Step 4: Review

Act for each employer or client as faithful agents or trustees.

Conduct themselves honorably, responsibly, ethically, and lawfully so as to enhance the honor, reputation, and usefulness of the profession.

Engineers shall not aid or abet the unlawful practice of engineering by a person or firm.

Engineers having knowledge of any alleged violation of this Code shall report thereon to appropriate professional bodies and, when relevant, also to public authorities, and cooperate with the proper authorities in furnishing such information or assistance as may be required.

Engineers shall not attempt to obtain employment or advancement or professional engagements by untruthfully criticizing other engineers, or by other improper or questionable methods.

Engineers shall not attempt to injure, maliciously or falsely, directly or indirectly, the professional reputation, prospects, practice, or employment of other engineers. Engineers who believe others are guilty of unethical or illegal practice shall present such information to the proper authority for action.

Engineers shall conform with state registration laws in the practice of engineering.

Cited to establish that despite antitrust-driven removal of Code provisions on competitive bidding and related practices, procurement laws requiring QBS processes remain fully enforceable and engineers must comply with them.

Cited as background to BER Case 08-8, referencing the Supreme Court ruling that led to removal of anti-competitive Code provisions while preserving procurement laws.

Cited to show that engineers may ethically challenge or protest procurement/selection practices that could compromise public interest, such as an unsafe low-cost bid.

Cited as a recent example demonstrating that careful compliance with licensure law is expected, and that engineers must report unlicensed practice of engineering when discovered.

Cited to illustrate that engineers must consider the spirit, not just the letter, of the ethics code even absent explicit contractual prohibitions (e.g., revolving door provisions).

Quoted within the discussion of BER Case 23-3 to emphasize that engineers must uphold the 'purity of the enterprise' and avoid 'dishonor to the profession,' considering both letter and spirit of the ethics code.

Cited as a third example regarding compliance with licensure law, addressing when self-presentation as a non-engineer expert becomes unethical if licensure-related credentials are invoked.

It was not only ethical for Engineer B to complain to Engineer A, it was ethically required that Engineer B report his belief that statutory obligations were not being followed.

It was ethical for Engineer A to investigate City D’s contracting practices, both as a part of A’s own familiarization process and to follow up on Engineer B’s complaints.

Since the City D Engineer indicated they have no plans to change the contract arrangement with Firm Z, Engineer A is obligated to take appropriate action.

The Board's finding that Engineer B was ethically required to report under Code II.1.f is not undermined by the fact that Engineer B, as a competing firm owner, stood to benefit professionally from increased competitive bidding. The Code's reporting duty is triggered by knowledge of an alleged violation, not by the reporter's motive; a self-interested reporter can still fulfill a genuine ethical obligation, provided the underlying allegation is factually grounded, which Engineer A's subsequent investigation confirmed it was.

Engineer A's willingness to investigate and disclose findings that implicated a direct supervisor, City D's Engineer, demonstrates that faithful agency under I.4 is bounded by lawful and ethical conduct; faithful agency cannot be invoked to justify concealing or excusing a supervisor's noncompliance with registration and procurement law. The Board's endorsement of Engineer A's investigation implicitly resolves the tension between hierarchical deference and compliance duties in favor of compliance.

The Board's conclusion that Engineer A must take further appropriate action once City D's Engineer refused corrective measures implies a graduated escalation duty: Engineer A should first exhaust internal remedies (e.g., engaging the City Attorney or City Manager as stakeholders) before considering external reporting to the State Licensure Board. The Board's language of 'appropriate action' suggests proportionality rather than an automatic mandate to report externally.

Because the noncompliance in this case is limited to two contracts with Firm Z that exceeded the Council-authorization threshold, and does not extend to Firm X's compliant arrangement, Engineer A's corrective obligations are properly scoped to the Firm Z contracts alone. This distinction matters for determining the proportional severity of any escalation or reporting action Engineer A ultimately takes.

Engineer A's duty to report is not exhausted by raising the matter internally with City D's Engineer. Under II.1.f, Engineer A has an independent obligation to report the alleged Code and registration law violation to the appropriate authority, which here includes the State Licensure Board, once internal correction was refused. This obligation exists separately from, and continues beyond, the internal escalation to City D's Engineer.

The supervisory relationship between Engineer A and City D's Engineer does create a structural power imbalance, but the Code does not permit this imbalance to excuse inaction. Because faithful agency (I.4) is bounded by lawful conduct requirements (I.6, III.8.a), Engineer A's ethical obligation to pursue further corrective action or escalate the matter persists despite the risk of friction with a superior.

Firm Z's engineers bear their own registration law compliance duty under III.8.a and cannot be entirely absolved simply because City D initiated the noncompliant awards. If Firm Z's engineers knew or should have known the two most recent contracts bypassed the required RFQ process, their acceptance of that work without objection raises a secondary, though less culpable, ethical question distinct from City D Engineer's primary responsibility.

The principle of Loyalty as Faithful Agent to City D cannot be read to require concealment of unlawful procurement practices. Where City D's Engineer refuses corrective action, faithful agency must be understood as loyalty to the lawful mission and public interest of the employer, not personal deference to a supervisor's preferences, meaning Registration Law Compliance and QBS Compliance take precedence over supervisory comfort.

City D Engineer's justification of 'convenience and longstanding relationship' represents an informal loyalty to a favored contractor that directly conflicts with Integrity in Procurement Conduct and QBS Compliance. The Board's implicit rejection of this justification establishes that administrative convenience is never a valid substitute for compliance with codified procurement law.

From a deontological standpoint, Engineer A fulfilled rather than violated the duty of faithful agency by investigating and reporting the noncompliance. Faithful agency under I.4 is conditioned on lawful conduct; an agent who conceals known illegality to preserve workplace harmony fails the duty rather than fulfilling it. Engineer A's actions therefore represent the correct discharge of a faithful agent's obligations.

The disruption to City D's longstanding vendor relationships is ethically justified by the outcome of Engineer A's investigation. Seven years of exclusive contracting, part of which was unlawful, represents a sustained deprivation of competitive opportunity to qualified firms and a violation of codified QBS law; exposing this outweighs the administrative convenience the City Engineer sought to preserve.

Engineer B's status as a competing firm owner does not undermine the ethicality of the report. The Code's reporting obligation under II.1.f is duty-based rather than motive-based; even if Engineer B stood to gain from increased competitive bidding, this self-interest does not disqualify the legitimacy or necessity of reporting suspected procurement violations.

If the two most recent Firm Z contracts had fallen below the dollar threshold requiring Council authorization and an RFQ process, no procurement law violation would have occurred, and the Board's conclusion that Engineer A is obligated to take further action would likely not apply, since the ethical breach in this case is specifically tied to threshold-triggered legal requirements being bypassed.

Absent strong QBS procurement laws codified in state licensure statutes, City D Engineer's exclusive reliance on Firm Z might be characterized merely as questionable administrative judgment rather than an ethical or legal violation, since the Board's characterization of noncompliance hinges specifically on the breach of codified registration and procurement law rather than on favoritism alone.

The case demonstrates that 'faithful agency' is not owed unconditionally to an immediate supervisor or employer's convenience, but ultimately to lawful, publicly-accountable processes. Engineer A's loyalty to City D's Engineer as a direct supervisor was subordinated to the higher-order obligations of Registration Law Compliance and QBS Compliance once the City Engineer acknowledged noncompliance but refused correction. This suggests a layered model of faithful agency: engineers owe their most fundamental loyalty to lawful process and the public interest embedded in procurement statutes, with organizational deference operating only within the bounds of legal compliance.

The City Engineer's invocation of 'convenience and longstanding relationship' as justification for bypassing RFQ requirements reveals a direct clash between Integrity in Procurement Conduct and an informal, relationship-based loyalty to a favored contractor. The Board's implicit rejection of this justification -- by finding Engineer A obligated to take further action -- establishes that administrative convenience and vendor familiarity cannot override codified procurement law, even when the noncompliance is acknowledged rather than concealed. This indicates that Integrity in Procurement Conduct is treated as a near-absolute constraint rather than one to be balanced against organizational efficiency.

Engineer B's duty to report suspected violations (II.1.f) was treated by the Board as independent of Engineer B's competitive self-interest as a rival firm owner, showing that the Code's reporting obligation operates on a deontological basis rather than being contingent on the reporter's motives or potential to benefit. This resolves a potential tension between self-interested motive and duty-based reporting obligation in favor of the latter: the validity of a Code-based duty to report is not diminished by the reporter's simultaneous financial interest in the outcome.

Was it ethical for Engineer B to complain to Engineer A?

Were Engineer A’s actions in investigating City D’s contracting practices ethical?

Because City D’s Engineer refuses to change the contract arrangement with Firm Z, what steps must Engineer A take?

Does Engineer A have an independent duty to report the procurement law violations to the State Licensure Board, separate from raising the issue internally with City D's Engineer?

Because City D's Engineer is Engineer A's direct supervisor, does this reporting relationship create a power imbalance that could deter Engineer A from pursuing further corrective action or escalation?

Did Firm Z's engineers have their own ethical obligation under registration and Code provisions to question or decline contracts awarded to them outside the required RFQ process, even though City D initiated the noncompliance?

Should City D's City Attorney or City Manager have been engaged earlier as stakeholders once Engineer A confirmed noncompliance, rather than relying solely on the City Engineer's discretion?

How should Engineer A balance loyalty as a faithful agent to City D (and by extension to City D's Engineer as supervisor) against the duty to ensure QBS and registration law compliance when the City Engineer refuses corrective action?

Does the City Engineer's justification of 'convenience and longstanding relationship' with Firm Z represent a conflict between Integrity in Procurement Conduct and an informal loyalty to a favored contractor that undermines QBS Compliance?

When Engineer A's duty of Registration Law Compliance in City D Procurement conflicts with the City Engineer's authority and expectation of deference, which principle should take precedence, and what does this imply about the limits of faithful agency?

From a deontological perspective, did Engineer A fulfill the duty of a faithful agent to City D by investigating and reporting the Firm Z contracting noncompliance rather than remaining silent to preserve workplace harmony?

Did the outcome of Engineer A's investigation -- exposing seven years of exclusive, partly noncompliant contracting with Firm X and Firm Z -- justify the disruption to City D's longstanding vendor relationships and administrative convenience?

Did Engineer A act with professional integrity by pursuing a thorough compliance investigation shortly after joining City D, despite having no prior history with Engineer B and facing potential friction with a superior, City D's Engineer, over the findings?

From a deontological perspective, was Engineer B obligated under the Code to report suspected procurement violations to Engineer A even though Engineer B, as a competing firm owner, stood to gain professionally from increased competitive bidding opportunities?

If the two most recent Firm Z contracts had fallen below the dollar threshold requiring Council authorization and an RFQ process (rather than exceeding it), would the Board still have concluded that Engineer A is obligated to take further appropriate action against City D Engineer's noncompliance?

If City D's Engineer had agreed to correct the Firm Z contracting arrangement instead of refusing corrective action, would Engineer A still be obligated to consider reporting the matter to the state licensure board?

If Firm X's ongoing work for City D had exceeded the original scope of its RFQ-awarded contract (rather than remaining aligned with it), would the Board still have treated the Firm X arrangement as compliant and outside the scope of Engineer A's corrective obligations?

If City D's jurisdiction lacked strong QBS procurement laws codified in state licensure statutes, would the Board still characterize City D Engineer's exclusive reliance on Firm Z as an ethical violation rather than a permissible administrative choice?

By awarding contracts through a qualifications-based process, A1 fulfills the registration-law conformance obligation and stands as the compliant baseline against which the downstream harms of the non-compliant award (procurement violation, competitive exclusion) are measured.

A2 reinforces the same fair, qualifications-based standard as A1, showing that lawful procurement practice is achievable and making City D's later deviation into non-compliance clearly a matter of choice rather than necessity.

A3 violates the registration-law conformance obligation and is the causal root of both the procurement law violation and the competitive exclusion of qualified firms, so its wrongfulness lies precisely in setting off the chain that ultimately required reporting and investigation.

A4 fulfills the duty to report code violations and is the direct response to the competitive exclusion caused by A3, converting a private harm into a matter subject to institutional review through the ensuing compliance investigation.

A5 fulfills the faithful-agent and anti-aiding-unlawful-practice obligations by turning the report into concrete violation discovery and findings, and although this leads to City D's refusal of corrective action, the investigation itself upholds professional integrity by exposing the persistent noncompliance.

Because Engineer A's compliance investigation uncovered a genuine procurement violation, reporting those findings fulfills the duties to act as a faithful trustee, to avoid aiding unlawful engineering practice, and to report code violations, and this disclosure is precisely what triggers City D's Engineer to face a decision on corrective action.

By rejecting the corrective action that Findings Reporting called for, City D's Engineer violates the duty to conform with state registration laws, and this refusal directly causes the noncompliance to persist, showing how failing to act on a properly reported violation perpetuates the very harm the reporting obligation was meant to prevent.

The question arose because Engineer B's obligation to report a perceived Code violation collided with the practical reality that the only accessible recipient of that report, Engineer A, was himself bound by loyalty obligations to the very city engineer whose conduct was being challenged.

The question arose because Engineer A's fact gathering into City D's RFQ noncompliance sits at the intersection of subordinate loyalty and professional obligation to prevent unlawful practice, making the propriety of his investigative actions contestable.

The question arises because the responsible authority acknowledged noncompliance but refused corrective action, leaving Engineer A's faithful agent obligation unable to resolve the situation and forcing him to weigh further steps including possible external reporting.

The question arises because Engineer A already raised the issue internally per his Appropriate Action Duty, yet the City Engineer's Acknowledged Noncompliance without remedy leaves open whether faithful agency obligations are satisfied or whether a distinct, non-derivative duty to protect public welfare via licensure board reporting still applies.

The question arises because Engineer A possesses knowledge of an acknowledged, unremedied procurement violation but sits in a subordinate reporting relationship to the very official responsible for it, creating structural tension between institutional loyalty and professional obligation to act.

The question arises because the noncompliant contract awards create a factual situation where a third-party firm benefited from another party's procedural violation, forcing an assessment of whether passive recipients of unlawfully awarded work share ethical culpability under the Code's registration law provisions.

The question arises because Engineer A faced a structural ambiguity in the chain of accountability once he acknowledged the noncompliance persisted, since the Code obligates him to act as a faithful agent but does not clearly specify whether that agency runs to the City Engineer alone or to the City government as an institution with other stakeholders like the City Attorney and City Manager.

The question arises because Engineer A has direct knowledge of an unresolved procurement law violation from a superior who refuses to act, forcing a choice between hierarchical loyalty and independent professional and legal obligations that the Code does not clearly rank.

The question arises because the City Engineer openly cited convenience and relationship history to justify contracts that Engineer A and others recognize as inconsistent with QBS and registration law, creating an unresolved conflict between personal loyalty based justification and formal procurement integrity obligations.

The question arises because the same set of facts, an acknowledged and repeated procurement law violation ordered by a superior, activates two obligations that normally coexist peacefully (obedience to authority and legal compliance) but here directly conflict, forcing a ranking of principles.

The question arises because Engineer A's investigation and reporting directly confronted his supervisor's established practice, forcing a choice between organizational loyalty and the deontological duty to act as a faithful agent by disclosing known noncompliance.

This question arises because Engineer A's investigation produced a factually significant finding of long-term noncompliance, but the practical costs of correcting seven years of entrenched practice create genuine uncertainty about whether procedural integrity alone justifies the resulting institutional disruption.

The question arises because Engineer A's short tenure and lack of prior relationship with Engineer B create ambiguity about whether his thorough investigation reflects proper professional duty or premature interference with his superior's authority.

The question arises because deontological reporting duties are typically framed as motive independent, yet the entities show Engineer B's competitive position creates an apparent conflict of interest that observers might use to question whether the obligation truly applied in this case.

This question arose because the Board's original conclusion that Engineer A must act rested on facts involving contracts that exceeded a legal threshold, leaving ambiguous whether the obligation was grounded in that specific legal trigger or in a threshold-independent ethical principle of integrity and fair dealing.

The question arises because Toulmin's warrant linking the data (violation and corrective refusal) to the conclusion (reporting duty) is unstable under a changed antecedent condition, exposing whether the reporting obligation depends on the persistence of noncompliance or on the mere occurrence of a past violation.

The question arises because the Board's determination of Firm X's compliance rests on a specific factual premise (alignment with original RFQ scope) that, if altered, would test whether Engineer A's obligations are principle-based (applying uniformly to any procurement violation) or fact-contingent (only triggered by the specific noncompliance found in Firm Z's case).

The question arises because the same underlying fact, an engineer awarding contracts to one firm without competition, can be evaluated either as a technical legal breach contingent on local statute or as an inherent ethical breach of fairness and QBS principles, and the absence of codified law removes the clearest evidentiary anchor for judgment.

Given that Engineer B held a good faith belief that City D's contracting with Firm Z violated statutory and Code obligations, the Board concluded reporting to Engineer A was not merely permissible but ethically mandatory under II.1.f, independent of any benefit B might realize as a competitor.

Because Engineer A was new to City D and had received a specific complaint from Engineer B, the Board concluded that investigating the contracting practices was a proper exercise of diligence and faithful agency rather than disloyalty or overreach.

Given that City D's Engineer both acknowledged the noncompliant Firm Z arrangement and refused to change it, the Board concluded Engineer A must take further appropriate action, since faithful agency cannot justify tolerating an admitted, uncorrected legal violation.

Because Engineer A's investigation independently substantiated the Firm Z noncompliance that Engineer B had reported, the Board concluded that B's competitive motive did not undermine the genuineness of the reporting obligation under II.1.f.

Given that Engineer A was willing to investigate and disclose findings that implicated his own supervisor despite the evident power imbalance, the Board concluded faithful agency under I.4 is bounded by legal compliance, resolving the deference-versus-duty tension in favor of continued corrective action.

Given that City D's Engineer refused corrective action but internal stakeholders like the City Attorney and City Manager had not yet been consulted, the board concluded that Engineer A's 'appropriate action' duty calls for exhausting those internal avenues before considering escalation to the State Licensure Board.

Because only Firm Z's two contracts breached the authorization threshold while Firm X's arrangement stayed within its RFQ-awarded scope, the board concluded that Engineer A's corrective duty is properly confined to the Firm Z contracts alone.

Given that City D's Engineer refused corrective action after Engineer A raised the issue internally, the board concluded that II.1.f imposes a separate, unexhausted duty to report the violation to the State Licensure Board.

Because City D's Engineer, despite being Engineer A's supervisor, refused to correct a known registration law violation, the board concluded that the power imbalance inherent in the reporting relationship does not excuse Engineer A from pursuing further corrective action.

Because City D initiated the noncompliant contract awards but Firm Z's engineers accepted the work without objection, the board concluded that Firm Z bears a secondary, knowledge-dependent ethical obligation under III.8.a distinct from City D Engineer's primary responsibility.

Given that City D's Engineer refused corrective action on a confirmed registration law violation, the Board concluded that faithful agency could not require Engineer A to conceal it, because loyalty is owed to the lawful mission of the employer rather than to a supervisor's personal preference.

Because City D's Engineer relied solely on convenience and relationship history rather than any lawful procurement exception, the Board concluded this reasoning could never substitute for QBS and registration law compliance.

Since Engineer A investigated and disclosed confirmed noncompliance rather than concealing it to preserve workplace harmony, the Board concluded this was the correct discharge of faithful agency rather than a violation of it.

Because part of the seven-year exclusive relationship was confirmed to violate codified QBS law and deprived qualified firms of competitive opportunity, the Board concluded that exposing it justified the resulting disruption to City D's vendor relationships.

Although Engineer B stood to gain professionally as a competing firm owner, the Board concluded this self-interest did not disqualify the report because II.1.f imposes a duty to report known violations independent of the reporter's motives.

Given that the two most recent Firm Z contracts exceeded the RFQ threshold, the board found an actual legal violation and hence a duty for Engineer A to act; the board explicitly notes that absent threshold exceedance, this obligation would likely disappear.

Because City D operates under codified QBS procurement statutes, the board treated exclusive reliance on Firm Z as an ethical and legal violation rather than as a defensible administrative choice, and it explicitly signals this characterization would soften without that codification.

Given that the City Engineer admitted the noncompliance but refused to fix it, the board concluded that Engineer A's duty of faithful agency runs ultimately to lawful, publicly-accountable process rather than to the supervisor personally, making deference conditional on legal compliance.

Because the City Engineer's justification rested on convenience and relationship rather than any legal exception, the board treated the codified procurement requirement as a near-absolute constraint that administrative efficiency arguments cannot defeat.

Given that Engineer B had a plausible basis to suspect procurement violations, the board treated the II.1.f reporting duty as operative on its own terms, concluding that Engineer B's status as a competing firm owner did not diminish or disqualify the obligation to report.

Should Engineer B report the suspected Firm Z/Firm X procurement violations to Engineer A, or refrain from reporting given his competing commercial interest?

Should Engineer A conduct a thorough compliance investigation into City D's contracting practices, or defer to the City Engineer's existing arrangements without inquiry?

Should Engineer A escalate internally to the City Attorney and City Manager and consider reporting to the State Licensure Board, or accept the City Engineer's refusal and take no further action?

Should Firm Z's engineers have questioned or declined the two contracts awarded outside the RFQ process, or accepted the contracts as offered by City D's Engineer?

Should City D's Engineer conduct an RFQ process and obtain Council authorization for the Firm Z contracts exceeding the threshold, or continue awarding them based on convenience and longstanding relationship?