Step 4: Review

Engineers shall be objective and truthful in professional reports, statements, or testimony. They shall include all relevant and pertinent information in such reports, statements, or testimony, which should bear the date indicating when it was current.

Engineers shall issue no statements, criticisms, or arguments on technical matters that are inspired or paid for by interested parties, unless they have prefaced their comments by explicitly identifying the interested parties on whose behalf they are speaking, and by revealing the existence of any interest the engineers may have in the matters.

Engineers shall disclose all known or potential conflicts of interest that could influence or appear to influence their judgment or the quality of their services.

Cited as an early example of a conflict of interest arising when an engineer acted in both a private consulting capacity and a public governmental role on the same matter.

Cited as a later example illustrating the potential for conflict of interest when an engineer works simultaneously for a government agency and a private firm in related fields.

Cited as a more recent case showing an aggravated conflict of interest where an engineer blurred his public government role and private consulting work when testifying as an expert witness, which the Board contrasts with the present, less conflicted, situation.

Engineer A’s role as a private forensic engineering expert should not present any clear or apparent conflict of interest.

Engineer A has an obligation to (1) fully disclose to Attorney X his role as the chairman of the boiler code standards and safety committee within an engineering society, and (2) advise Attorney X that Engineer B serves a member of one of the technical subcommittees within the boiler code standards and safety committee.

Engineer A has an obligation to be respectful of Engineer B in his role as a member of one of the technical subcommittees within the boiler code standards and safety committee and also not engage in any written or verbal exchanges with Engineer B regarding the pending litigation without direction from legal counsel.

The Board's disclosure obligation runs only to Attorney X, but this leaves open whether transparency should extend further. Because Engineer B is directly affected by the chairman/subcommittee-member relationship and is a fellow professional bound by the same code standards apparatus, a stronger transparency norm might require that Engineer B (through opposing counsel) also be made aware that Engineer A chairs the committee. Without this, Engineer B may be blindsided by a structural relationship that Attorney X, but not Engineer B's own side, has been informed of, creating asymmetric awareness of a conflict that affects both experts equally.

The Board's finding of no clear or apparent conflict of interest understates a latent power asymmetry: Engineer A, as committee chair, holds organizational authority over the subcommittee in which Engineer B participates. Even absent any intent to misuse this position, the mere existence of a hierarchical relationship alongside an adversarial litigation posture creates a risk that Engineer B could feel professionally constrained in future committee interactions, or that others could perceive Engineer A's technical opinions in the litigation as implicitly carrying the weight of standards-committee authority over Engineer B's competing views. This dimension of institutional power differential is distinct from, and not fully captured by, the disclosure-based conflict analysis the Board offers.

The Board's directive that Engineer A avoid litigation-related communication with Engineer B absent counsel's direction does not resolve situations where committee business and the pending case substantively overlap, such as when the subcommittee is asked to interpret or revise the same boiler code provisions at issue in the explosion. In such circumstances, Engineer A may need to recuse himself from specific committee deliberations touching the disputed technical issue, or ensure counsel reviews any committee-related technical positions before they are finalized, to prevent the committee's standards work from being used, or perceived as being used, to bolster one side's litigation position.

Regarding Q101, the Board's framework suggests that full recusal from either the committee chairmanship or the litigation engagement is not required, provided disclosure is made and no substantive committee business intersects with the litigation. The obligation is one of transparency and communication avoidance rather than withdrawal from either role, since Engineer A's independent judgment as a forensic expert is treated as separable from his administrative role as committee chair.

Regarding Q102, the hierarchical relationship in which Engineer A chairs the committee overseeing the subcommittee on which Engineer B serves does create a latent power imbalance. Although the Board does not flag this as disqualifying, it is precisely why the Board imposes the Litigation Exchange Bar and the Respect for Engineer B obligation: these safeguards exist to prevent Engineer A's committee authority from being leveraged, intentionally or not, to influence Engineer B's testimony or standing.

Regarding Q103, the Board's conclusions are limited to disclosure obligations owed to Attorney X as the retaining client; they do not extend the disclosure duty to opposing counsel or to Engineer B directly. This suggests the disclosure obligation is contractual and client-protective in nature (informing Engineer A's own client of a relationship relevant to the client's risk assessment) rather than a broader transparency duty to all litigation participants, though such disclosure may occur naturally through discovery.

Regarding Q104, if committee business unavoidably overlaps with the technical issues in litigation, Engineer A would need to abstain from committee deliberations on that specific matter or ensure any code interpretation is handled through formal, documented committee channels rather than informal exchanges with Engineer B, to preserve both the integrity of the standards process and compliance with the Litigation Exchange Bar.

Regarding Q201 and Q203, the Board implicitly resolves the tension between independent judgment/honesty and respect for Engineer B by treating them as compatible rather than competing: professional respect governs personal conduct and communication, not the content or rigor of technical findings. Engineer A may issue an adverse professional opinion against Engineer B's conclusions while still maintaining collegial and respectful conduct within the committee structure, because respect is owed to the person and role, not to the substance of contested technical claims.

Regarding Q202, the Board's ordering of obligations implies that disclosure to Attorney X takes priority over any strategic concern about client perception. Engineer A's faithful agent duty does not excuse withholding disclosure of the committee relationship, since a properly informed client can decide whether to proceed; nondisclosure would itself undermine the faithful agent relationship by depriving the client of material information affecting litigation strategy and credibility.

Regarding Q301, Engineer A satisfies a deontological disclosure duty only if the disclosure to Attorney X occurs proactively and prior to formal acceptance of the engagement, not merely at some point during the litigation. The Board's language of disclosure being an 'obligation' implies a duty that must be discharged at the outset, during the Expert Engagement Request phase, to allow the client an informed decision before Engineer A's independent judgment is exercised on the client's behalf.

Regarding Q302, from a consequentialist view the Board's 'no clear or apparent conflict' finding is justified only conditionally: the outcome is acceptable because the disclosure and non-communication safeguards mitigate the risk of tainted perception, not because the shared committee relationship is inherently inconsequential. Had those safeguards been absent, the same underlying relationship could plausibly have produced a different, less favorable consequentialist assessment of fairness to the litigation process.

Regarding Q401, the Board would likely still require disclosure even if Engineer B were an ordinary society member rather than a subcommittee member, since general professional acquaintance through a shared engineering society could still constitute a potential conflict of interest under II.4.a.; however, the intensity of the obligation and the specific added instruction to avoid litigation-related exchanges appear tied specifically to the closer, hierarchically structured relationship created by the subcommittee membership under Engineer A's chairmanship.

Regarding Q402, if Engineer A were merely a general committee member rather than chair, the Board would likely still find no clear conflict of interest, but the specific disclosure obligation might be less pronounced, since the chairmanship role uniquely creates an apparent authority relationship over Engineer B's subcommittee that heightens the appearance-of-conflict concern the Board explicitly addresses in its first conclusion.

The apparent tension between Independent Judgment as Expert and Respect for Engineer B is resolved not by softening Engineer A's technical conclusions but by confining 'respect' to interpersonal conduct rather than substantive opinion. Engineer A may still render an adverse professional opinion against Engineer B's findings, but must do so without personal criticism, informal contact, or leveraging his committee authority. This shows that collegial respect operates as a behavioral constraint layered on top of, not a limitation on, independent technical judgment.

The tension between Disclosure of Committee Role and Engineer A's Faithful Agent Duty to the boiler manufacturer is resolved by treating disclosure as a precondition of faithful agency rather than a threat to it. Full, proactive disclosure to Attorney X before or upon accepting the engagement allows the client (through counsel) to make an informed decision about retaining Engineer A, which strengthens rather than undermines the client relationship by foreclosing later claims of concealment or bias. Faithful agency is thus reframed as loyalty exercised through transparency, not loyalty achieved by withholding information that might raise doubts.

The case establishes an implicit hierarchy among the competing principles rather than a genuine conflict requiring trade-offs: objectivity and truthfulness in forensic reporting (Independent Judgment, Forensic Expert Honesty) are treated as non-negotiable substantive duties; disclosure of the committee relationship is a procedural safeguard that must precede and accompany the engagement; and respect for Engineer B is a secondary, conduct-level norm that governs interpersonal interaction but never overrides the first two. Because these principles operate at different levels (substantive outcome, procedural transparency, interpersonal conduct), full compliance with all three is possible simultaneously, and no principle need be sacrificed for another—explaining why the Board found no clear or apparent conflict of interest despite the overlapping committee relationship.

What are Engineer A’s ethical obligations under the circumstances?

Should Engineer A consider recusing himself from committee chairmanship duties involving Engineer B, or from the litigation engagement itself, given the ongoing professional relationship created by the boiler code standards committee structure?

Does Engineer A's authority as committee chair over the subcommittee in which Engineer B participates create a power imbalance that could improperly influence Engineer B's professional standing or willingness to testify freely?

Should Engineer A also disclose the committee relationship to opposing counsel or to Engineer B directly, rather than only to Attorney X, to ensure full transparency to all parties in the litigation?

What obligations arise if legitimate committee business (such as interpreting the boiler code) unavoidably overlaps with technical issues central to the pending litigation between Engineer A and Engineer B?

Does the principle of Independent Judgment as Expert conflict with Respect for Engineer B, given that Engineer A must render an adverse professional opinion against someone he interacts with collegially on a standards committee?

How should Disclosure of Committee Role be balanced against Engineer A's Faithful Agent Duty to the boiler manufacturer, if disclosing the relationship risks the client questioning Engineer A's suitability as an expert?

Could Forensic Expert Honesty in Reports come into tension with Respect for Engineer B if Engineer A's truthful technical findings necessarily undermine Engineer B's credibility within their shared professional committee?

From a deontological perspective, did Engineer A fulfill their duty of disclosure by proactively informing Attorney X of both the committee chairmanship and Engineer B's subcommittee membership before accepting the engagement?

From a consequentialist perspective, did the outcome of Engineer A proceeding as expert witness justify the risk that the shared committee relationship could taint perceptions of the litigation's fairness, regardless of actual bias?

Did Engineer A act with professional integrity in maintaining respectful, arm's-length conduct toward Engineer B on committee matters while simultaneously serving as an adversarial expert witness against Engineer B's client position?

If Engineer B were not a member of any technical subcommittee under Engineer A's committee chairmanship but instead an ordinary society member with no committee ties, would the Board still have imposed the same disclosure obligation on Engineer A toward Attorney X?

If Engineer A did not chair the boiler code standards and safety committee but was merely a general member, would the Board still find no clear or apparent conflict of interest in Engineer A serving as the defense's forensic expert?

Taking on the volunteer committee chairmanship, though itself neutral and guided only by the public benefit purpose of standards work, is what later creates the conflict of interest that Engineer A must disclose once litigation reveals Engineer B is the opposing expert on the same committee.

The attorney's request to engage an expert, triggered by the pressure vessel explosion, sets in motion the discovery that the opposing expert is a fellow committee member, so this otherwise unevaluated action is the causal hinge that eventually forces both the disclosure and communication-avoidance obligations onto Engineer A.

Because both the prior committee chairmanship and the discovery of Engineer B as opposing expert converge on this action, disclosing the conflict to Attorney X fulfills the duties of full disclosure and honesty in forensic services, ensuring the litigation proceeds without hidden bias that could undermine trust in Engineer A's expert testimony.

Once the opposing expert's identity is known, avoiding litigation-related communication with Engineer B fulfills the obligations to refrain from improper contact and respect his committee role, and is guided by honesty and independent judgment so that the standards committee's work is not compromised by the adversarial litigation relationship.

The question emerged because accepting the engagement (Expert Engagement Request) collided with Engineer A's preexisting nonlitigation role as chair overseeing Engineer B, forcing a choice among competing obligations of client fidelity, disclosure, and collegial respect without a clear rule dictating priority.

The question arises because a professional standards relationship and an adversarial litigation relationship unexpectedly overlap in the same two individuals, forcing a choice between competing loyalty and integrity obligations that the committee structure did not anticipate.

The question arises because the same organizational fact, Engineer A's chairmanship over a body Engineer B belongs to, can be read either as a neutral administrative role or as a latent power asymmetry affecting litigation conduct, and the absence of an explicit rule resolving this ambiguity forces an ethical judgment.

The question arises because the disclosure principle could logically extend to all parties in litigation, yet the constraint against unauthorized exchanges with Engineer B and the faithful agent obligation to Attorney X narrow the scope of who must be told.

The question emerged because Engineer A's dual role as committee chair and opposing forensic expert creates an unavoidable structural overlap between routine professional duties and adversarial litigation interests, forcing a choice between competing loyalty and disclosure obligations without a clear rule for when the overlap becomes disqualifying.

The question arose because the same set of facts, an ongoing collegial committee relationship coinciding with an adversarial litigation role, activates two distinct professional obligations whose practical demands appear to pull in opposite directions.

The question arises because a single fact, the pre-existing professional relationship between two opposing experts on a technical committee, can be read either as material information owed to the client or as a risk to the client relationship that a faithful agent should manage carefully.

The question arose because Engineer A occupies dual roles as truthful forensic reporter and as committee chair with a collegial relationship to Engineer B, so any adverse finding forces a choice between candor and interpersonal deference within the same professional community.

The question emerges because deontological duty requires disclosure timed to precede action, and the ambiguity over whether Engineer A's disclosure preceded or followed acceptance of the engagement creates a contested boundary between formal compliance and substantive fulfillment of the disclosure duty.

The question arises because the good outcome (a competent expert serving the client) and the harm to perceived fairness (an undisclosed or under-scrutinized professional tie between opposing experts) pull toward different ethical conclusions about the same set of facts.

The question emerged because dual professional roles, one as neutral committee chair and one as retained adversarial expert, converged on the same individual relationship, forcing scrutiny of whether behavior appropriate in one role undermines obligations in the other.

This question arises because the Board's ruling rested on the specific fact of a chair-subcommittee relationship, prompting scrutiny of whether the disclosure obligation is a general rule about opposing experts or a narrower rule contingent on the degree of institutional connection between them.

The question arises because the Board's original no-conflict finding was implicitly tied to the absence of a hierarchical chair-subordinate relationship, so removing that hierarchical fact tests whether the underlying warrant was really about authority or about any professional association at all.

Given that Engineer A's forensic role and his committee chairmanship occupy separate spheres of professional activity with no overlapping authority, the board concluded there was no clear or apparent conflict of interest, provided the relationship is disclosed.

Because Engineer A held a position of committee authority directly connected to Engineer B's subcommittee role, and because Attorney X needed this information to evaluate the engagement, the board concluded that full disclosure to Attorney X was an ethical prerequisite.

Since the litigation created an adversarial relationship that coexists with an ongoing collegial committee relationship, the board concluded Engineer A must preserve respect toward Engineer B in committee matters while strictly avoiding any unauthorized litigation-related exchanges.

Because Engineer B is directly implicated in the same chair-subcommittee relationship but was not informed through the board's actual determination, this conclusion argues the board's disclosure-only-to-Attorney-X holding leaves an asymmetry that a stronger transparency norm would resolve.

Given that Engineer A's chairmanship confers organizational authority over the very subcommittee Engineer B belongs to, this conclusion argues that a latent power differential exists that the board's no-conflict finding, resting only on disclosure, does not fully capture.

Given that the subcommittee could be asked to interpret the very code provisions at issue in the explosion, the board concluded that the original communication-avoidance directive was insufficient and that recusal from specific deliberations or counsel review of committee positions is needed to prevent the standards process from being tainted by the litigation.

Because Engineer A disclosed the relationship upfront and the two roles remained functionally separate at the time of engagement, the board concluded that neither full recusal from the chairmanship nor withdrawal from the litigation engagement was required.

Given that Engineer A's chairmanship places him in a position of institutional authority over Engineer B, the board concluded the imbalance is real but manageable, provided the specific communication and respect safeguards it prescribed are honored.

Because the disclosure duty is grounded in protecting the retaining client's ability to assess risk, the board concluded that Engineer A's obligation ran only to Attorney X, leaving any broader transparency to occur through ordinary discovery processes.

Given the risk that overlapping code interpretation could be exploited or perceived as tainted by the litigation, the board concluded Engineer A must abstain from that specific matter or route it through formal channels to preserve both the standards process and the communication bar.

Given that Engineer A's disagreement with Engineer B is technical rather than personal, the board concluded that issuing an adverse opinion does not breach respect obligations, because respect attaches to the person and shared role, not to protection of contested technical claims.

Given that nondisclosure would deprive the client of material information affecting litigation strategy and credibility, the board concluded that faithful agency demands disclosure to Attorney X ahead of any concern about how the client might react.

Given that Engineer A disclosed the committee relationship during the Expert Engagement Request phase rather than after accepting the case, the board concluded the deontological duty of disclosure was satisfied because the client could exercise informed choice before Engineer A's independent judgment was engaged.

Given that Engineer A both disclosed the relationship and refrained from litigation-related exchanges with Engineer B, the board concluded the consequentialist outcome was acceptable, but only because these safeguards actively neutralized the risk that the shared relationship might taint perceptions of fairness.

Given that Engineer B's role as subcommittee member under Engineer A's chairmanship creates a closer, structured relationship, the board reasoned that even a weaker acquaintance through general society membership would trigger some disclosure duty under II.4.a, but the specific heightened safeguards followed only from the hierarchical committee relationship actually present.

Because the chairmanship gives Engineer A apparent authority over Engineer B's subcommittee, the board reasoned that removing this leadership role would reduce the salience of the disclosure duty while still permitting the same overall conclusion of no clear conflict of interest.

Given that Engineer A must issue a truthful adverse opinion while maintaining a collegial committee relationship with Engineer B, the board resolved the tension by treating respect as a constraint on interpersonal behavior rather than a limit on substantive findings, allowing full honesty without disrespect.

Because Engineer A proactively informed Attorney X of the committee relationship prior to accepting the case, the board concluded that this transparency fulfills rather than threatens the faithful agent duty, since it lets the client decide with full knowledge rather than face a later concealment claim.

Because Engineer A satisfied objectivity, timely disclosure, and respectful conduct all at once in this case, the board concluded that the principles operate at different levels rather than in real conflict, which is why no clear or apparent conflict of interest was found despite the overlapping committee relationship.

Should Engineer A fully disclose his committee chairmanship and Engineer B's subcommittee membership to Attorney X, or withhold this information since it is not a financial or adversarial conflict?

Should Engineer A limit disclosure of the committee relationship to Attorney X, or also disclose it to opposing counsel or Engineer B directly to ensure symmetric transparency?

Should Engineer A recuse himself from the committee chairmanship or the litigation engagement, or continue serving in both roles while relying on disclosure and communication safeguards?

Should Engineer A maintain respectful, arm's-length conduct toward Engineer B and avoid any litigation-related communication absent counsel's direction, or treat the committee relationship as permitting informal direct exchanges about the case?

Should Engineer A recuse himself from specific committee deliberations that overlap with the litigation's technical issues, or continue participating in all committee business as usual?