about the project, including T’s views on alternative design approaches vis-à-vis the public safety, health, and welfare, but should not characterize the work as a design error.
Roles Extraction
LLM Prompt
DUAL ROLE EXTRACTION - Professional Roles Analysis EXISTING ROLE CLASSES IN ONTOLOGY: - Employer Relationship Role: Organizational relationship balancing loyalty and independence - Engineer Role: A professional role involving engineering practice and responsibilities - Participant Role: A role of an involved party or stakeholder that does not itself establish professional obligations ( - Professional Peer Role: Collegial relationship with mentoring and review obligations - Professional Role: A role within a profession that entails recognized ends/goals of practice (e.g., safeguarding public - Provider-Client Role: Service delivery relationship with duties of competence and care - Public Responsibility Role: Societal obligation that can override other professional duties - Role: A role that can be realized by processes involving professional duties and ethical obligations. This - Stakeholder Role: A participant role borne by stakeholders such as Clients, Employers, and the Public. Typically not t - Test Professional Role: Test class for source reference - Test Professional Role: Test class for source reference - Test Professional Role: Test class for source reference - Test Professional Role: Test class for source reference - Test Professional Role: Test class for source reference === TASK === From the following case text (discussion section), extract information at TWO levels: LEVEL 1 - NEW ROLE CLASSES: Identify professional roles that appear to be NEW types not covered by existing classes above. Look for: - Specialized professional functions - Emerging role types in engineering/technology - Domain-specific professional positions - Roles with unique qualifications or responsibilities For each NEW role class, provide: - label: Clear professional role name - definition: Detailed description of role function and scope - distinguishing_features: What makes this role unique/different - professional_scope: Areas of responsibility and authority - typical_qualifications: Required education, licensing, experience - generated_obligations: What specific duties does this role create? - associated_virtues: What virtues/qualities are expected (integrity, competence, etc.)? - relationship_type: Provider-Client, Professional Peer, Employer, Public Responsibility - domain_context: Engineering/Medical/Legal/etc. - examples_from_case: How this role appears in the case text - source_text: EXACT text snippet from the case where this role class is first identified or described (max 200 characters) LEVEL 2 - ROLE INDIVIDUALS: Identify specific people mentioned who fulfill professional roles. For each person: - name: EXACT name or identifier as it appears in the text (e.g., "Engineer A", "Client B", "Dr. Smith") - role_classification: Which role class they fulfill (use existing classes when possible, or new class label if discovered) - attributes: Specific qualifications, experience, titles, licenses mentioned in the text - relationships: Employment, reporting, collaboration relationships explicitly stated - Each relationship should specify: type (employs, reports_to, collaborates_with, serves_client, etc.) and target (person/org name) - active_obligations: What specific duties is this person fulfilling in the case? - ethical_tensions: Any conflicts between role obligations and personal/other obligations? - case_involvement: How they participate in this case - source_text: EXACT text snippet from the case where this individual is first mentioned or described (max 200 characters) IMPORTANT: Use ONLY the actual names/identifiers found in the case text. DO NOT create realistic names or make up details not explicitly stated. CASE TEXT: This case addresses two ethical issues in engineering practice: to what extent are design engineers obligated to account for construction safety risks in their designs if they are not trained or have experience in construction safety methods, and are engineers obligated by the NSPE Code of Ethics to “acknowledge errors” when it is not clear an error has been made. The first issue, having to do with considering construction safety risks in the design, can be approached from both a legal/contractual (i.e., risk management) perspective and from an ethical perspective. On the legal/contractual side, many professional engineers familiar with construction contracts believe contract language sufficiently settles the matter. They point to standard construction contract provisions such as, “Contractor shall be solely responsible for the means, methods, techniques, sequences, and procedures of construction” (Engineers Joint Contract Documents Committee [EJCDC], C-700, Standard General Conditions of the Construction Contract, Article 7, Paragraph 7.01A). The construction contracts also include provisions identifying the Contractor’s sole responsibility for initiating, maintaining, and supervising all safety programs and precautions (Article 7, Paragraph 7.13A), for obtaining additional services as needed to carry out Contractor’s safety responsibilities (Article 7, Paragraph 7.01B), and for taking necessary precautions for safety and providing necessary protection to prevent damage, injury, or loss to all persons on the site who may be affected by the work (Article 7, Paragraph 7.13C). Through these legal/contractual mechanisms, risk and responsibility for worker safety during construction are formally transferred to the contractor, the contractor being the party best positioned to provide for project safety.  By this view, and with reference to the present case, the contractor is solely responsible for project safety, so Engineer T did not make any design error so long as the design met the professional standard of care (which the facts suggest it did). But engineers must also consider the ethical perspective, and that is the primary area of concern for the Board of Ethical Review. Ethically, the facts of this case reveal a tension between the engineer doing what is professionally required, versus ”going above and beyond” in the interest of the public health, safety, and welfare. The Board has considered this ethical tension in various ways over the years. BER Case 97-13 introduces Engineer A, a civil engineer, who serves as a subconsultant to perform bridge inspection services on a major bridge overhaul project. Engineer A’s scope of work is solely to identify any pavement damage on the bridge and report the damage to its client, VWX Architects. While conducting the bridge inspection, and although not part of the scope of services for which he was retained, Engineer A notices an apparent pre-existing defective condition in a retaining wall which failed to restrain a vehicle, leading to a fatal accident involving Police Officer B. Engineer A surmises that the defective condition may have been a contributing factor in the wall failure and notes this in the engineering notes. Engineer A verbally reports this information to the client, which then verbally reports the information to the public agency. In finding it was ethical for Engineer A to retain the information in the engineering notes, but not include it in the final written report, the Board noted that Engineer A did the appropriate thing in coming forward to the client with the information and also by documenting the information for possible future reference as appropriate. But under the circumstances “it would have been improper for Engineer A to include reference to the information in his final report, particularly since it would have been based upon mere speculation and not careful testing or evaluation by a competent individual or firm.” In fact, the Board opined that had Engineer A formally “reported” the matter publicly, it would have been “an overreaction and could easily have risked jeopardizing the professional reputations of [Engineer A’s] client and the public agency.” The key finding from Case 97-13 is that the public welfare was best served by Engineer A exercising restraint in reporting. This parallels the current case, where Engineer A identified a safety risk in the design details, but per customary professional practice relied on the contractor (who had specific construction safety expertise) to address the issue. A second example is BER Case 21-2 , where a second Engineer A serves as a consulting engineer representing Client B, a developer who is proposing to develop a healthcare facility that requires a significant upgrade to the property’s access road that crosses a tidal saltmarsh. Engineer A’s scope includes design and local permitting of the roadway, including an upgrade of the tidal crossing from a small culvert to a small bridge, increasing its hydraulic capacity. The local development regulations and national design codes and standards have not yet been updated to reflect changing conditions and weather patterns, including effects of sea level rise and changes in precipitation intensities and recurrence intervals effected by on-going climate change. It is Engineer A’s judgment, based on hydraulic evaluation procedures presented at a recent transportation agency conference, that the proposed project may result in some upstream homes becoming uninhabitable a decade or more earlier than would otherwise be the case. Engineer A proposes a complex and costly hydrologic and hydraulic analysis by a specialized subconsultant to predict the extent to which sea level rise and the increased hydraulic capacity of the tidal crossing will result in flood damage to a neighborhood of twenty upstream homes during future high tides and storm surges, anticipating this to be a difficult question to answer in the project’s public hearings. Client B directs Engineer A to proceed without the costly analysis unless and until such an analysis is requested by the applicable regulatory authorities. In this case, the BER found that “if Engineer A is reasonably certain that the project will result in adverse impacts to public health, safety, and welfare, and if the Client B denies the requisite evaluation, Engineer A should include the concern regarding potential adverse public health, safety, and welfare impacts in an engineering report for consideration by regulatory agencies and the public.” Thus, the key finding from Case 21-2 is that the public welfare was best served by Engineer A reporting the public health, safety, and welfare concerns, even if the client did not wish for this to be done. This differs from the current case, not because public health, safety, and welfare is somehow less important now than in Case 21-2 , but because a project delivery process exists in this case by which it was accepted professional practice for Engineer A to complete the structural design, and rely on the contractor to handle safety aspects of construction. The Engineer A from Case 21-2 did not have this option. Finally, there is BER Case 02-5 where a third Engineer A, a structural engineer with experience in the design of structures in the region in which the current project is located, designed a structural system that Engineer A believed was sound and met applicable codes. However, new and improved design methods had recently been suggested in an article published in a technical journal, addressing new information regarding severe weather design in that region. Engineer A had not read that technical journal article. Within a year following construction, the building was damaged by severe weather conditions. It was determined that had the methods suggested in the technical articles been utilized in design, the damage would not have occurred. The BER concluded that it was not unethical for Engineer A to fail to follow methods suggested in a recent technical journal article that Engineer A had not reviewed. The BER indicated that they believed that the definition of what is “current practice” must be discerning and reasonable. The key finding from Case 02-5 was that engineers cannot be expected (obligated) to incorporate each and every new, innovative technique until such techniques are incorporated into generally accepted practice and become standards that should be followed. Engineer T (in the current case) and Engineer A ( Case 02-5 ) both followed accepted standard design practice. But these same engineers also had the opportunity (not obligation) to take the public welfare more firmly into account, to go above and beyond what was legally and ethically required. While they cannot be ethically faulted for not “going the extra mile” for the sake of the public health, safety, and welfare, the project outcomes likely would have been better if these engineers had done so. In hindsight, knowing the outcomes, the BER believes all parties would have wanted to at least consider the opportunity. Collectively, the prior BER Cases reveal several principles to guide the engineer relative to the ethics of the situation. First, the engineer must hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public. Second, engineers must be competent in their areas of service. Third, engineers must be honest, and issue public statements only in an objective and truthful manner. Fourth, the engineer must acknowledge their errors and not distort or alter the facts. These ethical obligations are required, and non-negotiable. So it is within this context that the engineer must determine how best to satisfy their obligations. The facts of the present case do not raise concerns about Engineer T’s competence in performing structural engineering design work. Further, Engineer T’s structural modification approach appears to have been straightforward, professionally designed, and properly presented in the construction documents. Not only this, but the design specifically mentions that the new structural connections were located in such a way that access was limited. These points demonstrate proper awareness and consideration of public safety, health, and welfare. When the design was completed, the facts imply Engineer T relied on the contractor to provide for worker safety during construction, and formally transferred this risk and responsibility via standard contractual language. Further, the facts indicate the contractor accepted the construction risk and responsibility without any question. On this basis, the facts do not suggest Engineer T made a design error. As with Engineer A in Case 97-13 , the fact that Engineer T (this present case) noticed after the accident that an alternative design approach could have prevented the worker injury does not mean that Engineer T was required to report this as an error. But the question remains – similar to Case 21-2 and Case 02-5 – whether Engineer T did all that could have been done for worker safety? After all, the solution approach Engineer T followed for this project did include an unusual and challenging construction aspect. Was it enough simply to call attention to this and shift safety responsibility to the contractor? Case 21-2 suggests it would have been ethically appropriate (an opportunity, not an obligation) for Engineer T to identify not just the straightforward design alternative, but also the more involved structural modification concept, to identify and discuss the benefits and drawbacks of both options, and to place these matters before the client and other members of the design team, possibly including the contractor, early in the process. Another option would have been for Engineer T to request a constructability review, or an independent construction safety review, or to inquire whether the contractor’s construction safety plan had flagged the heightened safety risk. If so, perhaps the issue would have been raised and alternatives might have been addressed. But Engineer T did not actively seek this input, and perhaps that is why Engineer T “felt some personal responsibility for the accident.” But was this an “error?” Did Engineer T and/or Engineer B deviate from ethical engineering practice under the facts? The BER affirms the “ethical high road” of considering more than one design approach, and certainly the BER would agree with seeking critical input from construction safety professionals. But as in Case 02-5 , the BER does not view Engineer T’s design as unethical. While the construction accident and worker injury are tragic outcomes, because Engineer T’s design approach represented professional practice consistent with the standard of care, the BER sees this more as a missed opportunity than an ethical lapse and concludes that no “error” was made in design. Was it ethical for Engineer T not to acknowledge an error after the accident occurred? The facts of this case and especially the discussion between Engineer T and Engineer B, as well as the legal/contractual perspective and ethical considerations outlined above, provide a rationale as to why Engineer T’s design was not an “error.” Because there was no error, Engineer T was not ethically obligated to acknowledge an error after the accident occurred. However, the BER believes this project was a missed opportunity for Engineer T to more fully and carefully hold paramount the public safety, health, and welfare. The BER believes Engineer T should state that while no error was made, based on hindsight, other ways to approach the project existed which may have prevented the accident and worker injury. The view is consistent with ethics provisions that require engineers to be objective and truthful in professional reports, statements, or testimony; that engineers include all relevant and pertinent information, that they not distort or alter the facts, and avoid the use of statements containing a material misrepresentation of fact or omitting a material fact; and that they accept personal responsibility for their professional activities. Such conversation will not only allow Engineer T’s firm and others to benefit from lessons learned through this very difficult experience but will also promote continued professional development relative to projects of this type. Was it ethical for Engineer T not to acknowledge an error during the deposition? Again, using the same analysis presented above, the BER concludes that Engineer T’s design was not an “error.” Because there was no error, Engineer T was not ethically obligated to acknowledge an error during the deposition. Engineer T should respond clearly and honestly when questioned about the project, including T’s views on alternative design approaches vis-à-vis the public safety, health, and welfare, but should not characterize the work as a design error. Respond with valid JSON in this format: { "new_role_classes": [ { "label": "Environmental Compliance Specialist", "definition": "Professional responsible for ensuring projects meet environmental regulations and standards", "distinguishing_features": ["Environmental regulation expertise", "Compliance assessment capabilities", "EPA standards knowledge"], "professional_scope": "Environmental impact assessment, regulatory compliance review, permit coordination", "typical_qualifications": ["Environmental engineering degree", "Regulatory compliance experience", "Knowledge of EPA standards"], "generated_obligations": ["Ensure regulatory compliance", "Report violations", "Maintain environmental standards"], "associated_virtues": ["Environmental stewardship", "Regulatory integrity", "Technical competence"], "relationship_type": "Provider-Client", "domain_context": "Engineering", "examples_from_case": ["Engineer A was retained to prepare environmental assessment", "specialist reviewed compliance requirements"], "source_text": "Engineer A was retained to prepare environmental assessment" } ], "role_individuals": [ { "name": "Engineer A", "role_classification": "Environmental Compliance Specialist", "attributes": { "title": "Engineer", "license": "professional engineering license", "specialization": "environmental engineer", "experience": "several years of experience" }, "relationships": [ {"type": "retained_by", "target": "Client W"} ], "case_involvement": "Retained to prepare comprehensive report addressing organic compound characteristics", "source_text": "Engineer A, a professional engineer with several years of experience, was retained by Client W" } ] }
Saved: 2025-12-20 13:36
States Extraction
LLM Prompt
EXISTING STATE CLASSES IN ONTOLOGY (DO NOT RE-EXTRACT THESE): STATE STATES: - AI Tool Inexperience State: A state where a professional is using AI tools without prior experience or full understanding of their functionality, accuracy, and limitations - AI Tool Reliance State: A state where a professional is using AI-generated content or tools for technical work without full verification processes - Certification Required State: Checkpoint state requiring formal validation processes - Client Risk Acceptance State: A state where a client has been fully informed of specific risks to vulnerable populations but chooses to proceed without mitigation measures - Climate Resilience Policy State: A state where an organization has formal policies requiring infrastructure projects to incorporate climate change resilience and sustainability considerations - Competing Duties State: State requiring ethical prioritization between conflicting obligations - Confidentiality Breach State: A state where client confidential information has been exposed to unauthorized parties or systems without prior consent - Conflict of Interest State: Professional situation where personal and professional interests compete - Disproportionate Impact Discovery State: A state where a professional has discovered that a proposed solution would disproportionately harm a specific vulnerable population under certain conditions - Insufficient Attribution State: A state where substantial contributions to work product from AI or other sources are not properly acknowledged or cited - Make Objective Truthful Statements: Requirement for honesty in professional communications - Mentor Absence State: A state where a professional lacks access to their established mentor or supervisor for guidance and quality assurance, affecting their confidence and work processes - Non-Compliant State: State requiring compliance remediation - Non-Compliant State: Problematic state requiring immediate corrective action - Objective and Truthful Statements: Requirement for honesty in professional communications - Professional Position Statement: Official position statements from professional organizations defining key concepts and standards - Provide Objective Statements: Professional communication standard - Public Statements: Requirement for honesty and objectivity in all public communications and professional statements - Regulatory Compliance State: Legal compliance context constraining actions - Stakeholder Division State: A state where stakeholder groups have expressed conflicting preferences for different technical solutions, creating competing pressures on professional decision-making - State: A quality representing conditions that affect ethical decisions and professional conduct. This is the S component of the formal specification D=(R,P,O,S,Rs,A,E,Ca,Cs). - Technical Writing Insecurity State: A state where a professional lacks confidence in a specific technical skill area despite having expertise in other aspects of their field IMPORTANT: Only extract NEW state types not listed above! You are analyzing a professional ethics case to extract both STATE CLASSES and STATE INSTANCES. DEFINITIONS: - STATE CLASS: A type of situational condition (e.g., "Conflict of Interest", "Emergency Situation", "Resource Constraint") - STATE INDIVIDUAL: A specific instance of a state active in this case attached to specific people/organizations CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Every STATE CLASS you identify MUST be based on at least one specific STATE INDIVIDUAL instance in the case. You cannot propose a state class without providing the concrete instance(s) that demonstrate it. KEY INSIGHT FROM LITERATURE: States are not abstract - they are concrete conditions affecting specific actors at specific times. Each state has a subject (WHO is in the state), temporal boundaries (WHEN), and causal relationships (WHY). YOUR TASK - Extract two LINKED types of entities: 1. NEW STATE CLASSES (types not in the existing ontology above): - Novel types of situational states discovered in this case - Must be sufficiently general to apply to other cases - Should represent distinct environmental or contextual conditions - Consider both inertial (persistent) and non-inertial (momentary) fluents 2. STATE INDIVIDUALS (specific instances in this case): - Specific states active in this case narrative - MUST be attached to specific individuals or organizations in the case - Include temporal properties (when initiated, when terminated) - Include causal relationships (triggered by what event, affects which obligations) - Map to existing classes where possible, or to new classes you discover EXTRACTION GUIDELINES: For NEW STATE CLASSES, identify: - Label: Clear, professional name for the state type - Definition: What this state represents - Activation conditions: What events/conditions trigger this state - Termination conditions: What events/conditions end this state - Persistence type: "inertial" (persists until terminated) or "non-inertial" (momentary) - Affected obligations: Which professional duties does this state affect? - Temporal properties: How does this state evolve over time? - Domain context: Medical/Engineering/Legal/etc. - Examples from case: Specific instances showing this state type For STATE INDIVIDUALS, identify: - Identifier: Unique descriptor (e.g., "John_Smith_ConflictOfInterest_ProjectX") - State class: Which state type it represents (existing or new) - Subject: WHO is in this state (person/organization name from the case) - Initiated by: What event triggered this state? - Initiated at: When did this state begin? - Terminated by: What event ended this state (if applicable)? - Terminated at: When did this state end (if applicable)? - Affects obligations: Which specific obligations were affected? - Urgency/Intensity: Does this state's urgency change over time? - Related parties: Who else is affected by this state? - Case involvement: How this state affected the case outcome CASE TEXT FROM discussion SECTION: This case addresses two ethical issues in engineering practice: to what extent are design engineers obligated to account for construction safety risks in their designs if they are not trained or have experience in construction safety methods, and are engineers obligated by the NSPE Code of Ethics to “acknowledge errors” when it is not clear an error has been made. The first issue, having to do with considering construction safety risks in the design, can be approached from both a legal/contractual (i.e., risk management) perspective and from an ethical perspective. On the legal/contractual side, many professional engineers familiar with construction contracts believe contract language sufficiently settles the matter. They point to standard construction contract provisions such as, “Contractor shall be solely responsible for the means, methods, techniques, sequences, and procedures of construction” (Engineers Joint Contract Documents Committee [EJCDC], C-700, Standard General Conditions of the Construction Contract, Article 7, Paragraph 7.01A). The construction contracts also include provisions identifying the Contractor’s sole responsibility for initiating, maintaining, and supervising all safety programs and precautions (Article 7, Paragraph 7.13A), for obtaining additional services as needed to carry out Contractor’s safety responsibilities (Article 7, Paragraph 7.01B), and for taking necessary precautions for safety and providing necessary protection to prevent damage, injury, or loss to all persons on the site who may be affected by the work (Article 7, Paragraph 7.13C). Through these legal/contractual mechanisms, risk and responsibility for worker safety during construction are formally transferred to the contractor, the contractor being the party best positioned to provide for project safety.  By this view, and with reference to the present case, the contractor is solely responsible for project safety, so Engineer T did not make any design error so long as the design met the professional standard of care (which the facts suggest it did). But engineers must also consider the ethical perspective, and that is the primary area of concern for the Board of Ethical Review. Ethically, the facts of this case reveal a tension between the engineer doing what is professionally required, versus ”going above and beyond” in the interest of the public health, safety, and welfare. The Board has considered this ethical tension in various ways over the years. BER Case 97-13 introduces Engineer A, a civil engineer, who serves as a subconsultant to perform bridge inspection services on a major bridge overhaul project. Engineer A’s scope of work is solely to identify any pavement damage on the bridge and report the damage to its client, VWX Architects. While conducting the bridge inspection, and although not part of the scope of services for which he was retained, Engineer A notices an apparent pre-existing defective condition in a retaining wall which failed to restrain a vehicle, leading to a fatal accident involving Police Officer B. Engineer A surmises that the defective condition may have been a contributing factor in the wall failure and notes this in the engineering notes. Engineer A verbally reports this information to the client, which then verbally reports the information to the public agency. In finding it was ethical for Engineer A to retain the information in the engineering notes, but not include it in the final written report, the Board noted that Engineer A did the appropriate thing in coming forward to the client with the information and also by documenting the information for possible future reference as appropriate. But under the circumstances “it would have been improper for Engineer A to include reference to the information in his final report, particularly since it would have been based upon mere speculation and not careful testing or evaluation by a competent individual or firm.” In fact, the Board opined that had Engineer A formally “reported” the matter publicly, it would have been “an overreaction and could easily have risked jeopardizing the professional reputations of [Engineer A’s] client and the public agency.” The key finding from Case 97-13 is that the public welfare was best served by Engineer A exercising restraint in reporting. This parallels the current case, where Engineer A identified a safety risk in the design details, but per customary professional practice relied on the contractor (who had specific construction safety expertise) to address the issue. A second example is BER Case 21-2 , where a second Engineer A serves as a consulting engineer representing Client B, a developer who is proposing to develop a healthcare facility that requires a significant upgrade to the property’s access road that crosses a tidal saltmarsh. Engineer A’s scope includes design and local permitting of the roadway, including an upgrade of the tidal crossing from a small culvert to a small bridge, increasing its hydraulic capacity. The local development regulations and national design codes and standards have not yet been updated to reflect changing conditions and weather patterns, including effects of sea level rise and changes in precipitation intensities and recurrence intervals effected by on-going climate change. It is Engineer A’s judgment, based on hydraulic evaluation procedures presented at a recent transportation agency conference, that the proposed project may result in some upstream homes becoming uninhabitable a decade or more earlier than would otherwise be the case. Engineer A proposes a complex and costly hydrologic and hydraulic analysis by a specialized subconsultant to predict the extent to which sea level rise and the increased hydraulic capacity of the tidal crossing will result in flood damage to a neighborhood of twenty upstream homes during future high tides and storm surges, anticipating this to be a difficult question to answer in the project’s public hearings. Client B directs Engineer A to proceed without the costly analysis unless and until such an analysis is requested by the applicable regulatory authorities. In this case, the BER found that “if Engineer A is reasonably certain that the project will result in adverse impacts to public health, safety, and welfare, and if the Client B denies the requisite evaluation, Engineer A should include the concern regarding potential adverse public health, safety, and welfare impacts in an engineering report for consideration by regulatory agencies and the public.” Thus, the key finding from Case 21-2 is that the public welfare was best served by Engineer A reporting the public health, safety, and welfare concerns, even if the client did not wish for this to be done. This differs from the current case, not because public health, safety, and welfare is somehow less important now than in Case 21-2 , but because a project delivery process exists in this case by which it was accepted professional practice for Engineer A to complete the structural design, and rely on the contractor to handle safety aspects of construction. The Engineer A from Case 21-2 did not have this option. Finally, there is BER Case 02-5 where a third Engineer A, a structural engineer with experience in the design of structures in the region in which the current project is located, designed a structural system that Engineer A believed was sound and met applicable codes. However, new and improved design methods had recently been suggested in an article published in a technical journal, addressing new information regarding severe weather design in that region. Engineer A had not read that technical journal article. Within a year following construction, the building was damaged by severe weather conditions. It was determined that had the methods suggested in the technical articles been utilized in design, the damage would not have occurred. The BER concluded that it was not unethical for Engineer A to fail to follow methods suggested in a recent technical journal article that Engineer A had not reviewed. The BER indicated that they believed that the definition of what is “current practice” must be discerning and reasonable. The key finding from Case 02-5 was that engineers cannot be expected (obligated) to incorporate each and every new, innovative technique until such techniques are incorporated into generally accepted practice and become standards that should be followed. Engineer T (in the current case) and Engineer A ( Case 02-5 ) both followed accepted standard design practice. But these same engineers also had the opportunity (not obligation) to take the public welfare more firmly into account, to go above and beyond what was legally and ethically required. While they cannot be ethically faulted for not “going the extra mile” for the sake of the public health, safety, and welfare, the project outcomes likely would have been better if these engineers had done so. In hindsight, knowing the outcomes, the BER believes all parties would have wanted to at least consider the opportunity. Collectively, the prior BER Cases reveal several principles to guide the engineer relative to the ethics of the situation. First, the engineer must hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public. Second, engineers must be competent in their areas of service. Third, engineers must be honest, and issue public statements only in an objective and truthful manner. Fourth, the engineer must acknowledge their errors and not distort or alter the facts. These ethical obligations are required, and non-negotiable. So it is within this context that the engineer must determine how best to satisfy their obligations. The facts of the present case do not raise concerns about Engineer T’s competence in performing structural engineering design work. Further, Engineer T’s structural modification approach appears to have been straightforward, professionally designed, and properly presented in the construction documents. Not only this, but the design specifically mentions that the new structural connections were located in such a way that access was limited. These points demonstrate proper awareness and consideration of public safety, health, and welfare. When the design was completed, the facts imply Engineer T relied on the contractor to provide for worker safety during construction, and formally transferred this risk and responsibility via standard contractual language. Further, the facts indicate the contractor accepted the construction risk and responsibility without any question. On this basis, the facts do not suggest Engineer T made a design error. As with Engineer A in Case 97-13 , the fact that Engineer T (this present case) noticed after the accident that an alternative design approach could have prevented the worker injury does not mean that Engineer T was required to report this as an error. But the question remains – similar to Case 21-2 and Case 02-5 – whether Engineer T did all that could have been done for worker safety? After all, the solution approach Engineer T followed for this project did include an unusual and challenging construction aspect. Was it enough simply to call attention to this and shift safety responsibility to the contractor? Case 21-2 suggests it would have been ethically appropriate (an opportunity, not an obligation) for Engineer T to identify not just the straightforward design alternative, but also the more involved structural modification concept, to identify and discuss the benefits and drawbacks of both options, and to place these matters before the client and other members of the design team, possibly including the contractor, early in the process. Another option would have been for Engineer T to request a constructability review, or an independent construction safety review, or to inquire whether the contractor’s construction safety plan had flagged the heightened safety risk. If so, perhaps the issue would have been raised and alternatives might have been addressed. But Engineer T did not actively seek this input, and perhaps that is why Engineer T “felt some personal responsibility for the accident.” But was this an “error?” Did Engineer T and/or Engineer B deviate from ethical engineering practice under the facts? The BER affirms the “ethical high road” of considering more than one design approach, and certainly the BER would agree with seeking critical input from construction safety professionals. But as in Case 02-5 , the BER does not view Engineer T’s design as unethical. While the construction accident and worker injury are tragic outcomes, because Engineer T’s design approach represented professional practice consistent with the standard of care, the BER sees this more as a missed opportunity than an ethical lapse and concludes that no “error” was made in design. Was it ethical for Engineer T not to acknowledge an error after the accident occurred? The facts of this case and especially the discussion between Engineer T and Engineer B, as well as the legal/contractual perspective and ethical considerations outlined above, provide a rationale as to why Engineer T’s design was not an “error.” Because there was no error, Engineer T was not ethically obligated to acknowledge an error after the accident occurred. However, the BER believes this project was a missed opportunity for Engineer T to more fully and carefully hold paramount the public safety, health, and welfare. The BER believes Engineer T should state that while no error was made, based on hindsight, other ways to approach the project existed which may have prevented the accident and worker injury. The view is consistent with ethics provisions that require engineers to be objective and truthful in professional reports, statements, or testimony; that engineers include all relevant and pertinent information, that they not distort or alter the facts, and avoid the use of statements containing a material misrepresentation of fact or omitting a material fact; and that they accept personal responsibility for their professional activities. Such conversation will not only allow Engineer T’s firm and others to benefit from lessons learned through this very difficult experience but will also promote continued professional development relative to projects of this type. Was it ethical for Engineer T not to acknowledge an error during the deposition? Again, using the same analysis presented above, the BER concludes that Engineer T’s design was not an “error.” Because there was no error, Engineer T was not ethically obligated to acknowledge an error during the deposition. Engineer T should respond clearly and honestly when questioned about the project, including T’s views on alternative design approaches vis-à-vis the public safety, health, and welfare, but should not characterize the work as a design error. Respond with a JSON structure. Here's a CONCRETE EXAMPLE showing the required linkage: EXAMPLE (if the case mentions "Engineer A faced a conflict when discovering his brother worked for the contractor"): { "new_state_classes": [ { "label": "Family Conflict of Interest", "definition": "A state where a professional's family relationships create potential bias in professional decisions", "activation_conditions": ["Discovery of family member involvement", "Family member has financial interest"], "termination_conditions": ["Recusal from decision", "Family member withdraws"], "persistence_type": "inertial", "affected_obligations": ["Duty of impartiality", "Disclosure requirements"], "temporal_properties": "Persists until formally addressed through recusal or disclosure", "domain_context": "Engineering", "examples_from_case": ["Engineer A discovered brother worked for ABC Contractors"], "source_text": "Engineer A faced a conflict when discovering his brother worked for the contractor", "confidence": 0.85, "rationale": "Specific type of conflict not covered by general COI in existing ontology" } ], "state_individuals": [ { "identifier": "EngineerA_FamilyConflict_ABCContractors", "state_class": "Family Conflict of Interest", "subject": "Engineer A", "initiated_by": "Discovery that brother is senior manager at ABC Contractors", "initiated_at": "When bidding process began", "terminated_by": "Engineer A recused from contractor selection", "terminated_at": "Two weeks after discovery", "affects_obligations": ["Maintain impartial contractor selection", "Disclose conflicts to client"], "urgency_level": "high", "related_parties": ["Client B", "ABC Contractors", "Engineer A's brother"], "case_involvement": "Led to Engineer A's recusal from contractor selection process", "source_text": "Engineer A discovered his brother is senior manager at ABC Contractors during the bidding process", "is_existing_class": false, "confidence": 0.9 } ] } YOUR RESPONSE FORMAT (use the same structure with YOUR case's specific details): { "new_state_classes": [ // For each new state type you discover ], "state_individuals": [ // For each specific instance in the case (MUST have at least one per new class) ] } EXTRACTION RULES: 1. For EVERY new state class you identify, you MUST provide at least one corresponding state individual 2. State individuals MUST have a clear subject (specific person/organization from the case) 3. If you cannot identify a specific instance, do not create the state class 4. States without subjects are invalid (e.g., cannot have "general emergency" - must be "City M's water emergency") 5. Each state individual should clearly demonstrate why its state class is needed Focus on states that: 1. Are attached to specific individuals or organizations mentioned in the case 2. Have clear temporal boundaries (when initiated, when terminated) 3. Affect specific ethical obligations or professional duties 4. Show causal relationships with events in the case 5. Demonstrate the context-dependent nature of professional ethics EXAMPLE OF CORRECT EXTRACTION: State Class: "Public Health Risk State" State Individual: "City_M_PublicHealthRisk_2023" with subject="City M", initiated_by="Decision to change water source", affects_obligations=["Ensure public safety", "Provide clean water"] EXAMPLE OF INCORRECT EXTRACTION: State Class: "Emergency Situation" with NO corresponding individual (INVALID - no specific instance)
Saved: 2025-12-20 13:37
Resources Extraction
LLM Prompt
EXISTING RESOURCE CLASSES IN ONTOLOGY (DO NOT RE-EXTRACT THESE): - Legal Resource: Legal framework constraining professional practice - Resource: An independent continuant entity that serves as input or reference for professional activities. This is the Rs component of the formal specification D=(R,P,O,S,Rs,A,E,Ca,Cs). - Resource Constrained: Resource limitation affecting available actions - Resource Constraint: Limitations on available time, budget, materials, or human resources (Ganascia 2007) - Resource Type: Meta-class for specific resource types recognized by the ProEthica system - Resources Available: Resource sufficiency enabling full options IMPORTANT: Only extract NEW resource types not listed above! You are analyzing a professional ethics case to extract both RESOURCE CLASSES and RESOURCE INSTANCES. DEFINITIONS: - RESOURCE CLASS: A type of document, tool, standard, or knowledge source (e.g., "Emergency Response Protocol", "Technical Specification", "Ethics Code") - RESOURCE INDIVIDUAL: A specific instance of a resource used in this case (e.g., "NSPE Code of Ethics 2023", "City M Water Quality Standards") CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Every RESOURCE CLASS you identify MUST be based on at least one specific RESOURCE INDIVIDUAL instance in the case. You cannot propose a resource class without providing the concrete instance(s) that demonstrate it. YOUR TASK - Extract two LINKED types of entities: 1. NEW RESOURCE CLASSES (types not in the existing ontology above): - Novel types of resources discovered in this case - Must be sufficiently general to apply to other cases - Should represent distinct categories of decision-making resources - Consider documents, tools, standards, guidelines, databases, etc. 2. RESOURCE INDIVIDUALS (specific instances in this case): - Specific documents, tools, or knowledge sources mentioned - MUST have identifiable titles or descriptions - Include metadata (creator, date, version) where available - Map to existing classes where possible, or to new classes you discover EXTRACTION GUIDELINES: For NEW RESOURCE CLASSES, identify: - Label: Clear, professional name for the resource type - Definition: What this resource type represents - Resource type: document, tool, standard, guideline, database, etc. - Accessibility: public, restricted, proprietary, etc. - Authority source: Who typically creates/maintains these resources - Typical usage: How these resources are typically used - Domain context: Medical/Engineering/Legal/etc. - Examples from case: Specific instances showing this resource type For RESOURCE INDIVIDUALS, identify: - Identifier: Unique descriptor (e.g., "NSPE_CodeOfEthics_2023") - Resource class: Which resource type it represents (existing or new) - Document title: Official name or description - Created by: Organization or authority that created it - Created at: When it was created (if mentioned) - Version: Edition or version information - URL or location: Where to find it (if mentioned) - Used by: Who used this resource in the case - Used in context: How this resource was applied - Case involvement: How this resource affected decisions CASE TEXT FROM discussion SECTION: This case addresses two ethical issues in engineering practice: to what extent are design engineers obligated to account for construction safety risks in their designs if they are not trained or have experience in construction safety methods, and are engineers obligated by the NSPE Code of Ethics to “acknowledge errors” when it is not clear an error has been made. The first issue, having to do with considering construction safety risks in the design, can be approached from both a legal/contractual (i.e., risk management) perspective and from an ethical perspective. On the legal/contractual side, many professional engineers familiar with construction contracts believe contract language sufficiently settles the matter. They point to standard construction contract provisions such as, “Contractor shall be solely responsible for the means, methods, techniques, sequences, and procedures of construction” (Engineers Joint Contract Documents Committee [EJCDC], C-700, Standard General Conditions of the Construction Contract, Article 7, Paragraph 7.01A). The construction contracts also include provisions identifying the Contractor’s sole responsibility for initiating, maintaining, and supervising all safety programs and precautions (Article 7, Paragraph 7.13A), for obtaining additional services as needed to carry out Contractor’s safety responsibilities (Article 7, Paragraph 7.01B), and for taking necessary precautions for safety and providing necessary protection to prevent damage, injury, or loss to all persons on the site who may be affected by the work (Article 7, Paragraph 7.13C). Through these legal/contractual mechanisms, risk and responsibility for worker safety during construction are formally transferred to the contractor, the contractor being the party best positioned to provide for project safety.  By this view, and with reference to the present case, the contractor is solely responsible for project safety, so Engineer T did not make any design error so long as the design met the professional standard of care (which the facts suggest it did). But engineers must also consider the ethical perspective, and that is the primary area of concern for the Board of Ethical Review. Ethically, the facts of this case reveal a tension between the engineer doing what is professionally required, versus ”going above and beyond” in the interest of the public health, safety, and welfare. The Board has considered this ethical tension in various ways over the years. BER Case 97-13 introduces Engineer A, a civil engineer, who serves as a subconsultant to perform bridge inspection services on a major bridge overhaul project. Engineer A’s scope of work is solely to identify any pavement damage on the bridge and report the damage to its client, VWX Architects. While conducting the bridge inspection, and although not part of the scope of services for which he was retained, Engineer A notices an apparent pre-existing defective condition in a retaining wall which failed to restrain a vehicle, leading to a fatal accident involving Police Officer B. Engineer A surmises that the defective condition may have been a contributing factor in the wall failure and notes this in the engineering notes. Engineer A verbally reports this information to the client, which then verbally reports the information to the public agency. In finding it was ethical for Engineer A to retain the information in the engineering notes, but not include it in the final written report, the Board noted that Engineer A did the appropriate thing in coming forward to the client with the information and also by documenting the information for possible future reference as appropriate. But under the circumstances “it would have been improper for Engineer A to include reference to the information in his final report, particularly since it would have been based upon mere speculation and not careful testing or evaluation by a competent individual or firm.” In fact, the Board opined that had Engineer A formally “reported” the matter publicly, it would have been “an overreaction and could easily have risked jeopardizing the professional reputations of [Engineer A’s] client and the public agency.” The key finding from Case 97-13 is that the public welfare was best served by Engineer A exercising restraint in reporting. This parallels the current case, where Engineer A identified a safety risk in the design details, but per customary professional practice relied on the contractor (who had specific construction safety expertise) to address the issue. A second example is BER Case 21-2 , where a second Engineer A serves as a consulting engineer representing Client B, a developer who is proposing to develop a healthcare facility that requires a significant upgrade to the property’s access road that crosses a tidal saltmarsh. Engineer A’s scope includes design and local permitting of the roadway, including an upgrade of the tidal crossing from a small culvert to a small bridge, increasing its hydraulic capacity. The local development regulations and national design codes and standards have not yet been updated to reflect changing conditions and weather patterns, including effects of sea level rise and changes in precipitation intensities and recurrence intervals effected by on-going climate change. It is Engineer A’s judgment, based on hydraulic evaluation procedures presented at a recent transportation agency conference, that the proposed project may result in some upstream homes becoming uninhabitable a decade or more earlier than would otherwise be the case. Engineer A proposes a complex and costly hydrologic and hydraulic analysis by a specialized subconsultant to predict the extent to which sea level rise and the increased hydraulic capacity of the tidal crossing will result in flood damage to a neighborhood of twenty upstream homes during future high tides and storm surges, anticipating this to be a difficult question to answer in the project’s public hearings. Client B directs Engineer A to proceed without the costly analysis unless and until such an analysis is requested by the applicable regulatory authorities. In this case, the BER found that “if Engineer A is reasonably certain that the project will result in adverse impacts to public health, safety, and welfare, and if the Client B denies the requisite evaluation, Engineer A should include the concern regarding potential adverse public health, safety, and welfare impacts in an engineering report for consideration by regulatory agencies and the public.” Thus, the key finding from Case 21-2 is that the public welfare was best served by Engineer A reporting the public health, safety, and welfare concerns, even if the client did not wish for this to be done. This differs from the current case, not because public health, safety, and welfare is somehow less important now than in Case 21-2 , but because a project delivery process exists in this case by which it was accepted professional practice for Engineer A to complete the structural design, and rely on the contractor to handle safety aspects of construction. The Engineer A from Case 21-2 did not have this option. Finally, there is BER Case 02-5 where a third Engineer A, a structural engineer with experience in the design of structures in the region in which the current project is located, designed a structural system that Engineer A believed was sound and met applicable codes. However, new and improved design methods had recently been suggested in an article published in a technical journal, addressing new information regarding severe weather design in that region. Engineer A had not read that technical journal article. Within a year following construction, the building was damaged by severe weather conditions. It was determined that had the methods suggested in the technical articles been utilized in design, the damage would not have occurred. The BER concluded that it was not unethical for Engineer A to fail to follow methods suggested in a recent technical journal article that Engineer A had not reviewed. The BER indicated that they believed that the definition of what is “current practice” must be discerning and reasonable. The key finding from Case 02-5 was that engineers cannot be expected (obligated) to incorporate each and every new, innovative technique until such techniques are incorporated into generally accepted practice and become standards that should be followed. Engineer T (in the current case) and Engineer A ( Case 02-5 ) both followed accepted standard design practice. But these same engineers also had the opportunity (not obligation) to take the public welfare more firmly into account, to go above and beyond what was legally and ethically required. While they cannot be ethically faulted for not “going the extra mile” for the sake of the public health, safety, and welfare, the project outcomes likely would have been better if these engineers had done so. In hindsight, knowing the outcomes, the BER believes all parties would have wanted to at least consider the opportunity. Collectively, the prior BER Cases reveal several principles to guide the engineer relative to the ethics of the situation. First, the engineer must hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public. Second, engineers must be competent in their areas of service. Third, engineers must be honest, and issue public statements only in an objective and truthful manner. Fourth, the engineer must acknowledge their errors and not distort or alter the facts. These ethical obligations are required, and non-negotiable. So it is within this context that the engineer must determine how best to satisfy their obligations. The facts of the present case do not raise concerns about Engineer T’s competence in performing structural engineering design work. Further, Engineer T’s structural modification approach appears to have been straightforward, professionally designed, and properly presented in the construction documents. Not only this, but the design specifically mentions that the new structural connections were located in such a way that access was limited. These points demonstrate proper awareness and consideration of public safety, health, and welfare. When the design was completed, the facts imply Engineer T relied on the contractor to provide for worker safety during construction, and formally transferred this risk and responsibility via standard contractual language. Further, the facts indicate the contractor accepted the construction risk and responsibility without any question. On this basis, the facts do not suggest Engineer T made a design error. As with Engineer A in Case 97-13 , the fact that Engineer T (this present case) noticed after the accident that an alternative design approach could have prevented the worker injury does not mean that Engineer T was required to report this as an error. But the question remains – similar to Case 21-2 and Case 02-5 – whether Engineer T did all that could have been done for worker safety? After all, the solution approach Engineer T followed for this project did include an unusual and challenging construction aspect. Was it enough simply to call attention to this and shift safety responsibility to the contractor? Case 21-2 suggests it would have been ethically appropriate (an opportunity, not an obligation) for Engineer T to identify not just the straightforward design alternative, but also the more involved structural modification concept, to identify and discuss the benefits and drawbacks of both options, and to place these matters before the client and other members of the design team, possibly including the contractor, early in the process. Another option would have been for Engineer T to request a constructability review, or an independent construction safety review, or to inquire whether the contractor’s construction safety plan had flagged the heightened safety risk. If so, perhaps the issue would have been raised and alternatives might have been addressed. But Engineer T did not actively seek this input, and perhaps that is why Engineer T “felt some personal responsibility for the accident.” But was this an “error?” Did Engineer T and/or Engineer B deviate from ethical engineering practice under the facts? The BER affirms the “ethical high road” of considering more than one design approach, and certainly the BER would agree with seeking critical input from construction safety professionals. But as in Case 02-5 , the BER does not view Engineer T’s design as unethical. While the construction accident and worker injury are tragic outcomes, because Engineer T’s design approach represented professional practice consistent with the standard of care, the BER sees this more as a missed opportunity than an ethical lapse and concludes that no “error” was made in design. Was it ethical for Engineer T not to acknowledge an error after the accident occurred? The facts of this case and especially the discussion between Engineer T and Engineer B, as well as the legal/contractual perspective and ethical considerations outlined above, provide a rationale as to why Engineer T’s design was not an “error.” Because there was no error, Engineer T was not ethically obligated to acknowledge an error after the accident occurred. However, the BER believes this project was a missed opportunity for Engineer T to more fully and carefully hold paramount the public safety, health, and welfare. The BER believes Engineer T should state that while no error was made, based on hindsight, other ways to approach the project existed which may have prevented the accident and worker injury. The view is consistent with ethics provisions that require engineers to be objective and truthful in professional reports, statements, or testimony; that engineers include all relevant and pertinent information, that they not distort or alter the facts, and avoid the use of statements containing a material misrepresentation of fact or omitting a material fact; and that they accept personal responsibility for their professional activities. Such conversation will not only allow Engineer T’s firm and others to benefit from lessons learned through this very difficult experience but will also promote continued professional development relative to projects of this type. Was it ethical for Engineer T not to acknowledge an error during the deposition? Again, using the same analysis presented above, the BER concludes that Engineer T’s design was not an “error.” Because there was no error, Engineer T was not ethically obligated to acknowledge an error during the deposition. Engineer T should respond clearly and honestly when questioned about the project, including T’s views on alternative design approaches vis-à-vis the public safety, health, and welfare, but should not characterize the work as a design error. Respond with a JSON structure. Here's an EXAMPLE: EXAMPLE (if the case mentions "Engineer A consulted the NSPE Code of Ethics and the state's engineering regulations"): { "new_resource_classes": [ { "label": "State Engineering Regulations", "definition": "Legal requirements and regulations governing engineering practice at the state level", "resource_type": "regulatory_document", "accessibility": ["public", "official"], "authority_source": "State Engineering Board", "typical_usage": "Legal compliance and professional practice guidance", "domain_context": "Engineering", "examples_from_case": ["State engineering regulations consulted by Engineer A"], "source_text": "Engineer A consulted the state's engineering regulations", "confidence": 0.85, "rationale": "Specific type of regulatory resource not in existing ontology" } ], "resource_individuals": [ { "identifier": "NSPE_CodeOfEthics_Current", "resource_class": "Professional Ethics Code", "document_title": "NSPE Code of Ethics", "created_by": "National Society of Professional Engineers", "created_at": "Current version", "version": "Current", "used_by": "Engineer A", "used_in_context": "Consulted for ethical guidance on conflict of interest", "case_involvement": "Provided framework for ethical decision-making", "source_text": "Engineer A consulted the NSPE Code of Ethics", "is_existing_class": true, "confidence": 0.95 }, { "identifier": "State_Engineering_Regulations_Current", "resource_class": "State Engineering Regulations", "document_title": "State Engineering Practice Act and Regulations", "created_by": "State Engineering Board", "used_by": "Engineer A", "used_in_context": "Referenced for legal requirements", "case_involvement": "Defined legal obligations for professional practice", "source_text": "Engineer A referenced the State Engineering Practice Act and Regulations", "is_existing_class": false, "confidence": 0.9 } ] } EXTRACTION RULES: 1. For EVERY new resource class you identify, you MUST provide at least one corresponding resource individual 2. Resource individuals MUST have identifiable titles or descriptions 3. If you cannot identify a specific instance, do not create the resource class 4. Focus on resources that directly influence decision-making in the case 5. Each resource individual should clearly demonstrate why its resource class is needed Focus on resources that: 1. Are explicitly mentioned or referenced in the case 2. Guide professional decisions or actions 3. Provide standards, requirements, or frameworks 4. Serve as knowledge sources for the professionals involved
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