Step 4: Review

Cited as the most recent statement of the supplanting standard requiring that the complaining engineer had a contract or had been selected for negotiation for the particular work.

Cited alongside other cases as additional authority supporting the supplanting standard articulated in Case 76-5.

Cited alongside other cases as additional authority supporting the supplanting standard articulated in Case 76-5.

Cited alongside other cases as additional authority supporting the supplanting standard articulated in Case 76-5.

Cited alongside other cases as additional authority supporting the supplanting standard articulated in Case 76-5.

Cited for its interpretation of the phrase 'maliciously or falsely' under §12, used to determine whether A and Firm B's mutual criticisms violated the code even absent literal malice or falsity.

The four engineers who founded firm B did not violate the Code of Ethics by generally seeking work from former clients of Engineer A, but they were in violation of the code with regard to projects for which they had particular knowledge while in the employ of A.

The four engineers comprising Firm B acted unethically in casting doubt on the ability of Engineer A to provide quality services.

Engineer A acted unethically in casting doubt on the ability of Firm B to provide quality services.

The Board's distinction between generally permissible solicitation and impermissible supplanting turns on a factual question—whether particular knowledge of a specific client's pending project was acquired during employment with Engineer A—that the Board does not operationalize with a clear test. A more refined standard would ask whether the engineer's knowledge went beyond what any competent competitor could learn through ordinary market awareness, and whether that knowledge gave Firm B an unfair informational advantage in securing a specific, identifiable project rather than merely knowledge that the client existed and had general engineering needs.

The Board's finding of violation for particular-knowledge projects implies a remedial obligation that goes beyond mere condemnation: the four engineers should, at minimum, disclose their prior involvement to the affected clients and possibly recuse themselves from directly competing for those specific projects, allowing the client to make an informed choice untainted by the appearance of unfair advantage. The Board's silence on remedy leaves open whether disgorgement of any resulting contracts or fees would be warranted in a more severe application of the supplanting rule.

The Board's parallel findings against both Firm B's engineers and Engineer A for disparaging remarks reveal a structural asymmetry the Board does not explore: Engineer A's disparagement occurred reactively, after learning secondhand that Firm B had cast doubt on his competence, whereas Firm B's disparagement (as the initiating conduct) arguably carries greater ethical weight since it was not provoked. Treating both violations as equivalent risks obscuring the difference between initiating unprofessional conduct and responding in kind to provocation, even though neither response is excused under the objectivity principle.

The line separating permissible general familiarity from prohibited particular knowledge (Q101) appears to turn on whether the engineer's prior involvement gave them insider awareness of a specific client's needs, budget, or project status that was not otherwise publicly available. Mere awareness that a company is a potential client, based on general industry knowledge, does not trigger the supplanting bar; however, direct personal involvement in scoping, proposing, or negotiating a specific project while employed by Engineer A crosses into the territory the Board flagged as violative, since it exploits privileged access gained through the employment relationship rather than independently earned professional reputation.

Regarding Q102, the simultaneous and coordinated resignation of four key employees to immediately form a competing firm raises a distinct loyalty concern that is conceptually separate from the later solicitation issue the Board addressed. Even if no client contact occurred until after departure, the coordinated planning and organization of a competing entity likely required preparatory activity during employment (e.g., discussions, planning, possibly informal commitments) that could implicate the principle of Loyalty During Employment. The Board's silence on this dimension suggests it either found no evidence of pre-departure disloyalty or implicitly treated simultaneous resignation as ethically neutral so long as active client solicitation awaited actual departure.

On Q103, appropriate corrective action for the four engineers would logically be limited to withdrawal from, or disclosure of conflict regarding, those specific projects where they held particular knowledge from their employment with Engineer A, rather than a blanket restriction on soliciting Firm A's former client base generally. This proportionality reflects the Board's bifurcated finding in Conclusion 1: broad solicitation is permissible, but the ethical remedy must be narrowly tailored to the projects tainted by insider knowledge, potentially including recusal from bidding on those specific engagements or requiring disclosure of the prior involvement to the client.

In response to Q201, the tension between Loyalty During Employment and Fair Competition in Client Solicitation is resolved by a temporal and knowledge-based distinction rather than an outright prioritization of one principle over the other: loyalty obligations bind conduct strictly during the employment period and prohibit exploitation of confidential project-specific knowledge, but once employment ends, fair competition principles take over and permit former employees to compete broadly for clients based on their general professional reputation and skill, since clients are not the 'property' of any firm.

Addressing Q202, the tension between Objectivity in Peer Criticism and Fair Competition in Client Solicitation cannot be reconciled by framing disparaging remarks as merely aggressive marketing; the Code treats these as distinct domains. Competing for clients through legitimate means (demonstrating one's own capabilities) is permissible, but degrading a rival's competence to gain competitive advantage is not a legitimate competitive tool and independently violates the peer criticism standard, regardless of the competitive context in which it occurs. This explains why the Board found both parties, who were competing for the same clients, each independently liable for their disparaging statements.

From a deontological standpoint (Q301), the four engineers had an unconditional duty not to exploit specific client knowledge gained through their employment relationship with Engineer A, independent of any beneficial outcome their competition might produce. The Board's finding that they violated the Code specifically as to projects where they had particular knowledge indicates a rule-based judgment: the duty to respect confidential or privileged information acquired in a fiduciary employment relationship is not overridden by the general right to compete, reflecting a duty-based rather than purely consequentialist ethical framework in the Code's supplanting provisions.

Regarding Q303, the four engineers' disparaging remarks about Engineer A's capacity to deliver quality services are best understood as self-serving competitive tactics rather than honest professional assessments, since they were made precisely while soliciting the same clients for business, creating an inherent conflict of interest that undermines any claim to objective professional judgment. This self-interest taints the credibility of their statements and supports the Board's finding of an ethical violation independent of whether the substance of the criticism was factually accurate.

On Q304, even though Engineer A's counter-disparagement was arguably provoked and defensive in motivation, the Code's objectivity requirement does not permit a 'they did it first' justification; the outcome of protecting his own reputation does not excuse casting unsubstantiated doubt on Firm B's competence. This indicates the Board applied a symmetrical, non-consequentialist standard: reactive disparagement is equally unethical as initiating disparagement, since both equally violate the duty of objective, non-malicious professional criticism.

In answer to the counterfactual Q401, if none of the four engineers had personal involvement with the former clients' specific projects, the Board would likely have found no violation at all regarding those under-discussion projects, since the violation identified in Conclusion 1 was explicitly grounded in the engineers' particular prior knowledge, not merely in the fact that the projects were still under discussion with Firm A. The 'uncommitted' status of the projects alone was not sufficient to create a violation; it was the combination of that status with insider knowledge that mattered.

For counterfactual Q402, had Engineer A initiated the disparagement before learning of Firm B's remarks, the Board would likely still have characterized his conduct as an ethical violation, since Conclusion 3 rests on the objective content and effect of his statements (casting doubt on a competitor's ability to provide quality service) rather than on the sequence of provocation. The Code's objectivity standard for peer criticism does not condition wrongdoing on who spoke first; both instigating and retaliatory disparagement are treated as violations of the same underlying duty.

Considering Q403, if the projects had already been formally awarded to Firm A rather than merely under discussion, the ethical calculus would likely shift significantly: solicitation of clients regarding already-secured, formally contracted work would more clearly constitute an attempt to supplant an existing engagement, which the Code addresses directly, rather than the more ambiguous 'general future availability' solicitation the Board found permissible. Thus the Board's tolerance for general solicitation appears specifically contingent on the projects' unsettled, pre-negotiation status.

The tension between Loyalty During Employment and Fair Competition in Client Solicitation was resolved not by favoring one principle categorically over the other, but by drawing a factual line: general professional relationships built during employment may be leveraged afterward under Fair Competition, but specific project knowledge acquired through that employment remains encumbered by a residual loyalty obligation. This suggests the Board treats loyalty as a bounded, information-specific duty rather than a blanket restriction on post-employment competition, while treating fair competition as the default rule unless overridden by demonstrable informational advantage tied to the former employment relationship.

The conflict between Objectivity in Peer Criticism and Fair Competition in Client Solicitation was not resolved in favor of either party's competitive interest; instead, the Board subordinated competitive self-interest entirely to the duty of objective, non-disparaging criticism. Both Firm B and Engineer A attempted to justify their disparaging remarks as legitimate competitive responses or factual defenses, but the Board's symmetrical findings against both parties indicate that Fair Competition never licenses departure from Objectivity in Peer Criticism, even when a competitor has already cast the first doubt or when clients themselves solicit comparative judgments.

This case demonstrates a hierarchy in which Objectivity in Peer Criticism functions as a near-absolute constraint that cannot be traded off against competitive advantage, whereas Fair Competition in Client Solicitation and Loyalty During Employment function as competing default rules whose balance depends on contextual facts (such as the presence of specific project knowledge). The Board's willingness to find mutual violations on the criticism issue, but only a partial and knowledge-contingent violation on the solicitation issue, suggests that engineering ethics prioritizes protecting the profession's collective reputation for objectivity over resolving disputes about competitive fairness, which are treated as more fact-sensitive and less categorically resolvable.

Did the four engineers who founded Firm B violate the Code of Ethics by seeking work from former clients of Engineer A?

Did the four engineers comprising Firm B act unethically in casting doubt on the ability of Engineer A to provide quality services?

Did Engineer A act unethically in casting doubt on the ability of Firm B to provide quality services?

Where exactly is the line between general familiarity with a former client and the kind of particular project knowledge that triggers a supplanting violation?

Does the simultaneous, coordinated resignation of four key employees to immediately form a competing firm raise ethical concerns about loyalty during employment independent of any later client solicitation?

What remedies or corrective obligations should apply to the four engineers for the specific projects where they had particular knowledge, as distinct from their generally permissible solicitation of former clients?

Should former clients bear any responsibility for relaying disparaging comments between the two firms, and did this disclosure itself create an incentive for mutual mudslinging?

How should the principle of Loyalty During Employment be balanced against Fair Competition in Client Solicitation when former employees leave to compete against their prior employer for the same clients?

Does the principle of Objectivity in Peer Criticism conflict with Fair Competition in Client Solicitation when disparaging remarks about a rival's competence are made in the context of competing for the same clients?

How should the profession balance an engineer's right to defend the reputation of their firm under Fair Competition in Client Solicitation against the duty of Objectivity in Peer Criticism when both sides claim their statements were merely factual defenses rather than malicious attacks?

From a deontological perspective, did the four engineers fulfill their duty to refrain from using confidential or particular client knowledge gained during employment with Engineer A when soliciting former clients?

Did the outcome of increased competition for clients justify the four engineers' broad solicitation of Engineer A's former client base, even though it caused professional and financial harm to Firm A?

Did the four engineers of Firm B act with professional integrity when they cast doubt on Engineer A's ability to provide quality services, given that such conduct could be seen as self-serving rather than an honest professional judgment?

Did the outcome of protecting Firm A's reputation and client relationships justify Engineer A's decision to cast doubt on Firm B's competence in response to Firm B's own disparaging remarks?

If none of the four engineers had been personally involved with the former clients' projects while employed by Engineer A, would the Board still have found a violation regarding the projects under discussion but not yet formally selected or negotiated?

If Engineer A had been the first to cast doubt on the competing firm's competence, before hearing that Firm B had disparaged him, would the Board still characterize his criticism as an ethical violation on the same grounds?

If the projects the four engineers pursued had already been formally awarded to Firm A rather than merely under discussion, would the Board still conclude that general solicitation of those clients was permissible?

If the four engineers had waited a substantial period after resigning before contacting Engineer A's former clients, rather than doing so promptly, would the Board still find their solicitation practices ethically comparable?

Because the simultaneous resignation carries no explicit normative violation yet directly triggers key personnel loss and the formation of a new competing firm, its significance lies in setting a causally loaded but ethically neutral starting point from which later obligations regarding fair competition become relevant.

Forming the new firm is guided by fair competition norms rather than judged as fulfilling or violating them, which matters because this founding act is what makes the subsequent client solicitation possible and thus frames whether that solicitation stays within ethical bounds.

Client solicitation is guided by fair competition and causally produces both the client retention outreach by Engineer A and the ethics protest filing, so its normative status as merely guided rather than violating suggests the solicitation itself was permissible even though it provoked a formal ethics complaint.

Engineer A's client retention outreach, guided by fair competition and caused by the prior solicitation, matters because it represents a responsive competitive act rather than a breach, showing that reacting to a competitor's client outreach does not itself violate professional norms.

The disparagement of a competitor is significant because it violates the duty not to injure another engineer's reputation and this violation directly causes the disparagement disclosure and the subsequent counter-disparagement, illustrating how one ethical breach cascades into further reputational conflict between the firms.

Because Engineer A's counter-disparagement arose directly as a retaliatory response to Firm B's disparagement disclosure, it violates the Section 12 duty not to injure another engineer's reputation, showing how the original firm split escalated into mutual reputational harm rather than being resolved through proper channels.

Since the ethics protest filing was caused by the client solicitation stemming from the engineers' departure and use of specialized knowledge, Engineer A's choice to fulfill the Section 12 duty to report unethical practice to a proper authority represents the legitimate alternative to the disparagement cycle, channeling the dispute toward institutional resolution instead of further personal attacks.

The question arises because the same set of actions, resigning and starting a competing firm, can be framed either as legitimate professional mobility and fair competition or as an unethical supplanting of a former employer's clients, and BER Case 76-5 and BER Case 62-10 show the standard depends on timing and conduct details not fully settled by the facts alone.

The question arose because the same act of casting doubt on a competitor's ability can be read either as honest professional judgment or as malicious competitive disparagement, and the mutual criticism between A and B makes it hard to isolate motive from merit.

The question arose because Engineer A's criticism of Firm B occurred in the context of Mutual Self-Interested Criticism Between A and B, making it unclear whether the criticism reflected objective professional assessment or self-interested competitive attack.

The question emerged because the engineers' simultaneous departure and new firm formation created a situation where their knowledge base was ambiguous in origin, forcing an interpretive gap between the Fair Solicitation Duty and the Supplanting Bar that prior BER cases (76-5, 62-10) addressed only partially without establishing a precise boundary.

The question arises because the facts show only internal coordination and departure without direct evidence of solicitation, leaving open whether loyalty obligations extend to pre-departure planning or only to overt competitive acts after separation.

The question arises because the Board of Ethical Review must distinguish a blanket permission (soliciting former clients) from a narrower duty (not exploiting specific privileged project knowledge), and the case facts do not clearly separate ordinary competitive advantage from advantage rooted in insider information.

The question arose because Disparagement Disclosure sits between two firms locked in mutual self-interested criticism, making it unclear whether the third-party relay of comments is ethically inert or itself a causal trigger for the disparagement violations under Section 12.

The question arises because the same set of facts, engineers with specialized client knowledge leaving en masse to compete, can be read either as legitimate fair competition or as disloyal exploitation of an employment relationship, and the Code does not specify a bright line between the two.

The question arose because Engineer A's critical remarks about Firm B occurred simultaneously with active client solicitation by both firms, making it unclear whether the statements should be judged as professional peer review or as competitive disparagement.

The question emerges because both Firm A and Engineer A/Firm B claim their critical statements were factual competitive responses rather than violations of Section 12, creating a direct clash between two codified principles that each side invokes to justify the same conduct.

The question arises because the boundary between prohibited use of confidential client knowledge and permissible use of general professional experience is factually ambiguous in this case, forcing a deontological test of whether the engineers' duty not to exploit privileged information was actually breached.

The question arose because the outcome (increased competition and harm to Firm A) can be justified or condemned depending on whether one privileges free market solicitation rights or the fiduciary-like obligations owed to a former employer, and the facts leave ambiguous whether the solicitation crossed from fair competition into improper supplanting.

The question arises because the same disclosed criticism serves both a professional evaluative function and a competitive self-interest function, and the mutual self-interested criticism between A and B makes it impossible to separate honest judgment from strategic advantage without further evidence.

The question arises because a mutual exchange of disparaging remarks blurs the line between legitimate reputational defense and prohibited malicious criticism, forcing the Board to weigh outcome-based justification against the professional obligation of objective, non-self-interested peer criticism.

The question arises because the Board's original finding conflated personal project involvement with the broader ethical bar on supplanting, and removing that personal involvement variable tests whether the violation rests on individual conduct or on the mere structural advantage of insider knowledge and departure timing.

The question arises because the Board's ethical characterization rested on the specific sequence of mutual disparagement, and reversing that sequence exposes whether the violation depends on motive (self-interest) or on the act of criticism itself.

The question arises because the Board's ruling hinged on a specific factual condition (projects still under discussion, not awarded) that functions as the rebuttal boundary separating permissible competition from prohibited supplanting, prompting scrutiny of whether the ruling would survive if that boundary condition were altered.

The question arises because the Board's finding hinges on the temporal proximity between resignation and solicitation as evidence of supplanting, so altering that timing variable tests whether the ethical judgment depends on timing itself or on the underlying use of client relationships regardless of when contact occurs.

Given that the four engineers broadly solicited former clients using only general familiarity, the board found this permissible competition, but because some held particular knowledge of specific pending projects from their prior employment, the board found a violation limited to those projects.

Given that Firm B's engineers cast doubt on Engineer A's competence while actively competing for his former clients, the board concluded this crossed from fair competition into unethical disparagement lacking objectivity.

Given that Engineer A responded in kind by casting doubt on Firm B's competence within the same competitive dynamic, the board concluded that reciprocity did not justify the breach of objectivity, mirroring its finding against Firm B.

Given that the board's distinction in Conclusion_1 rested on an undefined factual line, this conclusion proposes that the line should instead be drawn at whether the engineer's knowledge exceeded what any competent competitor could learn through ordinary means, thereby refining an otherwise vague standard.

Given that the Board condemned the particular-knowledge solicitation without prescribing a remedy, this conclusion infers that disclosure to affected clients and possible recusal would be the minimal corrective step, leaving open whether harsher remedies like disgorgement apply in more severe cases.

Given that Firm B's remarks came first and unprompted, while Engineer A's came only after learning of them secondhand, the Board still found both to violate objectivity, but the underlying facts suggest the initiating conduct is more blameworthy even though the Board did not formally rank the violations.

Because some engineers merely knew a company was a potential client through general professional awareness, while others were personally involved in specific project negotiations during their employment, the Board's supplanting bar applies only to the latter, privileged-access scenario.

Given that the four engineers waited until after resignation to contact clients, the Board's silence on internal pre-departure planning suggests it treated simultaneous resignation as ethically neutral, though this leaves the preparatory-loyalty question unresolved.

Because the Board's earlier finding permitted broad solicitation but flagged only certain projects as tainted by particular knowledge, the appropriate remedy logically extends only to those specific engagements, such as recusal or disclosure, not a general non-solicitation restriction.

Given that the four engineers' solicitation occurred after their employment ended and was based on general professional standing rather than confidential specifics, the Board concluded fair competition governs post-employment conduct, while loyalty strictly bounds the employment period itself.

Given that both firms were vying for the same clients and each made disparaging statements about the other's competence, the Board concluded that framing this as mere aggressive marketing could not excuse the conduct, because the peer criticism standard applies independently of the competitive context in which the remarks were made.

Because the four engineers had particular knowledge of certain projects from their employment with Engineer A, the Board applied a duty-based rule barring exploitation of that knowledge regardless of the beneficial competitive outcome, while leaving their general solicitation of former clients unrestricted.

Because the four engineers cast doubt on Engineer A's capabilities precisely while soliciting his former clients, the Board treated this simultaneity as inherently self-serving, concluding that the conflict of interest itself established the violation without needing to assess the truth of the underlying criticism.

Although Engineer A's counter-disparagement was arguably provoked and aimed at protecting his firm's reputation, the Board concluded that this defensive motive and protective outcome could not excuse casting unsubstantiated doubt on Firm B, applying the objectivity duty symmetrically regardless of who acted first.

If none of the four engineers had personal involvement with the former clients' specific projects, the Board reasoned that the uncommitted status of those projects alone would not have been sufficient to establish a violation, since the earlier finding depended on the combination of insider knowledge with that status rather than the status by itself.

Because Conclusion 3 was grounded in the objective content and effect of Engineer A's statements rather than in who provoked whom, the Board reasoned that reversing the sequence of events would not change the underlying violation, since the same disparaging content would still injure a competitor's reputation.

Given that the actual projects were still under discussion and not yet contracted, the Board found general solicitation permissible, but it signaled that formal award to Firm A would have shifted the analysis toward a clear supplanting violation rather than permissible competition.

Because some client relationships were general while specific project knowledge existed for particular engagements, the Board resolved the loyalty versus competition tension by permitting general solicitation but treating knowledge-based solicitation as an encumbered exception.

Because both firms disparaged each other while claiming competitive necessity or factual justification, the Board concluded that Fair Competition never licenses abandoning Objectivity in Peer Criticism, resulting in mutual findings of violation.

Because the Board found mutual, unconditional violations on criticism but only a partial, fact-contingent violation on solicitation, it concluded that the profession prioritizes protecting collective reputation for objectivity as an near-absolute rule, while treating competitive fairness as a more negotiable, context-dependent matter.

Should the four engineers solicit all of Engineer A's former clients on the same basis, or distinguish and disclose/recuse for clients where they held particular project knowledge gained during their employment?

Should Firm B's engineers cast doubt on Engineer A's ability to provide quality services when competing for the same clients?

Should Engineer A respond to Firm B's disparagement by filing a formal ethics complaint, or by publicly disparaging Firm B's competence in turn?

Should the four engineers have refrained from any coordinated planning or preparatory activity for the competing firm until after their employment with Engineer A ended?